Investing in Non Performing Loans (NPNs)

[CA renter]

[quote=pri_dk][quote=justdoitstewart]I’m not following you here, who’s peddling anything?[/quote]

There is another thread with a similar theme (GSE) bonds. I agree that there is some good information in both threads. But both threads also have someone who is dropping hints, fishing for a PM.

The pattern is always the same: “Well, now that you mention it, I’ve been getting great returns for a while doing XYZ, and I just happen to be starting a fund, but it’s for only for a select few, …”

If one thinks they are going to pick up some easy, lucrative deal offered by someone that happened along this site, then they are just counting on random luck. And that is never a good investment strategy.[/quote]

If that’s regarding my first response, I can assure you that I’m not selling anything and have nothing to gain if someone wants to invest in the notes I’ve mentioned. The thread is specifically asking about buying non-performing notes, and I responded based on some research I’ve done regarding the same kind of investments. I’m looking into it myself as an investor, not as a salesperson.

[Anonymous]

CAr – I didn’t mean you and my apologies if it came off that way.

I was referring to the poster who has been a Pigg member for less than a week.

[Anonymous]

CAr – I didn’t mean you and my apologies if it came off that way.

I was referring to the poster who has been a Pigg member for less than a week.

[Anonymous]

CAr – I didn’t mean you and my apologies if it came off that way.

I was referring to the poster who has been a Pigg member for less than a week.

[Anonymous]

CAr – I didn’t mean you and my apologies if it came off that way.

I was referring to the poster who has been a Pigg member for less than a week.

[Anonymous]

CAr – I didn’t mean you and my apologies if it came off that way.

I was referring to the poster who has been a Pigg member for less than a week.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Clearfund: The discussion didn’t veer off into philosophy at all.

I directly challenged your assertions regarding “conservative underwriting” and what appeared to be an over-reliance on cash flow. Another poster also pointed out an issue with the 12% return being touted (which is reasonable).

I offered a CRE real world scenario involving Class A commercial in downtown San Francisco, to which there was no response. The discussion was anything but philosophical, in that it involved an actual scenario postulating a credible “meltdown” scenario. In my opinion, downtown San Francisco offers an excellent environment for discussion, given that nearly 75% of the buildings in downtown, including FiDi, Embarcadero and NoMa have changed hands in the last five to seven years.

If you feel that discussing a real world scenario is too esoteric, or that the downtown San Francisco market is neither emblematic nor symptomatic of the CRE Class A marketplace at large, I’d be happy to talk about Manhattan, Boston or Chicago instead.

I have a lot of former colleagues in CRE, banking/finance, insurance/surety and law and nearly all of them work in major metro areas. Companies like Heller and Thelen offer excellent cautionary lessons and directly challenge the underpinnings of your “conservative investment” offering a premium 12% return and robust cash flow.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Clearfund: The discussion didn’t veer off into philosophy at all.

I directly challenged your assertions regarding “conservative underwriting” and what appeared to be an over-reliance on cash flow. Another poster also pointed out an issue with the 12% return being touted (which is reasonable).

I offered a CRE real world scenario involving Class A commercial in downtown San Francisco, to which there was no response. The discussion was anything but philosophical, in that it involved an actual scenario postulating a credible “meltdown” scenario. In my opinion, downtown San Francisco offers an excellent environment for discussion, given that nearly 75% of the buildings in downtown, including FiDi, Embarcadero and NoMa have changed hands in the last five to seven years.

If you feel that discussing a real world scenario is too esoteric, or that the downtown San Francisco market is neither emblematic nor symptomatic of the CRE Class A marketplace at large, I’d be happy to talk about Manhattan, Boston or Chicago instead.

I have a lot of former colleagues in CRE, banking/finance, insurance/surety and law and nearly all of them work in major metro areas. Companies like Heller and Thelen offer excellent cautionary lessons and directly challenge the underpinnings of your “conservative investment” offering a premium 12% return and robust cash flow.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Clearfund: The discussion didn’t veer off into philosophy at all.

I directly challenged your assertions regarding “conservative underwriting” and what appeared to be an over-reliance on cash flow. Another poster also pointed out an issue with the 12% return being touted (which is reasonable).

I offered a CRE real world scenario involving Class A commercial in downtown San Francisco, to which there was no response. The discussion was anything but philosophical, in that it involved an actual scenario postulating a credible “meltdown” scenario. In my opinion, downtown San Francisco offers an excellent environment for discussion, given that nearly 75% of the buildings in downtown, including FiDi, Embarcadero and NoMa have changed hands in the last five to seven years.

If you feel that discussing a real world scenario is too esoteric, or that the downtown San Francisco market is neither emblematic nor symptomatic of the CRE Class A marketplace at large, I’d be happy to talk about Manhattan, Boston or Chicago instead.

I have a lot of former colleagues in CRE, banking/finance, insurance/surety and law and nearly all of them work in major metro areas. Companies like Heller and Thelen offer excellent cautionary lessons and directly challenge the underpinnings of your “conservative investment” offering a premium 12% return and robust cash flow.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Clearfund: The discussion didn’t veer off into philosophy at all.

I directly challenged your assertions regarding “conservative underwriting” and what appeared to be an over-reliance on cash flow. Another poster also pointed out an issue with the 12% return being touted (which is reasonable).

I offered a CRE real world scenario involving Class A commercial in downtown San Francisco, to which there was no response. The discussion was anything but philosophical, in that it involved an actual scenario postulating a credible “meltdown” scenario. In my opinion, downtown San Francisco offers an excellent environment for discussion, given that nearly 75% of the buildings in downtown, including FiDi, Embarcadero and NoMa have changed hands in the last five to seven years.

If you feel that discussing a real world scenario is too esoteric, or that the downtown San Francisco market is neither emblematic nor symptomatic of the CRE Class A marketplace at large, I’d be happy to talk about Manhattan, Boston or Chicago instead.

I have a lot of former colleagues in CRE, banking/finance, insurance/surety and law and nearly all of them work in major metro areas. Companies like Heller and Thelen offer excellent cautionary lessons and directly challenge the underpinnings of your “conservative investment” offering a premium 12% return and robust cash flow.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Clearfund: The discussion didn’t veer off into philosophy at all.

I directly challenged your assertions regarding “conservative underwriting” and what appeared to be an over-reliance on cash flow. Another poster also pointed out an issue with the 12% return being touted (which is reasonable).

I offered a CRE real world scenario involving Class A commercial in downtown San Francisco, to which there was no response. The discussion was anything but philosophical, in that it involved an actual scenario postulating a credible “meltdown” scenario. In my opinion, downtown San Francisco offers an excellent environment for discussion, given that nearly 75% of the buildings in downtown, including FiDi, Embarcadero and NoMa have changed hands in the last five to seven years.

If you feel that discussing a real world scenario is too esoteric, or that the downtown San Francisco market is neither emblematic nor symptomatic of the CRE Class A marketplace at large, I’d be happy to talk about Manhattan, Boston or Chicago instead.

I have a lot of former colleagues in CRE, banking/finance, insurance/surety and law and nearly all of them work in major metro areas. Companies like Heller and Thelen offer excellent cautionary lessons and directly challenge the underpinnings of your “conservative investment” offering a premium 12% return and robust cash flow.

[clearfund]

Allan – I think the SF is a good example of why anyone who buys that type of asset now has a higher chance of succeeding that did those that bought at historical record high values (and record low yields).

I would rather look at that type of bldg where the tenants have blown out, underwrite the new rent/downtime/ti/lc at levels meaningfully below ‘current’ market rents.

To your balance sheet focus, I am sure we’d all be happier with the identical asset as a significantly lower cost basis for all of the obvious reasons.

Is now the right time to buy that bldg given the others that may tumble behind it given the high level of over-leveraged, highly optimistic underwritten bldgs that you correctly state? I Don’t purport to know when to call a bottom. However, what I do know is the case for long term fundamentals (read: 10+ years of projected ownership). If you can achieve a low basis and capture a strong all cash yield (at some point in the next several years) in a top shelf SF bldg I think we’d sleep well at night and ultimately cash in at some point in the future.

12% offering: To be clear, I make no offer (or hint at one) of a 12%+ investment. My prior statement re: 12% was that I use that number as minimum all cash yield I would require upon achieving stabilization on the property when preparing the underwriting models. I feel that we can buy cash flow today for approaching 10%, however, I would expect any leased deal to go ‘backwards’ on income for a while due to rent reductions, etc to maintain tenants (lower rent is better than a vacancy). thus 12% is just a personal min yield requirement used in crafting my value/offer to submit to the lender to acquire the note.

Lastly re: “conservative assumptions” I do agree with you that the phrase can/has been used as ‘cover’ and BS many times over. However, it is just as likely that someone who uses that phrase is actually using conservative assumptions. Thus, to disparage someone due to a very subjective term is not appropriate without previously drilling down into their definition/idea of ‘conservative assumptions’.

The market has told me that my assumptions are hyper conservative due to the response I receive from lenders to my offers. My offers come with an explanation of how I derived my offer value (rents, vacancy factor, expenses, discount rate, etc) and they never have an issue with any of those items, just my price (which is a derived from the agreed upon assumptions).

As a further example of someone using the term “conservative basis” you might want to read the 3rd paragraph on page 2 of this link:
http://www.ticonline.com/buffett.partner.letters/1959.02.11.pdf

“…it has an intrinsic value of $125/share computed on a conservative basis…”
Warren Buffett, 1959 Partnership Letter

Not attempting to compare myself to ‘the man’ but it is possible, and probable, for someone to accurately, and ethically, underwrite deals in a conservative manner.

Moral of the story, not every property is worth buying, not every deal is truly a deal, but there are deals to be had if you are diligent and look hard. Don’t try to flip but rather underwrite for the long run, be as conservative as you can (even though my conservative assumption may not be your conservative assumption), and do your personal due diligence.

Happy New Year

ps: I was commercial real estate/REIT analyst for a top 2 wall street investment bank for many years so I too have seen the good/bad/ugly/losers/winners in Billions of real estate deals.

[clearfund]

Allan – I think the SF is a good example of why anyone who buys that type of asset now has a higher chance of succeeding that did those that bought at historical record high values (and record low yields).

I would rather look at that type of bldg where the tenants have blown out, underwrite the new rent/downtime/ti/lc at levels meaningfully below ‘current’ market rents.

To your balance sheet focus, I am sure we’d all be happier with the identical asset as a significantly lower cost basis for all of the obvious reasons.

Is now the right time to buy that bldg given the others that may tumble behind it given the high level of over-leveraged, highly optimistic underwritten bldgs that you correctly state? I Don’t purport to know when to call a bottom. However, what I do know is the case for long term fundamentals (read: 10+ years of projected ownership). If you can achieve a low basis and capture a strong all cash yield (at some point in the next several years) in a top shelf SF bldg I think we’d sleep well at night and ultimately cash in at some point in the future.

12% offering: To be clear, I make no offer (or hint at one) of a 12%+ investment. My prior statement re: 12% was that I use that number as minimum all cash yield I would require upon achieving stabilization on the property when preparing the underwriting models. I feel that we can buy cash flow today for approaching 10%, however, I would expect any leased deal to go ‘backwards’ on income for a while due to rent reductions, etc to maintain tenants (lower rent is better than a vacancy). thus 12% is just a personal min yield requirement used in crafting my value/offer to submit to the lender to acquire the note.

Lastly re: “conservative assumptions” I do agree with you that the phrase can/has been used as ‘cover’ and BS many times over. However, it is just as likely that someone who uses that phrase is actually using conservative assumptions. Thus, to disparage someone due to a very subjective term is not appropriate without previously drilling down into their definition/idea of ‘conservative assumptions’.

The market has told me that my assumptions are hyper conservative due to the response I receive from lenders to my offers. My offers come with an explanation of how I derived my offer value (rents, vacancy factor, expenses, discount rate, etc) and they never have an issue with any of those items, just my price (which is a derived from the agreed upon assumptions).

As a further example of someone using the term “conservative basis” you might want to read the 3rd paragraph on page 2 of this link:
http://www.ticonline.com/buffett.partner.letters/1959.02.11.pdf

“…it has an intrinsic value of $125/share computed on a conservative basis…”
Warren Buffett, 1959 Partnership Letter

Not attempting to compare myself to ‘the man’ but it is possible, and probable, for someone to accurately, and ethically, underwrite deals in a conservative manner.

Moral of the story, not every property is worth buying, not every deal is truly a deal, but there are deals to be had if you are diligent and look hard. Don’t try to flip but rather underwrite for the long run, be as conservative as you can (even though my conservative assumption may not be your conservative assumption), and do your personal due diligence.

Happy New Year

ps: I was commercial real estate/REIT analyst for a top 2 wall street investment bank for many years so I too have seen the good/bad/ugly/losers/winners in Billions of real estate deals.

[clearfund]

Allan – I think the SF is a good example of why anyone who buys that type of asset now has a higher chance of succeeding that did those that bought at historical record high values (and record low yields).

I would rather look at that type of bldg where the tenants have blown out, underwrite the new rent/downtime/ti/lc at levels meaningfully below ‘current’ market rents.

To your balance sheet focus, I am sure we’d all be happier with the identical asset as a significantly lower cost basis for all of the obvious reasons.

Is now the right time to buy that bldg given the others that may tumble behind it given the high level of over-leveraged, highly optimistic underwritten bldgs that you correctly state? I Don’t purport to know when to call a bottom. However, what I do know is the case for long term fundamentals (read: 10+ years of projected ownership). If you can achieve a low basis and capture a strong all cash yield (at some point in the next several years) in a top shelf SF bldg I think we’d sleep well at night and ultimately cash in at some point in the future.

12% offering: To be clear, I make no offer (or hint at one) of a 12%+ investment. My prior statement re: 12% was that I use that number as minimum all cash yield I would require upon achieving stabilization on the property when preparing the underwriting models. I feel that we can buy cash flow today for approaching 10%, however, I would expect any leased deal to go ‘backwards’ on income for a while due to rent reductions, etc to maintain tenants (lower rent is better than a vacancy). thus 12% is just a personal min yield requirement used in crafting my value/offer to submit to the lender to acquire the note.

Lastly re: “conservative assumptions” I do agree with you that the phrase can/has been used as ‘cover’ and BS many times over. However, it is just as likely that someone who uses that phrase is actually using conservative assumptions. Thus, to disparage someone due to a very subjective term is not appropriate without previously drilling down into their definition/idea of ‘conservative assumptions’.

The market has told me that my assumptions are hyper conservative due to the response I receive from lenders to my offers. My offers come with an explanation of how I derived my offer value (rents, vacancy factor, expenses, discount rate, etc) and they never have an issue with any of those items, just my price (which is a derived from the agreed upon assumptions).

As a further example of someone using the term “conservative basis” you might want to read the 3rd paragraph on page 2 of this link:
http://www.ticonline.com/buffett.partner.letters/1959.02.11.pdf

“…it has an intrinsic value of $125/share computed on a conservative basis…”
Warren Buffett, 1959 Partnership Letter

Not attempting to compare myself to ‘the man’ but it is possible, and probable, for someone to accurately, and ethically, underwrite deals in a conservative manner.

Moral of the story, not every property is worth buying, not every deal is truly a deal, but there are deals to be had if you are diligent and look hard. Don’t try to flip but rather underwrite for the long run, be as conservative as you can (even though my conservative assumption may not be your conservative assumption), and do your personal due diligence.

Happy New Year

ps: I was commercial real estate/REIT analyst for a top 2 wall street investment bank for many years so I too have seen the good/bad/ugly/losers/winners in Billions of real estate deals.

[clearfund]

Allan – I think the SF is a good example of why anyone who buys that type of asset now has a higher chance of succeeding that did those that bought at historical record high values (and record low yields).

I would rather look at that type of bldg where the tenants have blown out, underwrite the new rent/downtime/ti/lc at levels meaningfully below ‘current’ market rents.

To your balance sheet focus, I am sure we’d all be happier with the identical asset as a significantly lower cost basis for all of the obvious reasons.

Is now the right time to buy that bldg given the others that may tumble behind it given the high level of over-leveraged, highly optimistic underwritten bldgs that you correctly state? I Don’t purport to know when to call a bottom. However, what I do know is the case for long term fundamentals (read: 10+ years of projected ownership). If you can achieve a low basis and capture a strong all cash yield (at some point in the next several years) in a top shelf SF bldg I think we’d sleep well at night and ultimately cash in at some point in the future.

12% offering: To be clear, I make no offer (or hint at one) of a 12%+ investment. My prior statement re: 12% was that I use that number as minimum all cash yield I would require upon achieving stabilization on the property when preparing the underwriting models. I feel that we can buy cash flow today for approaching 10%, however, I would expect any leased deal to go ‘backwards’ on income for a while due to rent reductions, etc to maintain tenants (lower rent is better than a vacancy). thus 12% is just a personal min yield requirement used in crafting my value/offer to submit to the lender to acquire the note.

Lastly re: “conservative assumptions” I do agree with you that the phrase can/has been used as ‘cover’ and BS many times over. However, it is just as likely that someone who uses that phrase is actually using conservative assumptions. Thus, to disparage someone due to a very subjective term is not appropriate without previously drilling down into their definition/idea of ‘conservative assumptions’.

The market has told me that my assumptions are hyper conservative due to the response I receive from lenders to my offers. My offers come with an explanation of how I derived my offer value (rents, vacancy factor, expenses, discount rate, etc) and they never have an issue with any of those items, just my price (which is a derived from the agreed upon assumptions).

As a further example of someone using the term “conservative basis” you might want to read the 3rd paragraph on page 2 of this link:
http://www.ticonline.com/buffett.partner.letters/1959.02.11.pdf

“…it has an intrinsic value of $125/share computed on a conservative basis…”
Warren Buffett, 1959 Partnership Letter

Not attempting to compare myself to ‘the man’ but it is possible, and probable, for someone to accurately, and ethically, underwrite deals in a conservative manner.

Moral of the story, not every property is worth buying, not every deal is truly a deal, but there are deals to be had if you are diligent and look hard. Don’t try to flip but rather underwrite for the long run, be as conservative as you can (even though my conservative assumption may not be your conservative assumption), and do your personal due diligence.

Happy New Year

ps: I was commercial real estate/REIT analyst for a top 2 wall street investment bank for many years so I too have seen the good/bad/ugly/losers/winners in Billions of real estate deals.

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