[davelj]

In my opinion, marriage is a bad idea in general. Kids are a worse idea. Marriage without a pre-nup is a horrific idea if you’re the party with the greater amount of assets. In general, marriage is a triumph of hope over observable experience. Having said that…

A man or woman that brings up a pre-nup out of nowhere prior to a serious discussion regarding marriage is extremely odd unless the subject of pre-nups came up independently on its own (like, “I read recently that so-and-so didn’t have a pre-nup…”). A guy that says “he doesn’t want someone hanging around for the money” is also odd, in my opinion. On the other hand, your comment that you “don’t give a blank about whatever money he has” is a lie (conscious or subconscious) 90% of the time it’s uttered.

I’ll spare you a long diatribe on evolutionary psychology but, put simply, a man’s ability to make money is a signal, albeit a somewhat flawed one, of his ability to protect and provide for a woman and (their future?) children. (The biggest problem here is that there is a difference between “ability” and “willingness.”) Twenty thousand years ago agility and brute strength were a man’s primary evolutionary advantage in attracting females. Today brute strength, looks, etc. definitely help, but IN GENERAL TERMS the most important trait in attracting females is, quite obviously, the ability to make money. (THIS IS NOT A GOOD OR BAD THING HOWEVER. It’s merely an evolutionary adaptation – it’s morally neutral.) The vast majority of women over the age of 25 subconsciously know this to be true whether or not they are willing to admit it to themselves.

So, to sum things up, in my opinion it seems like you two are made for each other. He’s pretending that he has enough wealth for it to matter whether or not a pre-nup is necessary, and you’re pretending to not care about the money he probably doesn’t have. But I’ve been wrong before.

[davelj]

In my opinion, marriage is a bad idea in general. Kids are a worse idea. Marriage without a pre-nup is a horrific idea if you’re the party with the greater amount of assets. In general, marriage is a triumph of hope over observable experience. Having said that…

A man or woman that brings up a pre-nup out of nowhere prior to a serious discussion regarding marriage is extremely odd unless the subject of pre-nups came up independently on its own (like, “I read recently that so-and-so didn’t have a pre-nup…”). A guy that says “he doesn’t want someone hanging around for the money” is also odd, in my opinion. On the other hand, your comment that you “don’t give a blank about whatever money he has” is a lie (conscious or subconscious) 90% of the time it’s uttered.

I’ll spare you a long diatribe on evolutionary psychology but, put simply, a man’s ability to make money is a signal, albeit a somewhat flawed one, of his ability to protect and provide for a woman and (their future?) children. (The biggest problem here is that there is a difference between “ability” and “willingness.”) Twenty thousand years ago agility and brute strength were a man’s primary evolutionary advantage in attracting females. Today brute strength, looks, etc. definitely help, but IN GENERAL TERMS the most important trait in attracting females is, quite obviously, the ability to make money. (THIS IS NOT A GOOD OR BAD THING HOWEVER. It’s merely an evolutionary adaptation – it’s morally neutral.) The vast majority of women over the age of 25 subconsciously know this to be true whether or not they are willing to admit it to themselves.

So, to sum things up, in my opinion it seems like you two are made for each other. He’s pretending that he has enough wealth for it to matter whether or not a pre-nup is necessary, and you’re pretending to not care about the money he probably doesn’t have. But I’ve been wrong before.

[davelj]

In my opinion, marriage is a bad idea in general. Kids are a worse idea. Marriage without a pre-nup is a horrific idea if you’re the party with the greater amount of assets. In general, marriage is a triumph of hope over observable experience. Having said that…

A man or woman that brings up a pre-nup out of nowhere prior to a serious discussion regarding marriage is extremely odd unless the subject of pre-nups came up independently on its own (like, “I read recently that so-and-so didn’t have a pre-nup…”). A guy that says “he doesn’t want someone hanging around for the money” is also odd, in my opinion. On the other hand, your comment that you “don’t give a blank about whatever money he has” is a lie (conscious or subconscious) 90% of the time it’s uttered.

I’ll spare you a long diatribe on evolutionary psychology but, put simply, a man’s ability to make money is a signal, albeit a somewhat flawed one, of his ability to protect and provide for a woman and (their future?) children. (The biggest problem here is that there is a difference between “ability” and “willingness.”) Twenty thousand years ago agility and brute strength were a man’s primary evolutionary advantage in attracting females. Today brute strength, looks, etc. definitely help, but IN GENERAL TERMS the most important trait in attracting females is, quite obviously, the ability to make money. (THIS IS NOT A GOOD OR BAD THING HOWEVER. It’s merely an evolutionary adaptation – it’s morally neutral.) The vast majority of women over the age of 25 subconsciously know this to be true whether or not they are willing to admit it to themselves.

So, to sum things up, in my opinion it seems like you two are made for each other. He’s pretending that he has enough wealth for it to matter whether or not a pre-nup is necessary, and you’re pretending to not care about the money he probably doesn’t have. But I’ve been wrong before.

[davelj]

In my opinion, marriage is a bad idea in general. Kids are a worse idea. Marriage without a pre-nup is a horrific idea if you’re the party with the greater amount of assets. In general, marriage is a triumph of hope over observable experience. Having said that…

A man or woman that brings up a pre-nup out of nowhere prior to a serious discussion regarding marriage is extremely odd unless the subject of pre-nups came up independently on its own (like, “I read recently that so-and-so didn’t have a pre-nup…”). A guy that says “he doesn’t want someone hanging around for the money” is also odd, in my opinion. On the other hand, your comment that you “don’t give a blank about whatever money he has” is a lie (conscious or subconscious) 90% of the time it’s uttered.

I’ll spare you a long diatribe on evolutionary psychology but, put simply, a man’s ability to make money is a signal, albeit a somewhat flawed one, of his ability to protect and provide for a woman and (their future?) children. (The biggest problem here is that there is a difference between “ability” and “willingness.”) Twenty thousand years ago agility and brute strength were a man’s primary evolutionary advantage in attracting females. Today brute strength, looks, etc. definitely help, but IN GENERAL TERMS the most important trait in attracting females is, quite obviously, the ability to make money. (THIS IS NOT A GOOD OR BAD THING HOWEVER. It’s merely an evolutionary adaptation – it’s morally neutral.) The vast majority of women over the age of 25 subconsciously know this to be true whether or not they are willing to admit it to themselves.

So, to sum things up, in my opinion it seems like you two are made for each other. He’s pretending that he has enough wealth for it to matter whether or not a pre-nup is necessary, and you’re pretending to not care about the money he probably doesn’t have. But I’ve been wrong before.

[davelj]

While I don’t disagree with your conclusion (which is, essentially, “b” from my original post) I don’t think your thought process is correct. The servicer and the ultimate “owner” of the mortgage are rarely the same entity. The only thing the servicer is really trying to accomplish is the most cost effective manner of protecting the value of the underlying mortgage for its ultimate owner, whether that’s a bank, thrift or mortgage-backed security holder. In other words, the servicer has no economic incentive to “pretend that the mortgage is still an asset” (as you put it). I think the only thing servicers are concerned with these days is doing whatever they have to do – whether it’s foreclosing or modifying the loan – to avoid getting sued by the true note holders. Any other thoughts?

[davelj]

While I don’t disagree with your conclusion (which is, essentially, “b” from my original post) I don’t think your thought process is correct. The servicer and the ultimate “owner” of the mortgage are rarely the same entity. The only thing the servicer is really trying to accomplish is the most cost effective manner of protecting the value of the underlying mortgage for its ultimate owner, whether that’s a bank, thrift or mortgage-backed security holder. In other words, the servicer has no economic incentive to “pretend that the mortgage is still an asset” (as you put it). I think the only thing servicers are concerned with these days is doing whatever they have to do – whether it’s foreclosing or modifying the loan – to avoid getting sued by the true note holders. Any other thoughts?

[davelj]

While I don’t disagree with your conclusion (which is, essentially, “b” from my original post) I don’t think your thought process is correct. The servicer and the ultimate “owner” of the mortgage are rarely the same entity. The only thing the servicer is really trying to accomplish is the most cost effective manner of protecting the value of the underlying mortgage for its ultimate owner, whether that’s a bank, thrift or mortgage-backed security holder. In other words, the servicer has no economic incentive to “pretend that the mortgage is still an asset” (as you put it). I think the only thing servicers are concerned with these days is doing whatever they have to do – whether it’s foreclosing or modifying the loan – to avoid getting sued by the true note holders. Any other thoughts?

[davelj]

While I don’t disagree with your conclusion (which is, essentially, “b” from my original post) I don’t think your thought process is correct. The servicer and the ultimate “owner” of the mortgage are rarely the same entity. The only thing the servicer is really trying to accomplish is the most cost effective manner of protecting the value of the underlying mortgage for its ultimate owner, whether that’s a bank, thrift or mortgage-backed security holder. In other words, the servicer has no economic incentive to “pretend that the mortgage is still an asset” (as you put it). I think the only thing servicers are concerned with these days is doing whatever they have to do – whether it’s foreclosing or modifying the loan – to avoid getting sued by the true note holders. Any other thoughts?

[davelj]

While I don’t disagree with your conclusion (which is, essentially, “b” from my original post) I don’t think your thought process is correct. The servicer and the ultimate “owner” of the mortgage are rarely the same entity. The only thing the servicer is really trying to accomplish is the most cost effective manner of protecting the value of the underlying mortgage for its ultimate owner, whether that’s a bank, thrift or mortgage-backed security holder. In other words, the servicer has no economic incentive to “pretend that the mortgage is still an asset” (as you put it). I think the only thing servicers are concerned with these days is doing whatever they have to do – whether it’s foreclosing or modifying the loan – to avoid getting sued by the true note holders. Any other thoughts?

[davelj]

A couple of things I’m kind of curious about and will try to get answers for over the next few days:

(1) If you’re a bank that’s holding some of these mortgages on the balance sheet – as opposed to securitizing them and selling them off – how does this rate freeze affect the the loan value on the balance sheet? Technically this is a “troubled debt restructuring” (TDR), thus the regulators will require the loan to be revalued (lower, obviously) based on the new loan terms. While this revaluation may be above the loan’s value in the sale market, it will certainly be materially lower than the value it’s currently held at on the balance sheet. Enough of these (and clearly there are a lot of them) and you run into capital adequacy issues.

(2) I’m assuming that this rate freeze will be some kind of a mandate from the government such that the ultimate holders of these securities will just have to suck up the (much) lower coupons – that is, the servicers won’t be penalized for merely enforcing the government’s plan. So, if we’re in a liquidity crisis, how does this really help? Potential buyers of MBS (providers of liquidity, that is) will definitely not want anything to do with these structures for years to come considering what the government is mandating. This will be a disaster for anything but GSE-conforming mortgage paper for some time to come.

I’m not saying that these measures won’t help a little bit at the margin, but I think it will be fairly limited when the dust settles and we see that as a percentage of those in trouble, only a relatively small number were actually able to avail themselves of this “help.”

[davelj]

A couple of things I’m kind of curious about and will try to get answers for over the next few days:

(1) If you’re a bank that’s holding some of these mortgages on the balance sheet – as opposed to securitizing them and selling them off – how does this rate freeze affect the the loan value on the balance sheet? Technically this is a “troubled debt restructuring” (TDR), thus the regulators will require the loan to be revalued (lower, obviously) based on the new loan terms. While this revaluation may be above the loan’s value in the sale market, it will certainly be materially lower than the value it’s currently held at on the balance sheet. Enough of these (and clearly there are a lot of them) and you run into capital adequacy issues.

(2) I’m assuming that this rate freeze will be some kind of a mandate from the government such that the ultimate holders of these securities will just have to suck up the (much) lower coupons – that is, the servicers won’t be penalized for merely enforcing the government’s plan. So, if we’re in a liquidity crisis, how does this really help? Potential buyers of MBS (providers of liquidity, that is) will definitely not want anything to do with these structures for years to come considering what the government is mandating. This will be a disaster for anything but GSE-conforming mortgage paper for some time to come.

I’m not saying that these measures won’t help a little bit at the margin, but I think it will be fairly limited when the dust settles and we see that as a percentage of those in trouble, only a relatively small number were actually able to avail themselves of this “help.”

[davelj]

A couple of things I’m kind of curious about and will try to get answers for over the next few days:

(1) If you’re a bank that’s holding some of these mortgages on the balance sheet – as opposed to securitizing them and selling them off – how does this rate freeze affect the the loan value on the balance sheet? Technically this is a “troubled debt restructuring” (TDR), thus the regulators will require the loan to be revalued (lower, obviously) based on the new loan terms. While this revaluation may be above the loan’s value in the sale market, it will certainly be materially lower than the value it’s currently held at on the balance sheet. Enough of these (and clearly there are a lot of them) and you run into capital adequacy issues.

(2) I’m assuming that this rate freeze will be some kind of a mandate from the government such that the ultimate holders of these securities will just have to suck up the (much) lower coupons – that is, the servicers won’t be penalized for merely enforcing the government’s plan. So, if we’re in a liquidity crisis, how does this really help? Potential buyers of MBS (providers of liquidity, that is) will definitely not want anything to do with these structures for years to come considering what the government is mandating. This will be a disaster for anything but GSE-conforming mortgage paper for some time to come.

I’m not saying that these measures won’t help a little bit at the margin, but I think it will be fairly limited when the dust settles and we see that as a percentage of those in trouble, only a relatively small number were actually able to avail themselves of this “help.”

[davelj]

A couple of things I’m kind of curious about and will try to get answers for over the next few days:

(1) If you’re a bank that’s holding some of these mortgages on the balance sheet – as opposed to securitizing them and selling them off – how does this rate freeze affect the the loan value on the balance sheet? Technically this is a “troubled debt restructuring” (TDR), thus the regulators will require the loan to be revalued (lower, obviously) based on the new loan terms. While this revaluation may be above the loan’s value in the sale market, it will certainly be materially lower than the value it’s currently held at on the balance sheet. Enough of these (and clearly there are a lot of them) and you run into capital adequacy issues.

(2) I’m assuming that this rate freeze will be some kind of a mandate from the government such that the ultimate holders of these securities will just have to suck up the (much) lower coupons – that is, the servicers won’t be penalized for merely enforcing the government’s plan. So, if we’re in a liquidity crisis, how does this really help? Potential buyers of MBS (providers of liquidity, that is) will definitely not want anything to do with these structures for years to come considering what the government is mandating. This will be a disaster for anything but GSE-conforming mortgage paper for some time to come.

I’m not saying that these measures won’t help a little bit at the margin, but I think it will be fairly limited when the dust settles and we see that as a percentage of those in trouble, only a relatively small number were actually able to avail themselves of this “help.”

[davelj]

A couple of things I’m kind of curious about and will try to get answers for over the next few days:

(1) If you’re a bank that’s holding some of these mortgages on the balance sheet – as opposed to securitizing them and selling them off – how does this rate freeze affect the the loan value on the balance sheet? Technically this is a “troubled debt restructuring” (TDR), thus the regulators will require the loan to be revalued (lower, obviously) based on the new loan terms. While this revaluation may be above the loan’s value in the sale market, it will certainly be materially lower than the value it’s currently held at on the balance sheet. Enough of these (and clearly there are a lot of them) and you run into capital adequacy issues.

(2) I’m assuming that this rate freeze will be some kind of a mandate from the government such that the ultimate holders of these securities will just have to suck up the (much) lower coupons – that is, the servicers won’t be penalized for merely enforcing the government’s plan. So, if we’re in a liquidity crisis, how does this really help? Potential buyers of MBS (providers of liquidity, that is) will definitely not want anything to do with these structures for years to come considering what the government is mandating. This will be a disaster for anything but GSE-conforming mortgage paper for some time to come.

I’m not saying that these measures won’t help a little bit at the margin, but I think it will be fairly limited when the dust settles and we see that as a percentage of those in trouble, only a relatively small number were actually able to avail themselves of this “help.”

[davelj]

I don’t view this guy’s problems as a lack of formal education, but rather very poor business judgment, which tends to be liberally distributed across the spectrum of educational attainment.

Alan Greenspan has a PhD. Mr. Haupt has 1 semester of community college. Who’s wrought more damage? That’s a rhetorical question.

Formal education is extremely over-rated where success in business or otherwise is concerned. That’s coming from someone who has two masters’ degrees.

[Author]

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