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AK
ParticipantThe “cash for summit” scandal didn’t produce diplomacy … merely diplomatic theatre. It’s the difference between a retired athlete or other celebrity showing up at your party because he’s a close personal friend, and the same celeb showing up because you booked him at great expense to represent himself as a “close personal friend.”
Anyway let’s take a look at the chronology of the six-party talks, to test the assertion that the U.S. resorted to negotiation only after becoming bogged down in Iraq:
—-
January 2002: “Axis of Evil” speech. Still, “Axis of Evil” is pretty mild compared to the everyday characterization of the U.S. and the Republic of Korea in official North Korean statements. But we’re grown-ups and we won’t hold that against them.
October 2002: US, Japan, and Republic of Korea jointly announce that DPRK nuclear program violates both the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Also several other international agreements, but I lost count.) U.S. pledges diplomatic approach.
January 2003: DPRK announces withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
February 2002: DPRK announces restarting of reactors.
March 2003: Start of Gulf War II.
April 2003: First round of trilateral talks between North Korea, U.S., and China. Trilateral talks lead to six-party talks. (It should be noted that leaving out South Korea wasn’t really nice.)
May 1: End of major combat operations announced.
July 22: First Iraq governing council founded.
August 27, 2003: First round of six-party talks.
August 29, 2003: Bombing of Imam Ali mosque in Najaf kills 90, first widely publicized instance of large-scale sectarian violence.
—–
So the timeline clearly refutes the assertion that diplomacy with North Korea was a last resort, prompted only by the Iraq insurgency.
Next assertion?
ParticipantThe “cash for summit” scandal didn’t produce diplomacy … merely diplomatic theatre. It’s the difference between a retired athlete or other celebrity showing up at your party because he’s a close personal friend, and the same celeb showing up because you booked him at great expense to represent himself as a “close personal friend.”
Anyway let’s take a look at the chronology of the six-party talks, to test the assertion that the U.S. resorted to negotiation only after becoming bogged down in Iraq:
—-
January 2002: “Axis of Evil” speech. Still, “Axis of Evil” is pretty mild compared to the everyday characterization of the U.S. and the Republic of Korea in official North Korean statements. But we’re grown-ups and we won’t hold that against them.
October 2002: US, Japan, and Republic of Korea jointly announce that DPRK nuclear program violates both the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Also several other international agreements, but I lost count.) U.S. pledges diplomatic approach.
January 2003: DPRK announces withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
February 2002: DPRK announces restarting of reactors.
March 2003: Start of Gulf War II.
April 2003: First round of trilateral talks between North Korea, U.S., and China. Trilateral talks lead to six-party talks. (It should be noted that leaving out South Korea wasn’t really nice.)
May 1: End of major combat operations announced.
July 22: First Iraq governing council founded.
August 27, 2003: First round of six-party talks.
August 29, 2003: Bombing of Imam Ali mosque in Najaf kills 90, first widely publicized instance of large-scale sectarian violence.
—–
So the timeline clearly refutes the assertion that diplomacy with North Korea was a last resort, prompted only by the Iraq insurgency.
Next assertion?
ParticipantThe “cash for summit” scandal didn’t produce diplomacy … merely diplomatic theatre. It’s the difference between a retired athlete or other celebrity showing up at your party because he’s a close personal friend, and the same celeb showing up because you booked him at great expense to represent himself as a “close personal friend.”
Anyway let’s take a look at the chronology of the six-party talks, to test the assertion that the U.S. resorted to negotiation only after becoming bogged down in Iraq:
—-
January 2002: “Axis of Evil” speech. Still, “Axis of Evil” is pretty mild compared to the everyday characterization of the U.S. and the Republic of Korea in official North Korean statements. But we’re grown-ups and we won’t hold that against them.
October 2002: US, Japan, and Republic of Korea jointly announce that DPRK nuclear program violates both the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Also several other international agreements, but I lost count.) U.S. pledges diplomatic approach.
January 2003: DPRK announces withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
February 2002: DPRK announces restarting of reactors.
March 2003: Start of Gulf War II.
April 2003: First round of trilateral talks between North Korea, U.S., and China. Trilateral talks lead to six-party talks. (It should be noted that leaving out South Korea wasn’t really nice.)
May 1: End of major combat operations announced.
July 22: First Iraq governing council founded.
August 27, 2003: First round of six-party talks.
August 29, 2003: Bombing of Imam Ali mosque in Najaf kills 90, first widely publicized instance of large-scale sectarian violence.
—–
So the timeline clearly refutes the assertion that diplomacy with North Korea was a last resort, prompted only by the Iraq insurgency.
Next assertion?
ParticipantThe “cash for summit” scandal didn’t produce diplomacy … merely diplomatic theatre. It’s the difference between a retired athlete or other celebrity showing up at your party because he’s a close personal friend, and the same celeb showing up because you booked him at great expense to represent himself as a “close personal friend.”
Anyway let’s take a look at the chronology of the six-party talks, to test the assertion that the U.S. resorted to negotiation only after becoming bogged down in Iraq:
—-
January 2002: “Axis of Evil” speech. Still, “Axis of Evil” is pretty mild compared to the everyday characterization of the U.S. and the Republic of Korea in official North Korean statements. But we’re grown-ups and we won’t hold that against them.
October 2002: US, Japan, and Republic of Korea jointly announce that DPRK nuclear program violates both the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Also several other international agreements, but I lost count.) U.S. pledges diplomatic approach.
January 2003: DPRK announces withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
February 2002: DPRK announces restarting of reactors.
March 2003: Start of Gulf War II.
April 2003: First round of trilateral talks between North Korea, U.S., and China. Trilateral talks lead to six-party talks. (It should be noted that leaving out South Korea wasn’t really nice.)
May 1: End of major combat operations announced.
July 22: First Iraq governing council founded.
August 27, 2003: First round of six-party talks.
August 29, 2003: Bombing of Imam Ali mosque in Najaf kills 90, first widely publicized instance of large-scale sectarian violence.
—–
So the timeline clearly refutes the assertion that diplomacy with North Korea was a last resort, prompted only by the Iraq insurgency.
Next assertion?
ParticipantThe “cash for summit” scandal didn’t produce diplomacy … merely diplomatic theatre. It’s the difference between a retired athlete or other celebrity showing up at your party because he’s a close personal friend, and the same celeb showing up because you booked him at great expense to represent himself as a “close personal friend.”
Anyway let’s take a look at the chronology of the six-party talks, to test the assertion that the U.S. resorted to negotiation only after becoming bogged down in Iraq:
—-
January 2002: “Axis of Evil” speech. Still, “Axis of Evil” is pretty mild compared to the everyday characterization of the U.S. and the Republic of Korea in official North Korean statements. But we’re grown-ups and we won’t hold that against them.
October 2002: US, Japan, and Republic of Korea jointly announce that DPRK nuclear program violates both the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Also several other international agreements, but I lost count.) U.S. pledges diplomatic approach.
January 2003: DPRK announces withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
February 2002: DPRK announces restarting of reactors.
March 2003: Start of Gulf War II.
April 2003: First round of trilateral talks between North Korea, U.S., and China. Trilateral talks lead to six-party talks. (It should be noted that leaving out South Korea wasn’t really nice.)
May 1: End of major combat operations announced.
July 22: First Iraq governing council founded.
August 27, 2003: First round of six-party talks.
August 29, 2003: Bombing of Imam Ali mosque in Najaf kills 90, first widely publicized instance of large-scale sectarian violence.
—–
So the timeline clearly refutes the assertion that diplomacy with North Korea was a last resort, prompted only by the Iraq insurgency.
Next assertion?
ParticipantBiggest obstacles to high-speed rail in CA are right-of-way acquisition costs, terrain, and NIMBY-ism.
Right-of-way: Virtually all of the projected route is privately owned, and it ain’t cheap. We don’t have the option of forcing out the current owners / residents with rubber hoses and tear gas.
Terrain: We have non-trivial mountain ranges to deal with … in earthquake country no less. In contrast the Beijing-Shanghai route is flat as a pancake. Maybe they could extend it as far as Wuhan without problems, but the costs would skyrocket if they tried to build out to Fujian or Guangdong.
NIMBY-ism: Palo Alto, Menlo Park, Atherton, and San Jose are already banding together in opposition to high-speed rail. Is this because of “environmental impacts,” or because high-speed rail will diminish the location premium factored into local property values?
It’s not because we (technically) can’t … it’s a matter of feasibility.
ParticipantBiggest obstacles to high-speed rail in CA are right-of-way acquisition costs, terrain, and NIMBY-ism.
Right-of-way: Virtually all of the projected route is privately owned, and it ain’t cheap. We don’t have the option of forcing out the current owners / residents with rubber hoses and tear gas.
Terrain: We have non-trivial mountain ranges to deal with … in earthquake country no less. In contrast the Beijing-Shanghai route is flat as a pancake. Maybe they could extend it as far as Wuhan without problems, but the costs would skyrocket if they tried to build out to Fujian or Guangdong.
NIMBY-ism: Palo Alto, Menlo Park, Atherton, and San Jose are already banding together in opposition to high-speed rail. Is this because of “environmental impacts,” or because high-speed rail will diminish the location premium factored into local property values?
It’s not because we (technically) can’t … it’s a matter of feasibility.
ParticipantBiggest obstacles to high-speed rail in CA are right-of-way acquisition costs, terrain, and NIMBY-ism.
Right-of-way: Virtually all of the projected route is privately owned, and it ain’t cheap. We don’t have the option of forcing out the current owners / residents with rubber hoses and tear gas.
Terrain: We have non-trivial mountain ranges to deal with … in earthquake country no less. In contrast the Beijing-Shanghai route is flat as a pancake. Maybe they could extend it as far as Wuhan without problems, but the costs would skyrocket if they tried to build out to Fujian or Guangdong.
NIMBY-ism: Palo Alto, Menlo Park, Atherton, and San Jose are already banding together in opposition to high-speed rail. Is this because of “environmental impacts,” or because high-speed rail will diminish the location premium factored into local property values?
It’s not because we (technically) can’t … it’s a matter of feasibility.
ParticipantBiggest obstacles to high-speed rail in CA are right-of-way acquisition costs, terrain, and NIMBY-ism.
Right-of-way: Virtually all of the projected route is privately owned, and it ain’t cheap. We don’t have the option of forcing out the current owners / residents with rubber hoses and tear gas.
Terrain: We have non-trivial mountain ranges to deal with … in earthquake country no less. In contrast the Beijing-Shanghai route is flat as a pancake. Maybe they could extend it as far as Wuhan without problems, but the costs would skyrocket if they tried to build out to Fujian or Guangdong.
NIMBY-ism: Palo Alto, Menlo Park, Atherton, and San Jose are already banding together in opposition to high-speed rail. Is this because of “environmental impacts,” or because high-speed rail will diminish the location premium factored into local property values?
It’s not because we (technically) can’t … it’s a matter of feasibility.
ParticipantBiggest obstacles to high-speed rail in CA are right-of-way acquisition costs, terrain, and NIMBY-ism.
Right-of-way: Virtually all of the projected route is privately owned, and it ain’t cheap. We don’t have the option of forcing out the current owners / residents with rubber hoses and tear gas.
Terrain: We have non-trivial mountain ranges to deal with … in earthquake country no less. In contrast the Beijing-Shanghai route is flat as a pancake. Maybe they could extend it as far as Wuhan without problems, but the costs would skyrocket if they tried to build out to Fujian or Guangdong.
NIMBY-ism: Palo Alto, Menlo Park, Atherton, and San Jose are already banding together in opposition to high-speed rail. Is this because of “environmental impacts,” or because high-speed rail will diminish the location premium factored into local property values?
It’s not because we (technically) can’t … it’s a matter of feasibility.
ParticipantI’d contemplate FHA even if I had the cash for 10% down. Right now FHA rates seem to be lower than conventional — my guess is that MBS investors are willing to take a slightly lower yield in exchange for an explicit government guarantee.
ParticipantI’d contemplate FHA even if I had the cash for 10% down. Right now FHA rates seem to be lower than conventional — my guess is that MBS investors are willing to take a slightly lower yield in exchange for an explicit government guarantee.
ParticipantI’d contemplate FHA even if I had the cash for 10% down. Right now FHA rates seem to be lower than conventional — my guess is that MBS investors are willing to take a slightly lower yield in exchange for an explicit government guarantee.
ParticipantI’d contemplate FHA even if I had the cash for 10% down. Right now FHA rates seem to be lower than conventional — my guess is that MBS investors are willing to take a slightly lower yield in exchange for an explicit government guarantee.
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