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DaCounselor
ParticipantGood point from scaredycat. On a similar note, I for one would much rather be the guy (actually, I am the guy) in the house that he can afford as opposed to the guy next door who is sweating his payments and badly needs a so-called “bailout”. It’s not even a close call as to who I would rather be.
And what is better for me, I ask? Is is better to have my neighbor and his family stay in the home pursuant to a mod, or would I rather he go into foreclosure with the house ultimately sitting empty and waiting to become an REO fire sale comp-killer. Again, not really a close call as to which is better for me.
To echo scaredycat – life ain’t fair, and complaining about life not being fair ain’t going to make it fair, and there you have it.
ParticipantGood point from scaredycat. On a similar note, I for one would much rather be the guy (actually, I am the guy) in the house that he can afford as opposed to the guy next door who is sweating his payments and badly needs a so-called “bailout”. It’s not even a close call as to who I would rather be.
And what is better for me, I ask? Is is better to have my neighbor and his family stay in the home pursuant to a mod, or would I rather he go into foreclosure with the house ultimately sitting empty and waiting to become an REO fire sale comp-killer. Again, not really a close call as to which is better for me.
To echo scaredycat – life ain’t fair, and complaining about life not being fair ain’t going to make it fair, and there you have it.
ParticipantGood point from scaredycat. On a similar note, I for one would much rather be the guy (actually, I am the guy) in the house that he can afford as opposed to the guy next door who is sweating his payments and badly needs a so-called “bailout”. It’s not even a close call as to who I would rather be.
And what is better for me, I ask? Is is better to have my neighbor and his family stay in the home pursuant to a mod, or would I rather he go into foreclosure with the house ultimately sitting empty and waiting to become an REO fire sale comp-killer. Again, not really a close call as to which is better for me.
To echo scaredycat – life ain’t fair, and complaining about life not being fair ain’t going to make it fair, and there you have it.
ParticipantI am going to just have to agree to disagree with some of you who don’t believe that upside-down borrowers are going to benefit from the govt. intervention into housing. Again, the Fed is going to purchase at least $500 billion of securitized mortgages. Bernanke is well-established, on the record, since at least March ’08, strenuously advocating principal write-downs. Now the Fed is going to own the paper. What in the world do you think is going to ultimately happen?
I will concede that Bernanke has mentioned, in what clearly appears to me as an aside in his view, the Office of Thrift Supervisions’ proposal of profit sharing between the lenders/homeowners on equity built post-writedown. In fact, I expect a very good likelihood exists that early Fed modification programs will contain equity-sharing provisions. Nevertheless, I believe without a shadow of a doubt that the best chance for a successful program lies in writedowns with no future profit-sharing as this is the only way to get full participation of borrowers. Bernanke knows this to be true. He may attempt half-measures first, but to get to the end-game I believe he knows that writedowns with a catch are probably not going to be attractive enough to get the job done.
ParticipantI am going to just have to agree to disagree with some of you who don’t believe that upside-down borrowers are going to benefit from the govt. intervention into housing. Again, the Fed is going to purchase at least $500 billion of securitized mortgages. Bernanke is well-established, on the record, since at least March ’08, strenuously advocating principal write-downs. Now the Fed is going to own the paper. What in the world do you think is going to ultimately happen?
I will concede that Bernanke has mentioned, in what clearly appears to me as an aside in his view, the Office of Thrift Supervisions’ proposal of profit sharing between the lenders/homeowners on equity built post-writedown. In fact, I expect a very good likelihood exists that early Fed modification programs will contain equity-sharing provisions. Nevertheless, I believe without a shadow of a doubt that the best chance for a successful program lies in writedowns with no future profit-sharing as this is the only way to get full participation of borrowers. Bernanke knows this to be true. He may attempt half-measures first, but to get to the end-game I believe he knows that writedowns with a catch are probably not going to be attractive enough to get the job done.
ParticipantI am going to just have to agree to disagree with some of you who don’t believe that upside-down borrowers are going to benefit from the govt. intervention into housing. Again, the Fed is going to purchase at least $500 billion of securitized mortgages. Bernanke is well-established, on the record, since at least March ’08, strenuously advocating principal write-downs. Now the Fed is going to own the paper. What in the world do you think is going to ultimately happen?
I will concede that Bernanke has mentioned, in what clearly appears to me as an aside in his view, the Office of Thrift Supervisions’ proposal of profit sharing between the lenders/homeowners on equity built post-writedown. In fact, I expect a very good likelihood exists that early Fed modification programs will contain equity-sharing provisions. Nevertheless, I believe without a shadow of a doubt that the best chance for a successful program lies in writedowns with no future profit-sharing as this is the only way to get full participation of borrowers. Bernanke knows this to be true. He may attempt half-measures first, but to get to the end-game I believe he knows that writedowns with a catch are probably not going to be attractive enough to get the job done.
ParticipantI am going to just have to agree to disagree with some of you who don’t believe that upside-down borrowers are going to benefit from the govt. intervention into housing. Again, the Fed is going to purchase at least $500 billion of securitized mortgages. Bernanke is well-established, on the record, since at least March ’08, strenuously advocating principal write-downs. Now the Fed is going to own the paper. What in the world do you think is going to ultimately happen?
I will concede that Bernanke has mentioned, in what clearly appears to me as an aside in his view, the Office of Thrift Supervisions’ proposal of profit sharing between the lenders/homeowners on equity built post-writedown. In fact, I expect a very good likelihood exists that early Fed modification programs will contain equity-sharing provisions. Nevertheless, I believe without a shadow of a doubt that the best chance for a successful program lies in writedowns with no future profit-sharing as this is the only way to get full participation of borrowers. Bernanke knows this to be true. He may attempt half-measures first, but to get to the end-game I believe he knows that writedowns with a catch are probably not going to be attractive enough to get the job done.
ParticipantI am going to just have to agree to disagree with some of you who don’t believe that upside-down borrowers are going to benefit from the govt. intervention into housing. Again, the Fed is going to purchase at least $500 billion of securitized mortgages. Bernanke is well-established, on the record, since at least March ’08, strenuously advocating principal write-downs. Now the Fed is going to own the paper. What in the world do you think is going to ultimately happen?
I will concede that Bernanke has mentioned, in what clearly appears to me as an aside in his view, the Office of Thrift Supervisions’ proposal of profit sharing between the lenders/homeowners on equity built post-writedown. In fact, I expect a very good likelihood exists that early Fed modification programs will contain equity-sharing provisions. Nevertheless, I believe without a shadow of a doubt that the best chance for a successful program lies in writedowns with no future profit-sharing as this is the only way to get full participation of borrowers. Bernanke knows this to be true. He may attempt half-measures first, but to get to the end-game I believe he knows that writedowns with a catch are probably not going to be attractive enough to get the job done.
ParticipantNo, this never was rhetoric – it has been in the works for many months. Uncle Sam is going to buy at least $500 billion of securitized loans (I believe they will ultimately buy more) and as the owner they can do whatever they want to the terms. I will give you one guess what that means.
ParticipantNo, this never was rhetoric – it has been in the works for many months. Uncle Sam is going to buy at least $500 billion of securitized loans (I believe they will ultimately buy more) and as the owner they can do whatever they want to the terms. I will give you one guess what that means.
ParticipantNo, this never was rhetoric – it has been in the works for many months. Uncle Sam is going to buy at least $500 billion of securitized loans (I believe they will ultimately buy more) and as the owner they can do whatever they want to the terms. I will give you one guess what that means.
ParticipantNo, this never was rhetoric – it has been in the works for many months. Uncle Sam is going to buy at least $500 billion of securitized loans (I believe they will ultimately buy more) and as the owner they can do whatever they want to the terms. I will give you one guess what that means.
ParticipantNo, this never was rhetoric – it has been in the works for many months. Uncle Sam is going to buy at least $500 billion of securitized loans (I believe they will ultimately buy more) and as the owner they can do whatever they want to the terms. I will give you one guess what that means.
ParticipantA very bad call as to timing. Still way off as to the index level. A disasterous call as to “no fall rally” and staying out of the market for at least a year (leaving 20+% returns on the table). I’m not seeing where this was a good call or even a close call by any definition.
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