OT: FOX News and the oil blowout

[briansd1]

[quote=Allan from Fallbrook]
This takes me back to my focal point about a national energy program. Yeah, we can point a finger at Bush/Cheney and with some validity. But, let’s also be honest about Obama, too. We’re not seeing anything approaching a national energy program, and I can say this because I also work on protective design, largely for Force Protection, in the private nuke sector, and I hear the complaints regarding the difficulties in permitting, approvals and loan guarantees. [/quote]

Allan, since you are so much for technically assigning blame where blame is due, Bush/Cheney relaxing the rules contributed to the lack of safety and THIS Gulf of Mexico environmental disaster.

Obama’s supposed lack of a national energy program, and “the difficulties in permitting, approvals and loan guarantees” in the nuclear industry did not contribute to THIS environmental disaster in the gulf.

Now, if you want to look at the big picture energy policy of this country, then don’t just fixate on the cementing of this well.

[quote=Allan from Fallbrook]
Taken one step further, you argued that this situation CLEARLY PROVED deep drilling was unsafe, but it did no such thing.
[/quote]

Referring to drill-baby-drill and Fox, I said:

Supporters of drilling have argued that technology now makes it safe to drill in sensitive, untouched natural areas.

The new drilling technology is not working and untested as evidenced by the oil gusher.

In other words, I’m saying that the arguments advanced by the drill-baby-drill crowds that current technology is safe and minimally intrusive in sensitive areas have been obviated.

There are risks and we really don’t understand the risks.

[quote=Allan from Fallbrook]
And I would also ask if you just referred to me as a coward?[/quote]

I’m talking about BP. They will inevitably point blame as they have done already.

[Aecetia]

Hey Brian,

Drill baby, drill!

[Aecetia]

Hey Brian,

Drill baby, drill!

[Aecetia]

Hey Brian,

Drill baby, drill!

[Aecetia]

Hey Brian,

Drill baby, drill!

[Aecetia]

Hey Brian,

Drill baby, drill!

[bubba99]

Not sure it was a technology problem or a process problem. The mud loggers (engineers) on site noted a serious pressure problem while the well was being flooded with seawater to ready for a cement cap.

The pressure was 1400 psi, way too high for the manover they were trying. The rig people wanted to refill with drilling mud until the pressure could be explained or mitigated. The BP manager on site said no. Continue with the sea water. The rest is history.

Technology is only as good as the people who use it. And in this case, mis-use it.

[bubba99]

Not sure it was a technology problem or a process problem. The mud loggers (engineers) on site noted a serious pressure problem while the well was being flooded with seawater to ready for a cement cap.

The pressure was 1400 psi, way too high for the manover they were trying. The rig people wanted to refill with drilling mud until the pressure could be explained or mitigated. The BP manager on site said no. Continue with the sea water. The rest is history.

Technology is only as good as the people who use it. And in this case, mis-use it.

[bubba99]

Not sure it was a technology problem or a process problem. The mud loggers (engineers) on site noted a serious pressure problem while the well was being flooded with seawater to ready for a cement cap.

The pressure was 1400 psi, way too high for the manover they were trying. The rig people wanted to refill with drilling mud until the pressure could be explained or mitigated. The BP manager on site said no. Continue with the sea water. The rest is history.

Technology is only as good as the people who use it. And in this case, mis-use it.

[bubba99]

Not sure it was a technology problem or a process problem. The mud loggers (engineers) on site noted a serious pressure problem while the well was being flooded with seawater to ready for a cement cap.

The pressure was 1400 psi, way too high for the manover they were trying. The rig people wanted to refill with drilling mud until the pressure could be explained or mitigated. The BP manager on site said no. Continue with the sea water. The rest is history.

Technology is only as good as the people who use it. And in this case, mis-use it.

[bubba99]

Not sure it was a technology problem or a process problem. The mud loggers (engineers) on site noted a serious pressure problem while the well was being flooded with seawater to ready for a cement cap.

The pressure was 1400 psi, way too high for the manover they were trying. The rig people wanted to refill with drilling mud until the pressure could be explained or mitigated. The BP manager on site said no. Continue with the sea water. The rest is history.

Technology is only as good as the people who use it. And in this case, mis-use it.

[Arraya]

A post from one of the rig guys over at theoildrum.com

No oil and gas well ever drilled has gone exactly to plan, or without mistakes being made. The Upstream Industry has learned the hard way. The path to todays drilling (well construction) approach is littered with terible loss events, and awash with lessons. But the fact is that todays drilling approach allows for mistakes to be made, simply because wells do not always behave as planned, and the execution of each step of the well construction plan relies on people. Contingency measure after contingency measure is layered over the average well construction plan such that if one, two, three, or even more consecutive issues occur and stack up against the well construction team there remains the cability on hand to identify there is a problem, to secure the well, and to plan and effect an appropriate remedial plan.

Yes a number of issues were stacking up against the well contruction team on Mississippi Canyon 252 #1-01 well on the night of the tradgey. Issues such as a communication path between the reservoir (oil and gas) and the well bore, the choice of casing plan and related well barriers, etc. However up until around 21:45 there remained the cability on hand to identify there was a problem, to secure the well, and to plan and effect an appropriate remedial plan to deal with the issues that had stacked up.

Unfortunately, at around 21:47 the Annular BOP opened releasing the immense energy that had accumulated beneath it (gas), energy that on release evacuated (ejected) the drilling riser of fluids in seconds. Thousands of gallons of fluids entering the workspace (drill floor) at almost jet force would have made any subsequent action to try to regain control of the well very difficult.

Much has been made about the issues that stacked up against the well construction team on that night, the cement program, the cement quality, the casing program, the testing program, etc etc, however the point remains that until around 21:45 the team still had the ability on hand to identify there was a problem, to secure the well, and to plan and effect an appropriate remedial plan to deal with the issues that had stacked up. The BOP Annular was closed and was capable of containing pressure build up as a result of the leak path between the reservoir and the well bore. There were other BOP Ram Preventers available of high pressure rating than the BOP Annular Preventer to call upon if required. With this contingency at hand (the last layer of contingency in any well construction plan), why did it still go so wrong?

I would offer that the real question is why did the BOP annular open? Did it fail? Was it opened by mistake? Was it opened thinking there was no hazardous gas build up below it? The investigation team will undoubtedly determine the truth.

I can also offer that in the Drilling Industry the Driller (the man that operates the drilling machine integrated into the rig structure) has two Golden Rules when it comes to well control:
#1, if there is any doubt whatsoever about a possible influx of formation fluid into the well bore then the well must be shut in (close the BOP), he requires approval from no-man for this action
#2, if the BOP has been closed for whatever well activity the Driller must be assured that doing so will not result in a hazardous situation for him, his team and all with him at the worksite. He requires approval from the worksite supervisors for this action.

The mud logger charts (main drilling parameter record) for the period 20:00hrs through 21:50hrs as presented at the Senate hearing show clear indicators of a problem with the well. There was more flow coming back from the well than going in, there was additional pressure where there should not have been. Evaluation and interpretation of these charts is an essential part fo providing the Driller the assurance he needs that opening the BOP Annular will not result in a hazardous situation.

If the BOP Annular was opened by the well construction team the other question undoubtedly being asked by the investigation team is whether suitable and sufficient evaluation and interpretation of the drilling parameter records was undertaken prior to authorising the opening of the BOP Annular?

The time line on the mud logger chart suggests around 15 minutes (from 21:30hrs to around 21:45hrs) may have been available for the well construction team to evaluate and interpret why there was pressure under the BOP Annular when there shouldnt have been.

15 minutes is not a long time to consider this kind of situation. Given that there had been a number of issues going on with this well since the casing was run and cemented (a lot of red flags were flying) there should have been the highest degree of awareness on every subsequent step of the operation. This means the full attention of all supervisors at all times. So, assuming again that the BOP Annular was opened by the team, why was there only a few minutes spent deciding the next step when the biggest red flag of them all (pressure under the BOP Annular) was waving.

[Arraya]

A post from one of the rig guys over at theoildrum.com

No oil and gas well ever drilled has gone exactly to plan, or without mistakes being made. The Upstream Industry has learned the hard way. The path to todays drilling (well construction) approach is littered with terible loss events, and awash with lessons. But the fact is that todays drilling approach allows for mistakes to be made, simply because wells do not always behave as planned, and the execution of each step of the well construction plan relies on people. Contingency measure after contingency measure is layered over the average well construction plan such that if one, two, three, or even more consecutive issues occur and stack up against the well construction team there remains the cability on hand to identify there is a problem, to secure the well, and to plan and effect an appropriate remedial plan.

Yes a number of issues were stacking up against the well contruction team on Mississippi Canyon 252 #1-01 well on the night of the tradgey. Issues such as a communication path between the reservoir (oil and gas) and the well bore, the choice of casing plan and related well barriers, etc. However up until around 21:45 there remained the cability on hand to identify there was a problem, to secure the well, and to plan and effect an appropriate remedial plan to deal with the issues that had stacked up.

Unfortunately, at around 21:47 the Annular BOP opened releasing the immense energy that had accumulated beneath it (gas), energy that on release evacuated (ejected) the drilling riser of fluids in seconds. Thousands of gallons of fluids entering the workspace (drill floor) at almost jet force would have made any subsequent action to try to regain control of the well very difficult.

Much has been made about the issues that stacked up against the well construction team on that night, the cement program, the cement quality, the casing program, the testing program, etc etc, however the point remains that until around 21:45 the team still had the ability on hand to identify there was a problem, to secure the well, and to plan and effect an appropriate remedial plan to deal with the issues that had stacked up. The BOP Annular was closed and was capable of containing pressure build up as a result of the leak path between the reservoir and the well bore. There were other BOP Ram Preventers available of high pressure rating than the BOP Annular Preventer to call upon if required. With this contingency at hand (the last layer of contingency in any well construction plan), why did it still go so wrong?

I would offer that the real question is why did the BOP annular open? Did it fail? Was it opened by mistake? Was it opened thinking there was no hazardous gas build up below it? The investigation team will undoubtedly determine the truth.

I can also offer that in the Drilling Industry the Driller (the man that operates the drilling machine integrated into the rig structure) has two Golden Rules when it comes to well control:
#1, if there is any doubt whatsoever about a possible influx of formation fluid into the well bore then the well must be shut in (close the BOP), he requires approval from no-man for this action
#2, if the BOP has been closed for whatever well activity the Driller must be assured that doing so will not result in a hazardous situation for him, his team and all with him at the worksite. He requires approval from the worksite supervisors for this action.

The mud logger charts (main drilling parameter record) for the period 20:00hrs through 21:50hrs as presented at the Senate hearing show clear indicators of a problem with the well. There was more flow coming back from the well than going in, there was additional pressure where there should not have been. Evaluation and interpretation of these charts is an essential part fo providing the Driller the assurance he needs that opening the BOP Annular will not result in a hazardous situation.

If the BOP Annular was opened by the well construction team the other question undoubtedly being asked by the investigation team is whether suitable and sufficient evaluation and interpretation of the drilling parameter records was undertaken prior to authorising the opening of the BOP Annular?

The time line on the mud logger chart suggests around 15 minutes (from 21:30hrs to around 21:45hrs) may have been available for the well construction team to evaluate and interpret why there was pressure under the BOP Annular when there shouldnt have been.

15 minutes is not a long time to consider this kind of situation. Given that there had been a number of issues going on with this well since the casing was run and cemented (a lot of red flags were flying) there should have been the highest degree of awareness on every subsequent step of the operation. This means the full attention of all supervisors at all times. So, assuming again that the BOP Annular was opened by the team, why was there only a few minutes spent deciding the next step when the biggest red flag of them all (pressure under the BOP Annular) was waving.

[Arraya]

A post from one of the rig guys over at theoildrum.com

No oil and gas well ever drilled has gone exactly to plan, or without mistakes being made. The Upstream Industry has learned the hard way. The path to todays drilling (well construction) approach is littered with terible loss events, and awash with lessons. But the fact is that todays drilling approach allows for mistakes to be made, simply because wells do not always behave as planned, and the execution of each step of the well construction plan relies on people. Contingency measure after contingency measure is layered over the average well construction plan such that if one, two, three, or even more consecutive issues occur and stack up against the well construction team there remains the cability on hand to identify there is a problem, to secure the well, and to plan and effect an appropriate remedial plan.

Yes a number of issues were stacking up against the well contruction team on Mississippi Canyon 252 #1-01 well on the night of the tradgey. Issues such as a communication path between the reservoir (oil and gas) and the well bore, the choice of casing plan and related well barriers, etc. However up until around 21:45 there remained the cability on hand to identify there was a problem, to secure the well, and to plan and effect an appropriate remedial plan to deal with the issues that had stacked up.

Unfortunately, at around 21:47 the Annular BOP opened releasing the immense energy that had accumulated beneath it (gas), energy that on release evacuated (ejected) the drilling riser of fluids in seconds. Thousands of gallons of fluids entering the workspace (drill floor) at almost jet force would have made any subsequent action to try to regain control of the well very difficult.

Much has been made about the issues that stacked up against the well construction team on that night, the cement program, the cement quality, the casing program, the testing program, etc etc, however the point remains that until around 21:45 the team still had the ability on hand to identify there was a problem, to secure the well, and to plan and effect an appropriate remedial plan to deal with the issues that had stacked up. The BOP Annular was closed and was capable of containing pressure build up as a result of the leak path between the reservoir and the well bore. There were other BOP Ram Preventers available of high pressure rating than the BOP Annular Preventer to call upon if required. With this contingency at hand (the last layer of contingency in any well construction plan), why did it still go so wrong?

I would offer that the real question is why did the BOP annular open? Did it fail? Was it opened by mistake? Was it opened thinking there was no hazardous gas build up below it? The investigation team will undoubtedly determine the truth.

I can also offer that in the Drilling Industry the Driller (the man that operates the drilling machine integrated into the rig structure) has two Golden Rules when it comes to well control:
#1, if there is any doubt whatsoever about a possible influx of formation fluid into the well bore then the well must be shut in (close the BOP), he requires approval from no-man for this action
#2, if the BOP has been closed for whatever well activity the Driller must be assured that doing so will not result in a hazardous situation for him, his team and all with him at the worksite. He requires approval from the worksite supervisors for this action.

The mud logger charts (main drilling parameter record) for the period 20:00hrs through 21:50hrs as presented at the Senate hearing show clear indicators of a problem with the well. There was more flow coming back from the well than going in, there was additional pressure where there should not have been. Evaluation and interpretation of these charts is an essential part fo providing the Driller the assurance he needs that opening the BOP Annular will not result in a hazardous situation.

If the BOP Annular was opened by the well construction team the other question undoubtedly being asked by the investigation team is whether suitable and sufficient evaluation and interpretation of the drilling parameter records was undertaken prior to authorising the opening of the BOP Annular?

The time line on the mud logger chart suggests around 15 minutes (from 21:30hrs to around 21:45hrs) may have been available for the well construction team to evaluate and interpret why there was pressure under the BOP Annular when there shouldnt have been.

15 minutes is not a long time to consider this kind of situation. Given that there had been a number of issues going on with this well since the casing was run and cemented (a lot of red flags were flying) there should have been the highest degree of awareness on every subsequent step of the operation. This means the full attention of all supervisors at all times. So, assuming again that the BOP Annular was opened by the team, why was there only a few minutes spent deciding the next step when the biggest red flag of them all (pressure under the BOP Annular) was waving.

[Arraya]

A post from one of the rig guys over at theoildrum.com

No oil and gas well ever drilled has gone exactly to plan, or without mistakes being made. The Upstream Industry has learned the hard way. The path to todays drilling (well construction) approach is littered with terible loss events, and awash with lessons. But the fact is that todays drilling approach allows for mistakes to be made, simply because wells do not always behave as planned, and the execution of each step of the well construction plan relies on people. Contingency measure after contingency measure is layered over the average well construction plan such that if one, two, three, or even more consecutive issues occur and stack up against the well construction team there remains the cability on hand to identify there is a problem, to secure the well, and to plan and effect an appropriate remedial plan.

Yes a number of issues were stacking up against the well contruction team on Mississippi Canyon 252 #1-01 well on the night of the tradgey. Issues such as a communication path between the reservoir (oil and gas) and the well bore, the choice of casing plan and related well barriers, etc. However up until around 21:45 there remained the cability on hand to identify there was a problem, to secure the well, and to plan and effect an appropriate remedial plan to deal with the issues that had stacked up.

Unfortunately, at around 21:47 the Annular BOP opened releasing the immense energy that had accumulated beneath it (gas), energy that on release evacuated (ejected) the drilling riser of fluids in seconds. Thousands of gallons of fluids entering the workspace (drill floor) at almost jet force would have made any subsequent action to try to regain control of the well very difficult.

Much has been made about the issues that stacked up against the well construction team on that night, the cement program, the cement quality, the casing program, the testing program, etc etc, however the point remains that until around 21:45 the team still had the ability on hand to identify there was a problem, to secure the well, and to plan and effect an appropriate remedial plan to deal with the issues that had stacked up. The BOP Annular was closed and was capable of containing pressure build up as a result of the leak path between the reservoir and the well bore. There were other BOP Ram Preventers available of high pressure rating than the BOP Annular Preventer to call upon if required. With this contingency at hand (the last layer of contingency in any well construction plan), why did it still go so wrong?

I would offer that the real question is why did the BOP annular open? Did it fail? Was it opened by mistake? Was it opened thinking there was no hazardous gas build up below it? The investigation team will undoubtedly determine the truth.

I can also offer that in the Drilling Industry the Driller (the man that operates the drilling machine integrated into the rig structure) has two Golden Rules when it comes to well control:
#1, if there is any doubt whatsoever about a possible influx of formation fluid into the well bore then the well must be shut in (close the BOP), he requires approval from no-man for this action
#2, if the BOP has been closed for whatever well activity the Driller must be assured that doing so will not result in a hazardous situation for him, his team and all with him at the worksite. He requires approval from the worksite supervisors for this action.

The mud logger charts (main drilling parameter record) for the period 20:00hrs through 21:50hrs as presented at the Senate hearing show clear indicators of a problem with the well. There was more flow coming back from the well than going in, there was additional pressure where there should not have been. Evaluation and interpretation of these charts is an essential part fo providing the Driller the assurance he needs that opening the BOP Annular will not result in a hazardous situation.

If the BOP Annular was opened by the well construction team the other question undoubtedly being asked by the investigation team is whether suitable and sufficient evaluation and interpretation of the drilling parameter records was undertaken prior to authorising the opening of the BOP Annular?

The time line on the mud logger chart suggests around 15 minutes (from 21:30hrs to around 21:45hrs) may have been available for the well construction team to evaluate and interpret why there was pressure under the BOP Annular when there shouldnt have been.

15 minutes is not a long time to consider this kind of situation. Given that there had been a number of issues going on with this well since the casing was run and cemented (a lot of red flags were flying) there should have been the highest degree of awareness on every subsequent step of the operation. This means the full attention of all supervisors at all times. So, assuming again that the BOP Annular was opened by the team, why was there only a few minutes spent deciding the next step when the biggest red flag of them all (pressure under the BOP Annular) was waving.

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