[Allan from Fallbrook]

gandalf: I want to isolate your comment about Vietnam and the aftermath to illustrate the problems with “misperceptions”.

The US military in Vietnam never lost a battle. Not one. The Tet Offensive of 1968, which Walter Cronkite (among other US newspeople) characterized as a US “defeat” was exactly the opposite. The US destroyed the fighting capability of the Viet Cong for the balance of the war and inflicted such massive casualties on the North Vietnamese Army that it took them years to rebuild their offensive capabilities. However, the American people believed that Tet was a defeat for US forces and the pressure increased on the homefront to end the war and get the troops home.

In 1972, the US launched the “Linebacker” campaigns, a series of sustained bombings against Hanoi and Haiphong Harbor (the main transhipment point for Soviet and Chinese military supplies and materiel). In large part, the campaign was designed to break the deadlock for the US/North Vietnamese peace talks and the overwhelming display of US firepower worked superbly.

Lastly, and most importantly, from 1973 through 1975, during Nixon’s “Vietnamization” program (the tranisition from US led operations to South Vietnamese led operations) the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam – the South Vietnamese forces) forces more than held their own against the North Vietnamese Army (communist). However, this success was entirely predicated on continued US military aid and materiel, and, in 1975 Congress pulled the plug on aid to South Vietnam and precipitated the complete collapse of the South.

I bring all of this up for two reasons: (1) Vietnam was not “Vietnam” in the conventionally held sense, meaning most of what we’ve been told or taught is in direct contradiction of the actual facts of the war, and (2) The parallels exist between Vietnam and Iraq, but not in the way(s) most people think.

Our precipitate withdrawal from Southeast Asia allowed the predations of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouges, as well as those of the North Vietnamese. It also started a long slide for US prestige and power on the world stage, culminating with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the hostage crisis in Iran, both in 1979.

I would argue that our strategic position is not as awful as you imagine. I don’t think our bellicosity with Iran is the best approach, but I don’t think we’ll get much out of attempting to engage the people, either. The hardliners control that country in every sense of the word, and breaking that control will take years, if not a decade or longer. We don’t have that kind of time when it comes to Iran’s timeline to develop the bomb (and I would agree that they probably are already in possession of one or more). We need to develop a strategy that works now and includes possible options that the Europeans won’t countenance, such as military strikes or action by proxy (Israel).

I was also being serious when I asked your opinion of what the heck “American Realism” is. What school of thought is this? Wilsonian? Emersonian? Kissingerian?

[Allan from Fallbrook]

gandalf: I want to isolate your comment about Vietnam and the aftermath to illustrate the problems with “misperceptions”.

The US military in Vietnam never lost a battle. Not one. The Tet Offensive of 1968, which Walter Cronkite (among other US newspeople) characterized as a US “defeat” was exactly the opposite. The US destroyed the fighting capability of the Viet Cong for the balance of the war and inflicted such massive casualties on the North Vietnamese Army that it took them years to rebuild their offensive capabilities. However, the American people believed that Tet was a defeat for US forces and the pressure increased on the homefront to end the war and get the troops home.

In 1972, the US launched the “Linebacker” campaigns, a series of sustained bombings against Hanoi and Haiphong Harbor (the main transhipment point for Soviet and Chinese military supplies and materiel). In large part, the campaign was designed to break the deadlock for the US/North Vietnamese peace talks and the overwhelming display of US firepower worked superbly.

Lastly, and most importantly, from 1973 through 1975, during Nixon’s “Vietnamization” program (the tranisition from US led operations to South Vietnamese led operations) the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam – the South Vietnamese forces) forces more than held their own against the North Vietnamese Army (communist). However, this success was entirely predicated on continued US military aid and materiel, and, in 1975 Congress pulled the plug on aid to South Vietnam and precipitated the complete collapse of the South.

I bring all of this up for two reasons: (1) Vietnam was not “Vietnam” in the conventionally held sense, meaning most of what we’ve been told or taught is in direct contradiction of the actual facts of the war, and (2) The parallels exist between Vietnam and Iraq, but not in the way(s) most people think.

Our precipitate withdrawal from Southeast Asia allowed the predations of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouges, as well as those of the North Vietnamese. It also started a long slide for US prestige and power on the world stage, culminating with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the hostage crisis in Iran, both in 1979.

I would argue that our strategic position is not as awful as you imagine. I don’t think our bellicosity with Iran is the best approach, but I don’t think we’ll get much out of attempting to engage the people, either. The hardliners control that country in every sense of the word, and breaking that control will take years, if not a decade or longer. We don’t have that kind of time when it comes to Iran’s timeline to develop the bomb (and I would agree that they probably are already in possession of one or more). We need to develop a strategy that works now and includes possible options that the Europeans won’t countenance, such as military strikes or action by proxy (Israel).

I was also being serious when I asked your opinion of what the heck “American Realism” is. What school of thought is this? Wilsonian? Emersonian? Kissingerian?

[Allan from Fallbrook]

gandalf: I want to isolate your comment about Vietnam and the aftermath to illustrate the problems with “misperceptions”.

The US military in Vietnam never lost a battle. Not one. The Tet Offensive of 1968, which Walter Cronkite (among other US newspeople) characterized as a US “defeat” was exactly the opposite. The US destroyed the fighting capability of the Viet Cong for the balance of the war and inflicted such massive casualties on the North Vietnamese Army that it took them years to rebuild their offensive capabilities. However, the American people believed that Tet was a defeat for US forces and the pressure increased on the homefront to end the war and get the troops home.

In 1972, the US launched the “Linebacker” campaigns, a series of sustained bombings against Hanoi and Haiphong Harbor (the main transhipment point for Soviet and Chinese military supplies and materiel). In large part, the campaign was designed to break the deadlock for the US/North Vietnamese peace talks and the overwhelming display of US firepower worked superbly.

Lastly, and most importantly, from 1973 through 1975, during Nixon’s “Vietnamization” program (the tranisition from US led operations to South Vietnamese led operations) the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam – the South Vietnamese forces) forces more than held their own against the North Vietnamese Army (communist). However, this success was entirely predicated on continued US military aid and materiel, and, in 1975 Congress pulled the plug on aid to South Vietnam and precipitated the complete collapse of the South.

I bring all of this up for two reasons: (1) Vietnam was not “Vietnam” in the conventionally held sense, meaning most of what we’ve been told or taught is in direct contradiction of the actual facts of the war, and (2) The parallels exist between Vietnam and Iraq, but not in the way(s) most people think.

Our precipitate withdrawal from Southeast Asia allowed the predations of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouges, as well as those of the North Vietnamese. It also started a long slide for US prestige and power on the world stage, culminating with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the hostage crisis in Iran, both in 1979.

I would argue that our strategic position is not as awful as you imagine. I don’t think our bellicosity with Iran is the best approach, but I don’t think we’ll get much out of attempting to engage the people, either. The hardliners control that country in every sense of the word, and breaking that control will take years, if not a decade or longer. We don’t have that kind of time when it comes to Iran’s timeline to develop the bomb (and I would agree that they probably are already in possession of one or more). We need to develop a strategy that works now and includes possible options that the Europeans won’t countenance, such as military strikes or action by proxy (Israel).

I was also being serious when I asked your opinion of what the heck “American Realism” is. What school of thought is this? Wilsonian? Emersonian? Kissingerian?

[Allan from Fallbrook]

gandalf: I want to isolate your comment about Vietnam and the aftermath to illustrate the problems with “misperceptions”.

The US military in Vietnam never lost a battle. Not one. The Tet Offensive of 1968, which Walter Cronkite (among other US newspeople) characterized as a US “defeat” was exactly the opposite. The US destroyed the fighting capability of the Viet Cong for the balance of the war and inflicted such massive casualties on the North Vietnamese Army that it took them years to rebuild their offensive capabilities. However, the American people believed that Tet was a defeat for US forces and the pressure increased on the homefront to end the war and get the troops home.

In 1972, the US launched the “Linebacker” campaigns, a series of sustained bombings against Hanoi and Haiphong Harbor (the main transhipment point for Soviet and Chinese military supplies and materiel). In large part, the campaign was designed to break the deadlock for the US/North Vietnamese peace talks and the overwhelming display of US firepower worked superbly.

Lastly, and most importantly, from 1973 through 1975, during Nixon’s “Vietnamization” program (the tranisition from US led operations to South Vietnamese led operations) the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam – the South Vietnamese forces) forces more than held their own against the North Vietnamese Army (communist). However, this success was entirely predicated on continued US military aid and materiel, and, in 1975 Congress pulled the plug on aid to South Vietnam and precipitated the complete collapse of the South.

I bring all of this up for two reasons: (1) Vietnam was not “Vietnam” in the conventionally held sense, meaning most of what we’ve been told or taught is in direct contradiction of the actual facts of the war, and (2) The parallels exist between Vietnam and Iraq, but not in the way(s) most people think.

Our precipitate withdrawal from Southeast Asia allowed the predations of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouges, as well as those of the North Vietnamese. It also started a long slide for US prestige and power on the world stage, culminating with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the hostage crisis in Iran, both in 1979.

I would argue that our strategic position is not as awful as you imagine. I don’t think our bellicosity with Iran is the best approach, but I don’t think we’ll get much out of attempting to engage the people, either. The hardliners control that country in every sense of the word, and breaking that control will take years, if not a decade or longer. We don’t have that kind of time when it comes to Iran’s timeline to develop the bomb (and I would agree that they probably are already in possession of one or more). We need to develop a strategy that works now and includes possible options that the Europeans won’t countenance, such as military strikes or action by proxy (Israel).

I was also being serious when I asked your opinion of what the heck “American Realism” is. What school of thought is this? Wilsonian? Emersonian? Kissingerian?

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Dan: Except it is not widely accepted by historians. On this one, I am going to go and get examples, so I don’t fall prey to making a sweeping generalization of my own.

Regarding global Wahhabism and “programming”: I would cite the findings of MI5/MI6 in England that the majority of the threat they (England) face is of the home grown variety. The cells in England are, in large part, comprised of Britons. Yes, you read that correctly: Britons. Not imports from Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Pakistan, but Britons. Holland, France and even places like Denmark are facing the same threat, although in those three examples the main element of the threat is from foreign emigres. None of these places is a dictatorship.

Regarding Iran and the bomb: They have the clearly stated intent of acquiring one and joining the Nuclear Club and the clearly stated intent of wiping both Israel and the US from the map. This is not simply rhetoric (on either count). The pointless negotiations and empty threats of the Europeans have indeed wasted time and have done absolutely nothing in terms of slowing Iran down. I’m not worried about Iran invading Florida, I’m worried about Iran lighting a nuke off over Tel Aviv. At that point, there is no conversation. As to their incentive to get a nuke because Israel has one (or, more accurately several dozen): Israel has been possessed of a nuclear capability for quite a while now, so I’m hard pressed to imagine Iran just woke up to the idea that since Israel has them, they need them, too.

Neville Chamberlain applies to the concept of appeasement. The Europeans are appeasing the Iranians, much the same way that Great Britain and France appeased Hitler. Perhaps the analogy is inapt, but the underlying concept is the same: They are giving things away and also reinforcing Iran’s belief that the West is weak and will always prefer to speak before taking action. Iran’s continued intransigence while the Europeans bleat on is proof of this.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Dan: Except it is not widely accepted by historians. On this one, I am going to go and get examples, so I don’t fall prey to making a sweeping generalization of my own.

Regarding global Wahhabism and “programming”: I would cite the findings of MI5/MI6 in England that the majority of the threat they (England) face is of the home grown variety. The cells in England are, in large part, comprised of Britons. Yes, you read that correctly: Britons. Not imports from Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Pakistan, but Britons. Holland, France and even places like Denmark are facing the same threat, although in those three examples the main element of the threat is from foreign emigres. None of these places is a dictatorship.

Regarding Iran and the bomb: They have the clearly stated intent of acquiring one and joining the Nuclear Club and the clearly stated intent of wiping both Israel and the US from the map. This is not simply rhetoric (on either count). The pointless negotiations and empty threats of the Europeans have indeed wasted time and have done absolutely nothing in terms of slowing Iran down. I’m not worried about Iran invading Florida, I’m worried about Iran lighting a nuke off over Tel Aviv. At that point, there is no conversation. As to their incentive to get a nuke because Israel has one (or, more accurately several dozen): Israel has been possessed of a nuclear capability for quite a while now, so I’m hard pressed to imagine Iran just woke up to the idea that since Israel has them, they need them, too.

Neville Chamberlain applies to the concept of appeasement. The Europeans are appeasing the Iranians, much the same way that Great Britain and France appeased Hitler. Perhaps the analogy is inapt, but the underlying concept is the same: They are giving things away and also reinforcing Iran’s belief that the West is weak and will always prefer to speak before taking action. Iran’s continued intransigence while the Europeans bleat on is proof of this.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Dan: Except it is not widely accepted by historians. On this one, I am going to go and get examples, so I don’t fall prey to making a sweeping generalization of my own.

Regarding global Wahhabism and “programming”: I would cite the findings of MI5/MI6 in England that the majority of the threat they (England) face is of the home grown variety. The cells in England are, in large part, comprised of Britons. Yes, you read that correctly: Britons. Not imports from Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Pakistan, but Britons. Holland, France and even places like Denmark are facing the same threat, although in those three examples the main element of the threat is from foreign emigres. None of these places is a dictatorship.

Regarding Iran and the bomb: They have the clearly stated intent of acquiring one and joining the Nuclear Club and the clearly stated intent of wiping both Israel and the US from the map. This is not simply rhetoric (on either count). The pointless negotiations and empty threats of the Europeans have indeed wasted time and have done absolutely nothing in terms of slowing Iran down. I’m not worried about Iran invading Florida, I’m worried about Iran lighting a nuke off over Tel Aviv. At that point, there is no conversation. As to their incentive to get a nuke because Israel has one (or, more accurately several dozen): Israel has been possessed of a nuclear capability for quite a while now, so I’m hard pressed to imagine Iran just woke up to the idea that since Israel has them, they need them, too.

Neville Chamberlain applies to the concept of appeasement. The Europeans are appeasing the Iranians, much the same way that Great Britain and France appeased Hitler. Perhaps the analogy is inapt, but the underlying concept is the same: They are giving things away and also reinforcing Iran’s belief that the West is weak and will always prefer to speak before taking action. Iran’s continued intransigence while the Europeans bleat on is proof of this.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Dan: Except it is not widely accepted by historians. On this one, I am going to go and get examples, so I don’t fall prey to making a sweeping generalization of my own.

Regarding global Wahhabism and “programming”: I would cite the findings of MI5/MI6 in England that the majority of the threat they (England) face is of the home grown variety. The cells in England are, in large part, comprised of Britons. Yes, you read that correctly: Britons. Not imports from Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Pakistan, but Britons. Holland, France and even places like Denmark are facing the same threat, although in those three examples the main element of the threat is from foreign emigres. None of these places is a dictatorship.

Regarding Iran and the bomb: They have the clearly stated intent of acquiring one and joining the Nuclear Club and the clearly stated intent of wiping both Israel and the US from the map. This is not simply rhetoric (on either count). The pointless negotiations and empty threats of the Europeans have indeed wasted time and have done absolutely nothing in terms of slowing Iran down. I’m not worried about Iran invading Florida, I’m worried about Iran lighting a nuke off over Tel Aviv. At that point, there is no conversation. As to their incentive to get a nuke because Israel has one (or, more accurately several dozen): Israel has been possessed of a nuclear capability for quite a while now, so I’m hard pressed to imagine Iran just woke up to the idea that since Israel has them, they need them, too.

Neville Chamberlain applies to the concept of appeasement. The Europeans are appeasing the Iranians, much the same way that Great Britain and France appeased Hitler. Perhaps the analogy is inapt, but the underlying concept is the same: They are giving things away and also reinforcing Iran’s belief that the West is weak and will always prefer to speak before taking action. Iran’s continued intransigence while the Europeans bleat on is proof of this.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Dan: Except it is not widely accepted by historians. On this one, I am going to go and get examples, so I don’t fall prey to making a sweeping generalization of my own.

Regarding global Wahhabism and “programming”: I would cite the findings of MI5/MI6 in England that the majority of the threat they (England) face is of the home grown variety. The cells in England are, in large part, comprised of Britons. Yes, you read that correctly: Britons. Not imports from Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Pakistan, but Britons. Holland, France and even places like Denmark are facing the same threat, although in those three examples the main element of the threat is from foreign emigres. None of these places is a dictatorship.

Regarding Iran and the bomb: They have the clearly stated intent of acquiring one and joining the Nuclear Club and the clearly stated intent of wiping both Israel and the US from the map. This is not simply rhetoric (on either count). The pointless negotiations and empty threats of the Europeans have indeed wasted time and have done absolutely nothing in terms of slowing Iran down. I’m not worried about Iran invading Florida, I’m worried about Iran lighting a nuke off over Tel Aviv. At that point, there is no conversation. As to their incentive to get a nuke because Israel has one (or, more accurately several dozen): Israel has been possessed of a nuclear capability for quite a while now, so I’m hard pressed to imagine Iran just woke up to the idea that since Israel has them, they need them, too.

Neville Chamberlain applies to the concept of appeasement. The Europeans are appeasing the Iranians, much the same way that Great Britain and France appeased Hitler. Perhaps the analogy is inapt, but the underlying concept is the same: They are giving things away and also reinforcing Iran’s belief that the West is weak and will always prefer to speak before taking action. Iran’s continued intransigence while the Europeans bleat on is proof of this.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Dan: You wrote: “The last time there were large Islamic empires they existed as one of the pinnacles of Mediterranean development. They had great works, religious tolerance (for montheists) and tremendous economic and intellectual developments”.

This is a popular misconception and one that has been furthered by cinema (David Lean’s “Lawrence of Arabia” comes to mind), books and the media.

In point of fact most of the “tremendous economic and intellectual developments” you cite were actually products of the conquered peoples (the Jews, for instance) and not the Arabs/Muslims/Moors themselves. Bernard Lewis and other Arabist authors have made this point as well.

The “religious tolerance” you cite is also something of a sweeping generalization rather than a specific truth. The Spanish Reconquista came about because the Spaniards sought to throw off the repressive government they lived under. The Crusades are another example of what happens after several centuries of Islamic “religious tolerance”.

Whether or not the worldwide Islamic Caliphate that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda envision will be a reality is obviously open to debate. However, it is gaining traction and in areas from Indonesia to Egypt to Turkey to Britain. Wahhabist Islam is not only virulent, but viral. It threatens regimes in Saudi Arabia and Egypt (in my opinion, at even greater danger of destabilizing than Saudi Arabia), as well as democratic countries like Holland, France, Britain and Italy.

You’re correct that our being nicer isn’t really at issue. Our being smarter certainly is, and gandalf has astutely pointed out that we are barking up the wrong tree with our nation building exercise in Iraq. However, I would point out that Iran’s animosity at present has far less to do with our questionable coup in 1953 and far more to do with regional hegemony. And, in that case, the example of Neville Chamberlain is quite relevant. Perhaps the Iranians aren’t as dangerous as Herr Hitler in the late 1930s, but, with a nuke, even petty dictators can punch far above their weight.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Dan: You wrote: “The last time there were large Islamic empires they existed as one of the pinnacles of Mediterranean development. They had great works, religious tolerance (for montheists) and tremendous economic and intellectual developments”.

This is a popular misconception and one that has been furthered by cinema (David Lean’s “Lawrence of Arabia” comes to mind), books and the media.

In point of fact most of the “tremendous economic and intellectual developments” you cite were actually products of the conquered peoples (the Jews, for instance) and not the Arabs/Muslims/Moors themselves. Bernard Lewis and other Arabist authors have made this point as well.

The “religious tolerance” you cite is also something of a sweeping generalization rather than a specific truth. The Spanish Reconquista came about because the Spaniards sought to throw off the repressive government they lived under. The Crusades are another example of what happens after several centuries of Islamic “religious tolerance”.

Whether or not the worldwide Islamic Caliphate that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda envision will be a reality is obviously open to debate. However, it is gaining traction and in areas from Indonesia to Egypt to Turkey to Britain. Wahhabist Islam is not only virulent, but viral. It threatens regimes in Saudi Arabia and Egypt (in my opinion, at even greater danger of destabilizing than Saudi Arabia), as well as democratic countries like Holland, France, Britain and Italy.

You’re correct that our being nicer isn’t really at issue. Our being smarter certainly is, and gandalf has astutely pointed out that we are barking up the wrong tree with our nation building exercise in Iraq. However, I would point out that Iran’s animosity at present has far less to do with our questionable coup in 1953 and far more to do with regional hegemony. And, in that case, the example of Neville Chamberlain is quite relevant. Perhaps the Iranians aren’t as dangerous as Herr Hitler in the late 1930s, but, with a nuke, even petty dictators can punch far above their weight.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Dan: You wrote: “The last time there were large Islamic empires they existed as one of the pinnacles of Mediterranean development. They had great works, religious tolerance (for montheists) and tremendous economic and intellectual developments”.

This is a popular misconception and one that has been furthered by cinema (David Lean’s “Lawrence of Arabia” comes to mind), books and the media.

In point of fact most of the “tremendous economic and intellectual developments” you cite were actually products of the conquered peoples (the Jews, for instance) and not the Arabs/Muslims/Moors themselves. Bernard Lewis and other Arabist authors have made this point as well.

The “religious tolerance” you cite is also something of a sweeping generalization rather than a specific truth. The Spanish Reconquista came about because the Spaniards sought to throw off the repressive government they lived under. The Crusades are another example of what happens after several centuries of Islamic “religious tolerance”.

Whether or not the worldwide Islamic Caliphate that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda envision will be a reality is obviously open to debate. However, it is gaining traction and in areas from Indonesia to Egypt to Turkey to Britain. Wahhabist Islam is not only virulent, but viral. It threatens regimes in Saudi Arabia and Egypt (in my opinion, at even greater danger of destabilizing than Saudi Arabia), as well as democratic countries like Holland, France, Britain and Italy.

You’re correct that our being nicer isn’t really at issue. Our being smarter certainly is, and gandalf has astutely pointed out that we are barking up the wrong tree with our nation building exercise in Iraq. However, I would point out that Iran’s animosity at present has far less to do with our questionable coup in 1953 and far more to do with regional hegemony. And, in that case, the example of Neville Chamberlain is quite relevant. Perhaps the Iranians aren’t as dangerous as Herr Hitler in the late 1930s, but, with a nuke, even petty dictators can punch far above their weight.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Dan: You wrote: “The last time there were large Islamic empires they existed as one of the pinnacles of Mediterranean development. They had great works, religious tolerance (for montheists) and tremendous economic and intellectual developments”.

This is a popular misconception and one that has been furthered by cinema (David Lean’s “Lawrence of Arabia” comes to mind), books and the media.

In point of fact most of the “tremendous economic and intellectual developments” you cite were actually products of the conquered peoples (the Jews, for instance) and not the Arabs/Muslims/Moors themselves. Bernard Lewis and other Arabist authors have made this point as well.

The “religious tolerance” you cite is also something of a sweeping generalization rather than a specific truth. The Spanish Reconquista came about because the Spaniards sought to throw off the repressive government they lived under. The Crusades are another example of what happens after several centuries of Islamic “religious tolerance”.

Whether or not the worldwide Islamic Caliphate that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda envision will be a reality is obviously open to debate. However, it is gaining traction and in areas from Indonesia to Egypt to Turkey to Britain. Wahhabist Islam is not only virulent, but viral. It threatens regimes in Saudi Arabia and Egypt (in my opinion, at even greater danger of destabilizing than Saudi Arabia), as well as democratic countries like Holland, France, Britain and Italy.

You’re correct that our being nicer isn’t really at issue. Our being smarter certainly is, and gandalf has astutely pointed out that we are barking up the wrong tree with our nation building exercise in Iraq. However, I would point out that Iran’s animosity at present has far less to do with our questionable coup in 1953 and far more to do with regional hegemony. And, in that case, the example of Neville Chamberlain is quite relevant. Perhaps the Iranians aren’t as dangerous as Herr Hitler in the late 1930s, but, with a nuke, even petty dictators can punch far above their weight.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Dan: You wrote: “The last time there were large Islamic empires they existed as one of the pinnacles of Mediterranean development. They had great works, religious tolerance (for montheists) and tremendous economic and intellectual developments”.

This is a popular misconception and one that has been furthered by cinema (David Lean’s “Lawrence of Arabia” comes to mind), books and the media.

In point of fact most of the “tremendous economic and intellectual developments” you cite were actually products of the conquered peoples (the Jews, for instance) and not the Arabs/Muslims/Moors themselves. Bernard Lewis and other Arabist authors have made this point as well.

The “religious tolerance” you cite is also something of a sweeping generalization rather than a specific truth. The Spanish Reconquista came about because the Spaniards sought to throw off the repressive government they lived under. The Crusades are another example of what happens after several centuries of Islamic “religious tolerance”.

Whether or not the worldwide Islamic Caliphate that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda envision will be a reality is obviously open to debate. However, it is gaining traction and in areas from Indonesia to Egypt to Turkey to Britain. Wahhabist Islam is not only virulent, but viral. It threatens regimes in Saudi Arabia and Egypt (in my opinion, at even greater danger of destabilizing than Saudi Arabia), as well as democratic countries like Holland, France, Britain and Italy.

You’re correct that our being nicer isn’t really at issue. Our being smarter certainly is, and gandalf has astutely pointed out that we are barking up the wrong tree with our nation building exercise in Iraq. However, I would point out that Iran’s animosity at present has far less to do with our questionable coup in 1953 and far more to do with regional hegemony. And, in that case, the example of Neville Chamberlain is quite relevant. Perhaps the Iranians aren’t as dangerous as Herr Hitler in the late 1930s, but, with a nuke, even petty dictators can punch far above their weight.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Dan: Well thought out response. I want to take some time and digest this before responding (although I realize that this was meant for surveyor).

Couple of things: You mention being a liberal from San Francisco. Were you born/bred in The City? I hail from down by Palo Alto, and was just curious.

As to Germany invading Belgium: Which Germany? The one in WWI or WWII? Granted, this is just a point of punctilio, but it would seem to matter when discussing types of regimes, especially given that the Germany that invaded Belgium in 1914 wasn’t fascist; however, their actions there were widely condemned by the world at large for their brutality.

Again, well thought out response and I will have some fun (as I’m sure surveyor will) noodling on this.

[Author]

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