[Allan from Fallbrook]

Rus/arraya: As I said before, history is immutable. As much as I would love to see things evolve, history tells a far different story.

The best book of history I ever read was Thucydides’ “A History of the Peloponnesian War”. This concise little volume contains an unchanging story, for nearly all of the written history that followed was the same tale, only with different actors in different places.

Looking at Athens and Sparta, at the height of their respective power and then watching as they engage in an utter fruitless, sanguinary war of thirty years that bankrupts Athens and opens the door to the autocracy and madness of Alexander the Great is heartbreaking. The story never changes, though. In the 2,500 years that have followed, the story never changes.

“Power tends to corrupt, absolute power corrupts absolutely”, Lord Acton.

“History is written by the victor”, Napoleon Bonaparte.

“Treason is simply a matter of dates”, Talleyrand.

“Good guy? Bad guy? I’m the guy with the gun”, Bruce Campbell in “Army of Darkness”.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Breeze: In reference to your comment on Al Gore and him not invading Iraq: (from Frank Harvey/CDI paper)

“Had he been elected, would Al Gore have taken the same path as George Bush? He concludes, overwhelmingly, that he would have.

Given the prevailing mood in the aftermath of 9/11, the institutional structures that surround the president, the political and social pressures of the time, the accepted wisdom regarding Saddam Hussein and the international factors at work, says Harvey, Gore “[would have been] compelled … to make many of the same interim (generally praised) decisions for many of the same reasons. Momentum would have done the rest.”

There are several threads to Harvey’s argument, which you can read in its entirety here. At the risk of oversimplifying a very detailed examination, here are a few of the arguments he makes:

• Despite its universal acceptance, the prevailing theory of the war, which Harvey calls “neoconism” “remains an unsubstantiated assertion, a ‘theory’ without theoretical content, an argument devoid of logic or perspective … Even the most superficial review of its central tenets reveals serious logical, empirical and theoretical flaws.”

For instance, he notes, it presumes that Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney and a few like-minded ideologues “had the intellectual prowess and political skills to manipulate the preferences, perceptions and priorities” of non-neocons such as Tony Blair and Colin Powell; the majority of both parties in both houses of Congress; the leadership of foreign policy and intelligence committees in the House and Senate — including every senior Democrat; most European leaders; “every member of the UN Security Council (including France, Russia and China) who unanimously endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 1441; and 60%-70% of the American people at the time.

• The “neocon” argument presumes Gore, in the same circumstances, would not have been presented with similar advice or faced pressures to act in a similar way. Harvey suggests this is wishful thinking. “In fact, all of the relevant evidence from Gore’s entire political career – his speeches on Iraq, contributions to the 2000 campaign debates on foreign affairs, policy announcements and interviews” argue Gore would have been at least as aggressive as Bush. As Harvey points out:

“Gore was a foreign policy hawk. He consistently opposed efforts to cut defense spending, supported Reagan’s decisions to bomb Libya, invade Grenada, aid the Contras in the 80s, and fund the B-1 and B-2 bomber and MX missile programs.” Gore and his running mate, Senator Joe Lieberman, both backed the 1991 Gulf War. As Vice President, Gore supported military actions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and “consistently adopted the hardest line in the Clinton administration when dealing with Saddam Hussein.” When President Clinton decided to abort his four-day bombing of Iraq in 1998, Gore opposed backing down “despite the absence of UN Security Council endorsement.”

Gore was surrounded by advisers who shared his hawkish views, whose speeches, statements and policy positions at the time give no hint they were reluctant to use force to bring Saddam Hussein into line.

• Bush did not invent the conditions or attitudes at the time. Gore would have been presented with the same flawed intelligence on Iraq’s weapons capabilities, faced the same public fears and pressures and the same international concerns. “Every member of the UN Security Council (including the war’s strongest critics, France and Russia)” unanimously endorsed the belief that Saddam had maintained proscribed weapons and was actively frustrating UN efforts to find them, Harvey writes.

“Anyone looking for reasons to be worried about Iraq could easily ignore speeches by Bush, Cheney or Rumsfeld and focus instead on those delivered by Clinton (Bill or Hillary), Gore and Kerry; they could ignore the 2002 [National Intelligence Estimate] and read the NIEs published over the previous five years; or they could simply read the reports by UNMOVIC’s chief weapons inspector Hans Blix, or UNSCOM’s inspector Scott Ritter (one of the war’s strongest critics).”

• The faulty intelligence was backed up by Saddam’s bizarre efforts to encourage such beliefs, in hopes it would reduce the danger of a second conflict with Iran. There is no reason to believe Saddam would have acted differently under a Gore administration.

Harvey notes that the decision to invade was not made overnight but culminated from a series of escalating steps involving the UN and a host of international leaders, both friendly and otherwise.
“President Gore would have been compelled to make all of the same rational moves to get inspectors back into Iraq,” he concludes. “Strategically, the only way to accomplish this goal through multilateral diplomacy would have been to follow the same basic strategy. The competing counterfactual claim that none of these decisions would have been taken is simply not credible.”

He adds: “The only significant difference would have been the size of the invading force – Gore would probably have recommended a much larger troop deployment in line with General Anthony Zinni’s plan under the Clinton administration (OPPLAN 1003-98, originally approved in 1996 and updated in 1998, called for 400,000 troops). Boosted by the confidence of deploying this many troops, and concerned about the cost of sustaining such a large force through prolonged (and unsuccessful) inspections, Gore would have been more, not less inclined to accept the risks of war. It is highly unlikely that a sitting Democratic President would have survived the 2004 election if he decided against enforcing “all necessary means” or “serious consequences” in favour of the French-Russian position.” END

As to your position that “Knowledge = Trivia” and “Polemics = Facts”, I’m not interested in continuing either a conversation or a debate with you. You’ve done neither. What you’ve done is regurgitated information (which is not knowledge) from a variety of different sources and tried to make it your own. Your reversals of position, use of strawman arguments and the general sense you have of simply being lost (akin to your discussing banking with davelj) makes conversation or debate impossible.

The idea that my sense of history is simply trivia is indicative of that. You are heavily propagandized and cannot see history for what it is: A road marker in terms of how nation-states behave in a given situation and a predictor of future actions. You might want to learn some more “trivia” yourself (read a book or two).

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Breeze: In reference to your comment on Al Gore and him not invading Iraq: (from Frank Harvey/CDI paper)

“Had he been elected, would Al Gore have taken the same path as George Bush? He concludes, overwhelmingly, that he would have.

Given the prevailing mood in the aftermath of 9/11, the institutional structures that surround the president, the political and social pressures of the time, the accepted wisdom regarding Saddam Hussein and the international factors at work, says Harvey, Gore “[would have been] compelled … to make many of the same interim (generally praised) decisions for many of the same reasons. Momentum would have done the rest.”

There are several threads to Harvey’s argument, which you can read in its entirety here. At the risk of oversimplifying a very detailed examination, here are a few of the arguments he makes:

• Despite its universal acceptance, the prevailing theory of the war, which Harvey calls “neoconism” “remains an unsubstantiated assertion, a ‘theory’ without theoretical content, an argument devoid of logic or perspective … Even the most superficial review of its central tenets reveals serious logical, empirical and theoretical flaws.”

For instance, he notes, it presumes that Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney and a few like-minded ideologues “had the intellectual prowess and political skills to manipulate the preferences, perceptions and priorities” of non-neocons such as Tony Blair and Colin Powell; the majority of both parties in both houses of Congress; the leadership of foreign policy and intelligence committees in the House and Senate — including every senior Democrat; most European leaders; “every member of the UN Security Council (including France, Russia and China) who unanimously endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 1441; and 60%-70% of the American people at the time.

• The “neocon” argument presumes Gore, in the same circumstances, would not have been presented with similar advice or faced pressures to act in a similar way. Harvey suggests this is wishful thinking. “In fact, all of the relevant evidence from Gore’s entire political career – his speeches on Iraq, contributions to the 2000 campaign debates on foreign affairs, policy announcements and interviews” argue Gore would have been at least as aggressive as Bush. As Harvey points out:

“Gore was a foreign policy hawk. He consistently opposed efforts to cut defense spending, supported Reagan’s decisions to bomb Libya, invade Grenada, aid the Contras in the 80s, and fund the B-1 and B-2 bomber and MX missile programs.” Gore and his running mate, Senator Joe Lieberman, both backed the 1991 Gulf War. As Vice President, Gore supported military actions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and “consistently adopted the hardest line in the Clinton administration when dealing with Saddam Hussein.” When President Clinton decided to abort his four-day bombing of Iraq in 1998, Gore opposed backing down “despite the absence of UN Security Council endorsement.”

Gore was surrounded by advisers who shared his hawkish views, whose speeches, statements and policy positions at the time give no hint they were reluctant to use force to bring Saddam Hussein into line.

• Bush did not invent the conditions or attitudes at the time. Gore would have been presented with the same flawed intelligence on Iraq’s weapons capabilities, faced the same public fears and pressures and the same international concerns. “Every member of the UN Security Council (including the war’s strongest critics, France and Russia)” unanimously endorsed the belief that Saddam had maintained proscribed weapons and was actively frustrating UN efforts to find them, Harvey writes.

“Anyone looking for reasons to be worried about Iraq could easily ignore speeches by Bush, Cheney or Rumsfeld and focus instead on those delivered by Clinton (Bill or Hillary), Gore and Kerry; they could ignore the 2002 [National Intelligence Estimate] and read the NIEs published over the previous five years; or they could simply read the reports by UNMOVIC’s chief weapons inspector Hans Blix, or UNSCOM’s inspector Scott Ritter (one of the war’s strongest critics).”

• The faulty intelligence was backed up by Saddam’s bizarre efforts to encourage such beliefs, in hopes it would reduce the danger of a second conflict with Iran. There is no reason to believe Saddam would have acted differently under a Gore administration.

Harvey notes that the decision to invade was not made overnight but culminated from a series of escalating steps involving the UN and a host of international leaders, both friendly and otherwise.
“President Gore would have been compelled to make all of the same rational moves to get inspectors back into Iraq,” he concludes. “Strategically, the only way to accomplish this goal through multilateral diplomacy would have been to follow the same basic strategy. The competing counterfactual claim that none of these decisions would have been taken is simply not credible.”

He adds: “The only significant difference would have been the size of the invading force – Gore would probably have recommended a much larger troop deployment in line with General Anthony Zinni’s plan under the Clinton administration (OPPLAN 1003-98, originally approved in 1996 and updated in 1998, called for 400,000 troops). Boosted by the confidence of deploying this many troops, and concerned about the cost of sustaining such a large force through prolonged (and unsuccessful) inspections, Gore would have been more, not less inclined to accept the risks of war. It is highly unlikely that a sitting Democratic President would have survived the 2004 election if he decided against enforcing “all necessary means” or “serious consequences” in favour of the French-Russian position.” END

As to your position that “Knowledge = Trivia” and “Polemics = Facts”, I’m not interested in continuing either a conversation or a debate with you. You’ve done neither. What you’ve done is regurgitated information (which is not knowledge) from a variety of different sources and tried to make it your own. Your reversals of position, use of strawman arguments and the general sense you have of simply being lost (akin to your discussing banking with davelj) makes conversation or debate impossible.

The idea that my sense of history is simply trivia is indicative of that. You are heavily propagandized and cannot see history for what it is: A road marker in terms of how nation-states behave in a given situation and a predictor of future actions. You might want to learn some more “trivia” yourself (read a book or two).

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Breeze: In reference to your comment on Al Gore and him not invading Iraq: (from Frank Harvey/CDI paper)

“Had he been elected, would Al Gore have taken the same path as George Bush? He concludes, overwhelmingly, that he would have.

Given the prevailing mood in the aftermath of 9/11, the institutional structures that surround the president, the political and social pressures of the time, the accepted wisdom regarding Saddam Hussein and the international factors at work, says Harvey, Gore “[would have been] compelled … to make many of the same interim (generally praised) decisions for many of the same reasons. Momentum would have done the rest.”

There are several threads to Harvey’s argument, which you can read in its entirety here. At the risk of oversimplifying a very detailed examination, here are a few of the arguments he makes:

• Despite its universal acceptance, the prevailing theory of the war, which Harvey calls “neoconism” “remains an unsubstantiated assertion, a ‘theory’ without theoretical content, an argument devoid of logic or perspective … Even the most superficial review of its central tenets reveals serious logical, empirical and theoretical flaws.”

For instance, he notes, it presumes that Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney and a few like-minded ideologues “had the intellectual prowess and political skills to manipulate the preferences, perceptions and priorities” of non-neocons such as Tony Blair and Colin Powell; the majority of both parties in both houses of Congress; the leadership of foreign policy and intelligence committees in the House and Senate — including every senior Democrat; most European leaders; “every member of the UN Security Council (including France, Russia and China) who unanimously endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 1441; and 60%-70% of the American people at the time.

• The “neocon” argument presumes Gore, in the same circumstances, would not have been presented with similar advice or faced pressures to act in a similar way. Harvey suggests this is wishful thinking. “In fact, all of the relevant evidence from Gore’s entire political career – his speeches on Iraq, contributions to the 2000 campaign debates on foreign affairs, policy announcements and interviews” argue Gore would have been at least as aggressive as Bush. As Harvey points out:

“Gore was a foreign policy hawk. He consistently opposed efforts to cut defense spending, supported Reagan’s decisions to bomb Libya, invade Grenada, aid the Contras in the 80s, and fund the B-1 and B-2 bomber and MX missile programs.” Gore and his running mate, Senator Joe Lieberman, both backed the 1991 Gulf War. As Vice President, Gore supported military actions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and “consistently adopted the hardest line in the Clinton administration when dealing with Saddam Hussein.” When President Clinton decided to abort his four-day bombing of Iraq in 1998, Gore opposed backing down “despite the absence of UN Security Council endorsement.”

Gore was surrounded by advisers who shared his hawkish views, whose speeches, statements and policy positions at the time give no hint they were reluctant to use force to bring Saddam Hussein into line.

• Bush did not invent the conditions or attitudes at the time. Gore would have been presented with the same flawed intelligence on Iraq’s weapons capabilities, faced the same public fears and pressures and the same international concerns. “Every member of the UN Security Council (including the war’s strongest critics, France and Russia)” unanimously endorsed the belief that Saddam had maintained proscribed weapons and was actively frustrating UN efforts to find them, Harvey writes.

“Anyone looking for reasons to be worried about Iraq could easily ignore speeches by Bush, Cheney or Rumsfeld and focus instead on those delivered by Clinton (Bill or Hillary), Gore and Kerry; they could ignore the 2002 [National Intelligence Estimate] and read the NIEs published over the previous five years; or they could simply read the reports by UNMOVIC’s chief weapons inspector Hans Blix, or UNSCOM’s inspector Scott Ritter (one of the war’s strongest critics).”

• The faulty intelligence was backed up by Saddam’s bizarre efforts to encourage such beliefs, in hopes it would reduce the danger of a second conflict with Iran. There is no reason to believe Saddam would have acted differently under a Gore administration.

Harvey notes that the decision to invade was not made overnight but culminated from a series of escalating steps involving the UN and a host of international leaders, both friendly and otherwise.
“President Gore would have been compelled to make all of the same rational moves to get inspectors back into Iraq,” he concludes. “Strategically, the only way to accomplish this goal through multilateral diplomacy would have been to follow the same basic strategy. The competing counterfactual claim that none of these decisions would have been taken is simply not credible.”

He adds: “The only significant difference would have been the size of the invading force – Gore would probably have recommended a much larger troop deployment in line with General Anthony Zinni’s plan under the Clinton administration (OPPLAN 1003-98, originally approved in 1996 and updated in 1998, called for 400,000 troops). Boosted by the confidence of deploying this many troops, and concerned about the cost of sustaining such a large force through prolonged (and unsuccessful) inspections, Gore would have been more, not less inclined to accept the risks of war. It is highly unlikely that a sitting Democratic President would have survived the 2004 election if he decided against enforcing “all necessary means” or “serious consequences” in favour of the French-Russian position.” END

As to your position that “Knowledge = Trivia” and “Polemics = Facts”, I’m not interested in continuing either a conversation or a debate with you. You’ve done neither. What you’ve done is regurgitated information (which is not knowledge) from a variety of different sources and tried to make it your own. Your reversals of position, use of strawman arguments and the general sense you have of simply being lost (akin to your discussing banking with davelj) makes conversation or debate impossible.

The idea that my sense of history is simply trivia is indicative of that. You are heavily propagandized and cannot see history for what it is: A road marker in terms of how nation-states behave in a given situation and a predictor of future actions. You might want to learn some more “trivia” yourself (read a book or two).

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Breeze: In reference to your comment on Al Gore and him not invading Iraq: (from Frank Harvey/CDI paper)

“Had he been elected, would Al Gore have taken the same path as George Bush? He concludes, overwhelmingly, that he would have.

Given the prevailing mood in the aftermath of 9/11, the institutional structures that surround the president, the political and social pressures of the time, the accepted wisdom regarding Saddam Hussein and the international factors at work, says Harvey, Gore “[would have been] compelled … to make many of the same interim (generally praised) decisions for many of the same reasons. Momentum would have done the rest.”

There are several threads to Harvey’s argument, which you can read in its entirety here. At the risk of oversimplifying a very detailed examination, here are a few of the arguments he makes:

• Despite its universal acceptance, the prevailing theory of the war, which Harvey calls “neoconism” “remains an unsubstantiated assertion, a ‘theory’ without theoretical content, an argument devoid of logic or perspective … Even the most superficial review of its central tenets reveals serious logical, empirical and theoretical flaws.”

For instance, he notes, it presumes that Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney and a few like-minded ideologues “had the intellectual prowess and political skills to manipulate the preferences, perceptions and priorities” of non-neocons such as Tony Blair and Colin Powell; the majority of both parties in both houses of Congress; the leadership of foreign policy and intelligence committees in the House and Senate — including every senior Democrat; most European leaders; “every member of the UN Security Council (including France, Russia and China) who unanimously endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 1441; and 60%-70% of the American people at the time.

• The “neocon” argument presumes Gore, in the same circumstances, would not have been presented with similar advice or faced pressures to act in a similar way. Harvey suggests this is wishful thinking. “In fact, all of the relevant evidence from Gore’s entire political career – his speeches on Iraq, contributions to the 2000 campaign debates on foreign affairs, policy announcements and interviews” argue Gore would have been at least as aggressive as Bush. As Harvey points out:

“Gore was a foreign policy hawk. He consistently opposed efforts to cut defense spending, supported Reagan’s decisions to bomb Libya, invade Grenada, aid the Contras in the 80s, and fund the B-1 and B-2 bomber and MX missile programs.” Gore and his running mate, Senator Joe Lieberman, both backed the 1991 Gulf War. As Vice President, Gore supported military actions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and “consistently adopted the hardest line in the Clinton administration when dealing with Saddam Hussein.” When President Clinton decided to abort his four-day bombing of Iraq in 1998, Gore opposed backing down “despite the absence of UN Security Council endorsement.”

Gore was surrounded by advisers who shared his hawkish views, whose speeches, statements and policy positions at the time give no hint they were reluctant to use force to bring Saddam Hussein into line.

• Bush did not invent the conditions or attitudes at the time. Gore would have been presented with the same flawed intelligence on Iraq’s weapons capabilities, faced the same public fears and pressures and the same international concerns. “Every member of the UN Security Council (including the war’s strongest critics, France and Russia)” unanimously endorsed the belief that Saddam had maintained proscribed weapons and was actively frustrating UN efforts to find them, Harvey writes.

“Anyone looking for reasons to be worried about Iraq could easily ignore speeches by Bush, Cheney or Rumsfeld and focus instead on those delivered by Clinton (Bill or Hillary), Gore and Kerry; they could ignore the 2002 [National Intelligence Estimate] and read the NIEs published over the previous five years; or they could simply read the reports by UNMOVIC’s chief weapons inspector Hans Blix, or UNSCOM’s inspector Scott Ritter (one of the war’s strongest critics).”

• The faulty intelligence was backed up by Saddam’s bizarre efforts to encourage such beliefs, in hopes it would reduce the danger of a second conflict with Iran. There is no reason to believe Saddam would have acted differently under a Gore administration.

Harvey notes that the decision to invade was not made overnight but culminated from a series of escalating steps involving the UN and a host of international leaders, both friendly and otherwise.
“President Gore would have been compelled to make all of the same rational moves to get inspectors back into Iraq,” he concludes. “Strategically, the only way to accomplish this goal through multilateral diplomacy would have been to follow the same basic strategy. The competing counterfactual claim that none of these decisions would have been taken is simply not credible.”

He adds: “The only significant difference would have been the size of the invading force – Gore would probably have recommended a much larger troop deployment in line with General Anthony Zinni’s plan under the Clinton administration (OPPLAN 1003-98, originally approved in 1996 and updated in 1998, called for 400,000 troops). Boosted by the confidence of deploying this many troops, and concerned about the cost of sustaining such a large force through prolonged (and unsuccessful) inspections, Gore would have been more, not less inclined to accept the risks of war. It is highly unlikely that a sitting Democratic President would have survived the 2004 election if he decided against enforcing “all necessary means” or “serious consequences” in favour of the French-Russian position.” END

As to your position that “Knowledge = Trivia” and “Polemics = Facts”, I’m not interested in continuing either a conversation or a debate with you. You’ve done neither. What you’ve done is regurgitated information (which is not knowledge) from a variety of different sources and tried to make it your own. Your reversals of position, use of strawman arguments and the general sense you have of simply being lost (akin to your discussing banking with davelj) makes conversation or debate impossible.

The idea that my sense of history is simply trivia is indicative of that. You are heavily propagandized and cannot see history for what it is: A road marker in terms of how nation-states behave in a given situation and a predictor of future actions. You might want to learn some more “trivia” yourself (read a book or two).

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Breeze: In reference to your comment on Al Gore and him not invading Iraq: (from Frank Harvey/CDI paper)

“Had he been elected, would Al Gore have taken the same path as George Bush? He concludes, overwhelmingly, that he would have.

Given the prevailing mood in the aftermath of 9/11, the institutional structures that surround the president, the political and social pressures of the time, the accepted wisdom regarding Saddam Hussein and the international factors at work, says Harvey, Gore “[would have been] compelled … to make many of the same interim (generally praised) decisions for many of the same reasons. Momentum would have done the rest.”

There are several threads to Harvey’s argument, which you can read in its entirety here. At the risk of oversimplifying a very detailed examination, here are a few of the arguments he makes:

• Despite its universal acceptance, the prevailing theory of the war, which Harvey calls “neoconism” “remains an unsubstantiated assertion, a ‘theory’ without theoretical content, an argument devoid of logic or perspective … Even the most superficial review of its central tenets reveals serious logical, empirical and theoretical flaws.”

For instance, he notes, it presumes that Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney and a few like-minded ideologues “had the intellectual prowess and political skills to manipulate the preferences, perceptions and priorities” of non-neocons such as Tony Blair and Colin Powell; the majority of both parties in both houses of Congress; the leadership of foreign policy and intelligence committees in the House and Senate — including every senior Democrat; most European leaders; “every member of the UN Security Council (including France, Russia and China) who unanimously endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 1441; and 60%-70% of the American people at the time.

• The “neocon” argument presumes Gore, in the same circumstances, would not have been presented with similar advice or faced pressures to act in a similar way. Harvey suggests this is wishful thinking. “In fact, all of the relevant evidence from Gore’s entire political career – his speeches on Iraq, contributions to the 2000 campaign debates on foreign affairs, policy announcements and interviews” argue Gore would have been at least as aggressive as Bush. As Harvey points out:

“Gore was a foreign policy hawk. He consistently opposed efforts to cut defense spending, supported Reagan’s decisions to bomb Libya, invade Grenada, aid the Contras in the 80s, and fund the B-1 and B-2 bomber and MX missile programs.” Gore and his running mate, Senator Joe Lieberman, both backed the 1991 Gulf War. As Vice President, Gore supported military actions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and “consistently adopted the hardest line in the Clinton administration when dealing with Saddam Hussein.” When President Clinton decided to abort his four-day bombing of Iraq in 1998, Gore opposed backing down “despite the absence of UN Security Council endorsement.”

Gore was surrounded by advisers who shared his hawkish views, whose speeches, statements and policy positions at the time give no hint they were reluctant to use force to bring Saddam Hussein into line.

• Bush did not invent the conditions or attitudes at the time. Gore would have been presented with the same flawed intelligence on Iraq’s weapons capabilities, faced the same public fears and pressures and the same international concerns. “Every member of the UN Security Council (including the war’s strongest critics, France and Russia)” unanimously endorsed the belief that Saddam had maintained proscribed weapons and was actively frustrating UN efforts to find them, Harvey writes.

“Anyone looking for reasons to be worried about Iraq could easily ignore speeches by Bush, Cheney or Rumsfeld and focus instead on those delivered by Clinton (Bill or Hillary), Gore and Kerry; they could ignore the 2002 [National Intelligence Estimate] and read the NIEs published over the previous five years; or they could simply read the reports by UNMOVIC’s chief weapons inspector Hans Blix, or UNSCOM’s inspector Scott Ritter (one of the war’s strongest critics).”

• The faulty intelligence was backed up by Saddam’s bizarre efforts to encourage such beliefs, in hopes it would reduce the danger of a second conflict with Iran. There is no reason to believe Saddam would have acted differently under a Gore administration.

Harvey notes that the decision to invade was not made overnight but culminated from a series of escalating steps involving the UN and a host of international leaders, both friendly and otherwise.
“President Gore would have been compelled to make all of the same rational moves to get inspectors back into Iraq,” he concludes. “Strategically, the only way to accomplish this goal through multilateral diplomacy would have been to follow the same basic strategy. The competing counterfactual claim that none of these decisions would have been taken is simply not credible.”

He adds: “The only significant difference would have been the size of the invading force – Gore would probably have recommended a much larger troop deployment in line with General Anthony Zinni’s plan under the Clinton administration (OPPLAN 1003-98, originally approved in 1996 and updated in 1998, called for 400,000 troops). Boosted by the confidence of deploying this many troops, and concerned about the cost of sustaining such a large force through prolonged (and unsuccessful) inspections, Gore would have been more, not less inclined to accept the risks of war. It is highly unlikely that a sitting Democratic President would have survived the 2004 election if he decided against enforcing “all necessary means” or “serious consequences” in favour of the French-Russian position.” END

As to your position that “Knowledge = Trivia” and “Polemics = Facts”, I’m not interested in continuing either a conversation or a debate with you. You’ve done neither. What you’ve done is regurgitated information (which is not knowledge) from a variety of different sources and tried to make it your own. Your reversals of position, use of strawman arguments and the general sense you have of simply being lost (akin to your discussing banking with davelj) makes conversation or debate impossible.

The idea that my sense of history is simply trivia is indicative of that. You are heavily propagandized and cannot see history for what it is: A road marker in terms of how nation-states behave in a given situation and a predictor of future actions. You might want to learn some more “trivia” yourself (read a book or two).

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Breeze: It’s interesting, but it almost appears that you consider Bush’s actions to have happened in a vacuum, versus being a continuation (with a little aberrant jaunt into Iraq) of US policy in the Mideast since at least the late 1940s (following the exit of the British from the world stage after WWII).

Regime change in Iraq was strongly advocated by Clinton from the beginning and, as much as everyone wants to dress up the Iraq invasion as a Bush family vendetta, the possibility of it has been on the books for quite a while. Granted, Bush certainly ginned up the casus belli with a strongly influenced NIE, but a little quick research on the internet will show the bellicose pronouncements of such leading Clintonistas as Albright, Berger and Clarke during both terms of the Clinton Administration.

You hammer away at Bush’s “illogicality”, but there is nothing substantive to support that assertion. You conveniently ignore Saudi Arabia and the virulent Wahhabist teachings of the clerics there. And now you’re conflating Obama’s actions with a new “keep the nukes from al-Qaeda” policy that I’ve heretofore never heard of.

One last thing: If Pakistan was aware of the location of al-Qaeda and Taliban operations within their own borders, why wouldn’t they simply go after them using the Pakistani Army and Air Force? Pakistan is clearly aware of the dangers of using US assets/resources/forces, especially given how much anger and blowback it would generate among it’s own citizens.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Breeze: It’s interesting, but it almost appears that you consider Bush’s actions to have happened in a vacuum, versus being a continuation (with a little aberrant jaunt into Iraq) of US policy in the Mideast since at least the late 1940s (following the exit of the British from the world stage after WWII).

Regime change in Iraq was strongly advocated by Clinton from the beginning and, as much as everyone wants to dress up the Iraq invasion as a Bush family vendetta, the possibility of it has been on the books for quite a while. Granted, Bush certainly ginned up the casus belli with a strongly influenced NIE, but a little quick research on the internet will show the bellicose pronouncements of such leading Clintonistas as Albright, Berger and Clarke during both terms of the Clinton Administration.

You hammer away at Bush’s “illogicality”, but there is nothing substantive to support that assertion. You conveniently ignore Saudi Arabia and the virulent Wahhabist teachings of the clerics there. And now you’re conflating Obama’s actions with a new “keep the nukes from al-Qaeda” policy that I’ve heretofore never heard of.

One last thing: If Pakistan was aware of the location of al-Qaeda and Taliban operations within their own borders, why wouldn’t they simply go after them using the Pakistani Army and Air Force? Pakistan is clearly aware of the dangers of using US assets/resources/forces, especially given how much anger and blowback it would generate among it’s own citizens.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Breeze: It’s interesting, but it almost appears that you consider Bush’s actions to have happened in a vacuum, versus being a continuation (with a little aberrant jaunt into Iraq) of US policy in the Mideast since at least the late 1940s (following the exit of the British from the world stage after WWII).

Regime change in Iraq was strongly advocated by Clinton from the beginning and, as much as everyone wants to dress up the Iraq invasion as a Bush family vendetta, the possibility of it has been on the books for quite a while. Granted, Bush certainly ginned up the casus belli with a strongly influenced NIE, but a little quick research on the internet will show the bellicose pronouncements of such leading Clintonistas as Albright, Berger and Clarke during both terms of the Clinton Administration.

You hammer away at Bush’s “illogicality”, but there is nothing substantive to support that assertion. You conveniently ignore Saudi Arabia and the virulent Wahhabist teachings of the clerics there. And now you’re conflating Obama’s actions with a new “keep the nukes from al-Qaeda” policy that I’ve heretofore never heard of.

One last thing: If Pakistan was aware of the location of al-Qaeda and Taliban operations within their own borders, why wouldn’t they simply go after them using the Pakistani Army and Air Force? Pakistan is clearly aware of the dangers of using US assets/resources/forces, especially given how much anger and blowback it would generate among it’s own citizens.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Breeze: It’s interesting, but it almost appears that you consider Bush’s actions to have happened in a vacuum, versus being a continuation (with a little aberrant jaunt into Iraq) of US policy in the Mideast since at least the late 1940s (following the exit of the British from the world stage after WWII).

Regime change in Iraq was strongly advocated by Clinton from the beginning and, as much as everyone wants to dress up the Iraq invasion as a Bush family vendetta, the possibility of it has been on the books for quite a while. Granted, Bush certainly ginned up the casus belli with a strongly influenced NIE, but a little quick research on the internet will show the bellicose pronouncements of such leading Clintonistas as Albright, Berger and Clarke during both terms of the Clinton Administration.

You hammer away at Bush’s “illogicality”, but there is nothing substantive to support that assertion. You conveniently ignore Saudi Arabia and the virulent Wahhabist teachings of the clerics there. And now you’re conflating Obama’s actions with a new “keep the nukes from al-Qaeda” policy that I’ve heretofore never heard of.

One last thing: If Pakistan was aware of the location of al-Qaeda and Taliban operations within their own borders, why wouldn’t they simply go after them using the Pakistani Army and Air Force? Pakistan is clearly aware of the dangers of using US assets/resources/forces, especially given how much anger and blowback it would generate among it’s own citizens.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Breeze: It’s interesting, but it almost appears that you consider Bush’s actions to have happened in a vacuum, versus being a continuation (with a little aberrant jaunt into Iraq) of US policy in the Mideast since at least the late 1940s (following the exit of the British from the world stage after WWII).

Regime change in Iraq was strongly advocated by Clinton from the beginning and, as much as everyone wants to dress up the Iraq invasion as a Bush family vendetta, the possibility of it has been on the books for quite a while. Granted, Bush certainly ginned up the casus belli with a strongly influenced NIE, but a little quick research on the internet will show the bellicose pronouncements of such leading Clintonistas as Albright, Berger and Clarke during both terms of the Clinton Administration.

You hammer away at Bush’s “illogicality”, but there is nothing substantive to support that assertion. You conveniently ignore Saudi Arabia and the virulent Wahhabist teachings of the clerics there. And now you’re conflating Obama’s actions with a new “keep the nukes from al-Qaeda” policy that I’ve heretofore never heard of.

One last thing: If Pakistan was aware of the location of al-Qaeda and Taliban operations within their own borders, why wouldn’t they simply go after them using the Pakistani Army and Air Force? Pakistan is clearly aware of the dangers of using US assets/resources/forces, especially given how much anger and blowback it would generate among it’s own citizens.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Rus: Except I’m not occupying the moral high ground at all: You are.

I think an objective view of history simply holds that those that have power, exercise power. Sometimes the theory of “benevolent despotism” holds sway and other times those in power are too depraved to care.

The US has aspired to the higher good in some instances (like WWII) and in others was largely trying to ensure a balance of power, not unlike the British at the height of their powers. Also like the British, our present policies are being driven by energy needs to maintain our position in the world and we’re going to find and control that energy using the means at our disposal.

I don’t think of the world in terms of good and bad, I think of the world in terms of bad and worse. Human nature being what it is, I do believe, however, that the US, on balance, is one helluva better choice than a lot of the alternatives (Russia, China, etc) and maybe not so good as certain others (Canada, Sweden, etc), especially when one considers what the US has to do to maintain our position.

Having been where I’ve been and seen what I’ve seen, I gave up on the notion of moral high ground a long time ago, the way I also realized that those John Wayne movies of my childhood were selling a product to the American people that simply didn’t exist. However, Hollywood, Wall Street and Washington, DC all realize that the truth generally tastes pretty sour and will go down a lot easier if you sugarcoat it with some nice propaganda.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Rus: Except I’m not occupying the moral high ground at all: You are.

I think an objective view of history simply holds that those that have power, exercise power. Sometimes the theory of “benevolent despotism” holds sway and other times those in power are too depraved to care.

The US has aspired to the higher good in some instances (like WWII) and in others was largely trying to ensure a balance of power, not unlike the British at the height of their powers. Also like the British, our present policies are being driven by energy needs to maintain our position in the world and we’re going to find and control that energy using the means at our disposal.

I don’t think of the world in terms of good and bad, I think of the world in terms of bad and worse. Human nature being what it is, I do believe, however, that the US, on balance, is one helluva better choice than a lot of the alternatives (Russia, China, etc) and maybe not so good as certain others (Canada, Sweden, etc), especially when one considers what the US has to do to maintain our position.

Having been where I’ve been and seen what I’ve seen, I gave up on the notion of moral high ground a long time ago, the way I also realized that those John Wayne movies of my childhood were selling a product to the American people that simply didn’t exist. However, Hollywood, Wall Street and Washington, DC all realize that the truth generally tastes pretty sour and will go down a lot easier if you sugarcoat it with some nice propaganda.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Rus: Except I’m not occupying the moral high ground at all: You are.

I think an objective view of history simply holds that those that have power, exercise power. Sometimes the theory of “benevolent despotism” holds sway and other times those in power are too depraved to care.

The US has aspired to the higher good in some instances (like WWII) and in others was largely trying to ensure a balance of power, not unlike the British at the height of their powers. Also like the British, our present policies are being driven by energy needs to maintain our position in the world and we’re going to find and control that energy using the means at our disposal.

I don’t think of the world in terms of good and bad, I think of the world in terms of bad and worse. Human nature being what it is, I do believe, however, that the US, on balance, is one helluva better choice than a lot of the alternatives (Russia, China, etc) and maybe not so good as certain others (Canada, Sweden, etc), especially when one considers what the US has to do to maintain our position.

Having been where I’ve been and seen what I’ve seen, I gave up on the notion of moral high ground a long time ago, the way I also realized that those John Wayne movies of my childhood were selling a product to the American people that simply didn’t exist. However, Hollywood, Wall Street and Washington, DC all realize that the truth generally tastes pretty sour and will go down a lot easier if you sugarcoat it with some nice propaganda.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

Rus: Except I’m not occupying the moral high ground at all: You are.

I think an objective view of history simply holds that those that have power, exercise power. Sometimes the theory of “benevolent despotism” holds sway and other times those in power are too depraved to care.

The US has aspired to the higher good in some instances (like WWII) and in others was largely trying to ensure a balance of power, not unlike the British at the height of their powers. Also like the British, our present policies are being driven by energy needs to maintain our position in the world and we’re going to find and control that energy using the means at our disposal.

I don’t think of the world in terms of good and bad, I think of the world in terms of bad and worse. Human nature being what it is, I do believe, however, that the US, on balance, is one helluva better choice than a lot of the alternatives (Russia, China, etc) and maybe not so good as certain others (Canada, Sweden, etc), especially when one considers what the US has to do to maintain our position.

Having been where I’ve been and seen what I’ve seen, I gave up on the notion of moral high ground a long time ago, the way I also realized that those John Wayne movies of my childhood were selling a product to the American people that simply didn’t exist. However, Hollywood, Wall Street and Washington, DC all realize that the truth generally tastes pretty sour and will go down a lot easier if you sugarcoat it with some nice propaganda.

[Author]

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