Has Goldman fatally damaged their Franchise?

[Coronita]

[quote=UCGal][quote=flu][quote=UCGal][quote=SD Realtor]Yeah looks like Goldman is shaking in their boots.[/quote]

I don’t know if they’re shaking in their boots – but they announced great earnings numbers today – and the stock is still down. On the analysts call they had their lead council discuss the case. If they weren’t concerned, why would they have a lawyer talk on their earnings call?

I almost bought some GS a week or so ago – with the attitude that if I couldn’t beat them, I’d try to piggyback some profits out of their gaming of the system… But decided it fell into the camp with a few other profitable stocks (RAI, WMT) that I just wouldn’t feel right about owning because of my very misguided sense of morals. In this case, it worked out. I was looking at it at $170ish – it bumped up to 190 while I was debating it, internally.

Before I get slammed – I fully recognize that I’ll never get rich in the market if I let morality get in the way of my investment choices. I’m ok with that.[/quote]

Dudette, you’re talking about getting into the markets??? I’m thinking about getting out of the markets….It’s getting too hot to handle for my blood. Serveral things are already at the top ranges, with several at years high.

Anyone want to guess if Yahoo pukes this afternoon?[/quote]

I’m mostly out of the market in both my non-tax deferred and my 401k/IRA stuff… but it pains me to see the lack of returns… I’ve been trying to figure out a way to get *some* return on a small portion of my sidelined money.

And just so you know… as a native San Diegan and alumni of “ridgemont HS” (clairemont HS.)… I always thought “Dude” was gender neutral – could be used for girls and boys… But maybe I’m the only one who feels that way. LOL. (And I’ll never be as cool as “the Dude” Jeff Bridges.[/quote]

You know, a few years ago I bought about 20 See’s Candy gift certificates, each costing $7 for a 1lb box of chocolates, kinda to give out on Xmas to close friends/relatives. In hindsight, considering an average box costs $12-14, I should have just stocked up on more certificates.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

[quote=SK in CV][quote=Allan from Fallbrook]

Pat: Utter gibberish and utterly divorced from reality.

Goldman had NO counterparty risk with AIG at all. Their position was nearly fully collateralized through cash and securities and the balance was covered by insurance (in the form of CDS).

You might want to assemble the actual facts before weighing in on a topic.[/quote]

I don’t think gibberish. I’ll take your word that some of it was collateralized, though some reports I’ve found indicate that it was much less than the $11,000,0000 that you suggested.

On the insurance part, AIG is an insurance company. CDSs ARE insurance. If they go bankrupt, insurance claims against them are general credit obligations. Those contracts would have been examined and probably never sorted out. Hence my claim yesterday that it would last 10 years.[/quote]

SK: Except that “insurance” in this case (CDS) isn’t “insurance” in the conventional sense. Plus, the CDS that Goldman held wasn’t offered by AIG, but rather to “insure” against a default BY AIG (big difference). Meaning that Goldman wouldn’t be going to AIG to collect on the CDS, but another issuer, which makes perfect sense if you think about it.

You also hear terms like “portfolio insurance” on Wall Street. It isn’t insurance at all, but indicates a solidly (in some cases, perfectly) hedged position; thus you’re “insured”.

Again, the key point is counterparty risk and the fact is that Goldman had no such risk with AIG. Using the conventional notion of a BK “clawback” is totally incorrect and completely misses the point and creates a risk where there was none. Thus my use of the term “gibberish”, which I reserve for people who don’t know what they’re talking about.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

[quote=SK in CV][quote=Allan from Fallbrook]

Pat: Utter gibberish and utterly divorced from reality.

Goldman had NO counterparty risk with AIG at all. Their position was nearly fully collateralized through cash and securities and the balance was covered by insurance (in the form of CDS).

You might want to assemble the actual facts before weighing in on a topic.[/quote]

I don’t think gibberish. I’ll take your word that some of it was collateralized, though some reports I’ve found indicate that it was much less than the $11,000,0000 that you suggested.

On the insurance part, AIG is an insurance company. CDSs ARE insurance. If they go bankrupt, insurance claims against them are general credit obligations. Those contracts would have been examined and probably never sorted out. Hence my claim yesterday that it would last 10 years.[/quote]

SK: Except that “insurance” in this case (CDS) isn’t “insurance” in the conventional sense. Plus, the CDS that Goldman held wasn’t offered by AIG, but rather to “insure” against a default BY AIG (big difference). Meaning that Goldman wouldn’t be going to AIG to collect on the CDS, but another issuer, which makes perfect sense if you think about it.

You also hear terms like “portfolio insurance” on Wall Street. It isn’t insurance at all, but indicates a solidly (in some cases, perfectly) hedged position; thus you’re “insured”.

Again, the key point is counterparty risk and the fact is that Goldman had no such risk with AIG. Using the conventional notion of a BK “clawback” is totally incorrect and completely misses the point and creates a risk where there was none. Thus my use of the term “gibberish”, which I reserve for people who don’t know what they’re talking about.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

[quote=SK in CV][quote=Allan from Fallbrook]

Pat: Utter gibberish and utterly divorced from reality.

Goldman had NO counterparty risk with AIG at all. Their position was nearly fully collateralized through cash and securities and the balance was covered by insurance (in the form of CDS).

You might want to assemble the actual facts before weighing in on a topic.[/quote]

I don’t think gibberish. I’ll take your word that some of it was collateralized, though some reports I’ve found indicate that it was much less than the $11,000,0000 that you suggested.

On the insurance part, AIG is an insurance company. CDSs ARE insurance. If they go bankrupt, insurance claims against them are general credit obligations. Those contracts would have been examined and probably never sorted out. Hence my claim yesterday that it would last 10 years.[/quote]

SK: Except that “insurance” in this case (CDS) isn’t “insurance” in the conventional sense. Plus, the CDS that Goldman held wasn’t offered by AIG, but rather to “insure” against a default BY AIG (big difference). Meaning that Goldman wouldn’t be going to AIG to collect on the CDS, but another issuer, which makes perfect sense if you think about it.

You also hear terms like “portfolio insurance” on Wall Street. It isn’t insurance at all, but indicates a solidly (in some cases, perfectly) hedged position; thus you’re “insured”.

Again, the key point is counterparty risk and the fact is that Goldman had no such risk with AIG. Using the conventional notion of a BK “clawback” is totally incorrect and completely misses the point and creates a risk where there was none. Thus my use of the term “gibberish”, which I reserve for people who don’t know what they’re talking about.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

[quote=SK in CV][quote=Allan from Fallbrook]

Pat: Utter gibberish and utterly divorced from reality.

Goldman had NO counterparty risk with AIG at all. Their position was nearly fully collateralized through cash and securities and the balance was covered by insurance (in the form of CDS).

You might want to assemble the actual facts before weighing in on a topic.[/quote]

I don’t think gibberish. I’ll take your word that some of it was collateralized, though some reports I’ve found indicate that it was much less than the $11,000,0000 that you suggested.

On the insurance part, AIG is an insurance company. CDSs ARE insurance. If they go bankrupt, insurance claims against them are general credit obligations. Those contracts would have been examined and probably never sorted out. Hence my claim yesterday that it would last 10 years.[/quote]

SK: Except that “insurance” in this case (CDS) isn’t “insurance” in the conventional sense. Plus, the CDS that Goldman held wasn’t offered by AIG, but rather to “insure” against a default BY AIG (big difference). Meaning that Goldman wouldn’t be going to AIG to collect on the CDS, but another issuer, which makes perfect sense if you think about it.

You also hear terms like “portfolio insurance” on Wall Street. It isn’t insurance at all, but indicates a solidly (in some cases, perfectly) hedged position; thus you’re “insured”.

Again, the key point is counterparty risk and the fact is that Goldman had no such risk with AIG. Using the conventional notion of a BK “clawback” is totally incorrect and completely misses the point and creates a risk where there was none. Thus my use of the term “gibberish”, which I reserve for people who don’t know what they’re talking about.

[Allan from Fallbrook]

[quote=SK in CV][quote=Allan from Fallbrook]

Pat: Utter gibberish and utterly divorced from reality.

Goldman had NO counterparty risk with AIG at all. Their position was nearly fully collateralized through cash and securities and the balance was covered by insurance (in the form of CDS).

You might want to assemble the actual facts before weighing in on a topic.[/quote]

I don’t think gibberish. I’ll take your word that some of it was collateralized, though some reports I’ve found indicate that it was much less than the $11,000,0000 that you suggested.

On the insurance part, AIG is an insurance company. CDSs ARE insurance. If they go bankrupt, insurance claims against them are general credit obligations. Those contracts would have been examined and probably never sorted out. Hence my claim yesterday that it would last 10 years.[/quote]

SK: Except that “insurance” in this case (CDS) isn’t “insurance” in the conventional sense. Plus, the CDS that Goldman held wasn’t offered by AIG, but rather to “insure” against a default BY AIG (big difference). Meaning that Goldman wouldn’t be going to AIG to collect on the CDS, but another issuer, which makes perfect sense if you think about it.

You also hear terms like “portfolio insurance” on Wall Street. It isn’t insurance at all, but indicates a solidly (in some cases, perfectly) hedged position; thus you’re “insured”.

Again, the key point is counterparty risk and the fact is that Goldman had no such risk with AIG. Using the conventional notion of a BK “clawback” is totally incorrect and completely misses the point and creates a risk where there was none. Thus my use of the term “gibberish”, which I reserve for people who don’t know what they’re talking about.

[briansd1]

Allan, despite the technical details, the $13 billion paid to GS came from AIG.

Had AIG been allowed to collapse, there would not have been any money to pay GS. GS would have had to line up in court like everybody else.

*

Lawsuits take on lives of their own sometimes. It’ll take about a decade to resolve them all.

More on AIG/GS

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/db7dc52a-4bee-11df-a217-00144feab49a.html

AIG, the US government-controlled insurer, is considering pursuing Goldman Sachs over losses incurred on $6bn of insurance deals on mortgage-backed securities similar to the one that led to fraud charges against the US bank.

AIG’s move over the deals that caused it a loss of about $2bn is a sign that Friday’s decision by the Securities and Exchange Commission to file civil fraud charges against Goldman could spark actions from investors who lost money on mortgage-backed securities.

[briansd1]

Allan, despite the technical details, the $13 billion paid to GS came from AIG.

Had AIG been allowed to collapse, there would not have been any money to pay GS. GS would have had to line up in court like everybody else.

*

Lawsuits take on lives of their own sometimes. It’ll take about a decade to resolve them all.

More on AIG/GS

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/db7dc52a-4bee-11df-a217-00144feab49a.html

AIG, the US government-controlled insurer, is considering pursuing Goldman Sachs over losses incurred on $6bn of insurance deals on mortgage-backed securities similar to the one that led to fraud charges against the US bank.

AIG’s move over the deals that caused it a loss of about $2bn is a sign that Friday’s decision by the Securities and Exchange Commission to file civil fraud charges against Goldman could spark actions from investors who lost money on mortgage-backed securities.

[briansd1]

Allan, despite the technical details, the $13 billion paid to GS came from AIG.

Had AIG been allowed to collapse, there would not have been any money to pay GS. GS would have had to line up in court like everybody else.

*

Lawsuits take on lives of their own sometimes. It’ll take about a decade to resolve them all.

More on AIG/GS

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/db7dc52a-4bee-11df-a217-00144feab49a.html

AIG, the US government-controlled insurer, is considering pursuing Goldman Sachs over losses incurred on $6bn of insurance deals on mortgage-backed securities similar to the one that led to fraud charges against the US bank.

AIG’s move over the deals that caused it a loss of about $2bn is a sign that Friday’s decision by the Securities and Exchange Commission to file civil fraud charges against Goldman could spark actions from investors who lost money on mortgage-backed securities.

[briansd1]

Allan, despite the technical details, the $13 billion paid to GS came from AIG.

Had AIG been allowed to collapse, there would not have been any money to pay GS. GS would have had to line up in court like everybody else.

*

Lawsuits take on lives of their own sometimes. It’ll take about a decade to resolve them all.

More on AIG/GS

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/db7dc52a-4bee-11df-a217-00144feab49a.html

AIG, the US government-controlled insurer, is considering pursuing Goldman Sachs over losses incurred on $6bn of insurance deals on mortgage-backed securities similar to the one that led to fraud charges against the US bank.

AIG’s move over the deals that caused it a loss of about $2bn is a sign that Friday’s decision by the Securities and Exchange Commission to file civil fraud charges against Goldman could spark actions from investors who lost money on mortgage-backed securities.

[briansd1]

Allan, despite the technical details, the $13 billion paid to GS came from AIG.

Had AIG been allowed to collapse, there would not have been any money to pay GS. GS would have had to line up in court like everybody else.

*

Lawsuits take on lives of their own sometimes. It’ll take about a decade to resolve them all.

More on AIG/GS

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/db7dc52a-4bee-11df-a217-00144feab49a.html

AIG, the US government-controlled insurer, is considering pursuing Goldman Sachs over losses incurred on $6bn of insurance deals on mortgage-backed securities similar to the one that led to fraud charges against the US bank.

AIG’s move over the deals that caused it a loss of about $2bn is a sign that Friday’s decision by the Securities and Exchange Commission to file civil fraud charges against Goldman could spark actions from investors who lost money on mortgage-backed securities.

[Arraya]

These stories just leave us fainthearted
As we sink into criminality uncharted;
The horror perverse
Just keep getting worse,
And we know, we’ve only just started.

http://theautomaticearth.blogspot.com/
There’s some curious things about that SEC case, like who’s actually charged with what. There’s no Jonathan Egol, Fabrice Tourre’s partner at Goldman, no hedge funder John Paulson, no Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein. Instead, the only person the SEC names -far as I’ve seen- is Fabrice Tourre, who, at the time the Abacus deal involved played, was all of 28 years old.

That age thing keeps on itching me. It somehow points to the degree of involvement of the likes of Blankfein, Goldman president Gary Cohn and CFO David Viniar. These guys don’t let a mere kid play with billions of their capital without keeping a close watch. They were all down there on the trade floor for extended periods of time, figuring out what exactly transpired, as can be proven.

Moreover, the then (2006-7) 28-year old Tourre was claiming something that was the 180 degree opposite of what other traders at Goldman had a lot of the firms’ money invested in, namely the continued upward growth of the housing market. Tourre’s contrary claims were nothing short of revolutionary, certainly in the eyes of the older, and more bullish, traders. So it should not come as a surprise that the highest echelons of the firm spent a lot of time with Tourre and other traders. They would have been mad not to. That also means, however, that claiming they didn’t know what was going on is not believable

If after all that, Blankfein, Cohn and Viniar still didn’t know what went on, they should be fired on the spot by the shareholders. If they did know, which is faaaar more likely (you don’t get to the GS top spots by being complete doofuses), they should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Which is where Cuomo should come in, but, yes, he’s campaigning… So maybe right now would be an appropriate moment to check out where his campaign donations stem from. We might just find some juice.

[Arraya]

These stories just leave us fainthearted
As we sink into criminality uncharted;
The horror perverse
Just keep getting worse,
And we know, we’ve only just started.

http://theautomaticearth.blogspot.com/
There’s some curious things about that SEC case, like who’s actually charged with what. There’s no Jonathan Egol, Fabrice Tourre’s partner at Goldman, no hedge funder John Paulson, no Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein. Instead, the only person the SEC names -far as I’ve seen- is Fabrice Tourre, who, at the time the Abacus deal involved played, was all of 28 years old.

That age thing keeps on itching me. It somehow points to the degree of involvement of the likes of Blankfein, Goldman president Gary Cohn and CFO David Viniar. These guys don’t let a mere kid play with billions of their capital without keeping a close watch. They were all down there on the trade floor for extended periods of time, figuring out what exactly transpired, as can be proven.

Moreover, the then (2006-7) 28-year old Tourre was claiming something that was the 180 degree opposite of what other traders at Goldman had a lot of the firms’ money invested in, namely the continued upward growth of the housing market. Tourre’s contrary claims were nothing short of revolutionary, certainly in the eyes of the older, and more bullish, traders. So it should not come as a surprise that the highest echelons of the firm spent a lot of time with Tourre and other traders. They would have been mad not to. That also means, however, that claiming they didn’t know what was going on is not believable

If after all that, Blankfein, Cohn and Viniar still didn’t know what went on, they should be fired on the spot by the shareholders. If they did know, which is faaaar more likely (you don’t get to the GS top spots by being complete doofuses), they should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Which is where Cuomo should come in, but, yes, he’s campaigning… So maybe right now would be an appropriate moment to check out where his campaign donations stem from. We might just find some juice.

[Arraya]

These stories just leave us fainthearted
As we sink into criminality uncharted;
The horror perverse
Just keep getting worse,
And we know, we’ve only just started.

http://theautomaticearth.blogspot.com/
There’s some curious things about that SEC case, like who’s actually charged with what. There’s no Jonathan Egol, Fabrice Tourre’s partner at Goldman, no hedge funder John Paulson, no Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein. Instead, the only person the SEC names -far as I’ve seen- is Fabrice Tourre, who, at the time the Abacus deal involved played, was all of 28 years old.

That age thing keeps on itching me. It somehow points to the degree of involvement of the likes of Blankfein, Goldman president Gary Cohn and CFO David Viniar. These guys don’t let a mere kid play with billions of their capital without keeping a close watch. They were all down there on the trade floor for extended periods of time, figuring out what exactly transpired, as can be proven.

Moreover, the then (2006-7) 28-year old Tourre was claiming something that was the 180 degree opposite of what other traders at Goldman had a lot of the firms’ money invested in, namely the continued upward growth of the housing market. Tourre’s contrary claims were nothing short of revolutionary, certainly in the eyes of the older, and more bullish, traders. So it should not come as a surprise that the highest echelons of the firm spent a lot of time with Tourre and other traders. They would have been mad not to. That also means, however, that claiming they didn’t know what was going on is not believable

If after all that, Blankfein, Cohn and Viniar still didn’t know what went on, they should be fired on the spot by the shareholders. If they did know, which is faaaar more likely (you don’t get to the GS top spots by being complete doofuses), they should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Which is where Cuomo should come in, but, yes, he’s campaigning… So maybe right now would be an appropriate moment to check out where his campaign donations stem from. We might just find some juice.

[Arraya]

These stories just leave us fainthearted
As we sink into criminality uncharted;
The horror perverse
Just keep getting worse,
And we know, we’ve only just started.

http://theautomaticearth.blogspot.com/
There’s some curious things about that SEC case, like who’s actually charged with what. There’s no Jonathan Egol, Fabrice Tourre’s partner at Goldman, no hedge funder John Paulson, no Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein. Instead, the only person the SEC names -far as I’ve seen- is Fabrice Tourre, who, at the time the Abacus deal involved played, was all of 28 years old.

That age thing keeps on itching me. It somehow points to the degree of involvement of the likes of Blankfein, Goldman president Gary Cohn and CFO David Viniar. These guys don’t let a mere kid play with billions of their capital without keeping a close watch. They were all down there on the trade floor for extended periods of time, figuring out what exactly transpired, as can be proven.

Moreover, the then (2006-7) 28-year old Tourre was claiming something that was the 180 degree opposite of what other traders at Goldman had a lot of the firms’ money invested in, namely the continued upward growth of the housing market. Tourre’s contrary claims were nothing short of revolutionary, certainly in the eyes of the older, and more bullish, traders. So it should not come as a surprise that the highest echelons of the firm spent a lot of time with Tourre and other traders. They would have been mad not to. That also means, however, that claiming they didn’t know what was going on is not believable

If after all that, Blankfein, Cohn and Viniar still didn’t know what went on, they should be fired on the spot by the shareholders. If they did know, which is faaaar more likely (you don’t get to the GS top spots by being complete doofuses), they should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Which is where Cuomo should come in, but, yes, he’s campaigning… So maybe right now would be an appropriate moment to check out where his campaign donations stem from. We might just find some juice.

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