[Bugs]

Right now we’re in the equivalent of Round 2 of 12 scheduled round of exciting ARM Reset action. The champ (interest rates) has already gotten a bloody nose in the first round (foreclosures doubled) and a nasty cut over the right eye in the second round (hedgies being revalued). We still have 10 more rounds to go and the interest rates cannot be saved by the bell.

Just based on what I think will happen with financing, I’m thinking the projections for the 50% correction off peak will eventually prove out to be overly conservative. I think this downcycle will overcorrect as has all its predecessors.

[Bugs]

I remember a couple years ago we were talking about rate increases being inevitable and how some of the bulls told us they thought we were crazy. Perpetually low interest rates were a staple of the bulls’ arguments over the years.

The bump to 8% is just the opening move. By the time this first wave of ARM resets is over and all that damage is done the rates will be higher than that. The second wave of ARM resets appears to be comprised of a larger percentage of the most neg-amortization loans. Coming after the blowout caused by the first wave, the fallout from the second wave will probably be even worse.

Let’s all stop for a moment to ponder what interest rates will be like by the time this second wave of ARM resets maxes out.

[Bugs]

I remember a couple years ago we were talking about rate increases being inevitable and how some of the bulls told us they thought we were crazy. Perpetually low interest rates were a staple of the bulls’ arguments over the years.

The bump to 8% is just the opening move. By the time this first wave of ARM resets is over and all that damage is done the rates will be higher than that. The second wave of ARM resets appears to be comprised of a larger percentage of the most neg-amortization loans. Coming after the blowout caused by the first wave, the fallout from the second wave will probably be even worse.

Let’s all stop for a moment to ponder what interest rates will be like by the time this second wave of ARM resets maxes out.

[Bugs]

I remember a couple years ago we were talking about rate increases being inevitable and how some of the bulls told us they thought we were crazy. Perpetually low interest rates were a staple of the bulls’ arguments over the years.

The bump to 8% is just the opening move. By the time this first wave of ARM resets is over and all that damage is done the rates will be higher than that. The second wave of ARM resets appears to be comprised of a larger percentage of the most neg-amortization loans. Coming after the blowout caused by the first wave, the fallout from the second wave will probably be even worse.

Let’s all stop for a moment to ponder what interest rates will be like by the time this second wave of ARM resets maxes out.

[Bugs]

All his arguments are based on what he thinks “should be”. All of our arguments have been based on what “is”.

We correctly identified how overstretched the markets are, we correctly identified each of the elements that contributed to those distortions, we correctly identified the risks each of those elements posed to the whole, and (so far) our projections about how it would unravel have been coming true. We literally wrote the list and as these events unfold its as if the market is going down our list and checking each box off in the sequence they were originally forecasted. The only thing we couldn’t know for sure was timing, which is why many of us characterized our projections on timing as guesswork.

Strage how he doesn’t apparently attribute any of the increase to media spin but he wants to lay the majority of the blame for the decline on the spin.

The facts remain:

– People haven’t been paying their mortgages in sufficient numbers to cause the foreclosure rate to skyrocket.

– Those foreclosures have caused massive losses in the secondary market because of the way the salesmen packaged them into derivatives.

– The losses in the secondary market have caused a number of lenders to go down and has forced investors to withdraw from those derivatives as best they can.

– All of these elements are contributing to tightening of underwriting of mortgages, reducing options, and increasing pricing on financings – all of these elements reduce purchasing power thus putting more pressure on an alreadyt weakening pricing structure.

– He’s whining about job growth but he neglects to consider the composition of the job market and how its degrading away from the high-paying jobs necessary to pay mortgages.

– The media’s reporting of these elements absolutely does have an effect on buyers – it makes them more informed. They are using this information to make decisions, including the decision to withdraw from the market or to lowball their bids.

Inasmuch as Mr. Chamberlain works in the media, I should think he’d go a little easier on his peers who, after all, are just reporting the news. Reporting that the hedge funds are going bust and mortgage lenders are going out of business is not spin – it’s fact.

Here’s another fact – Mr. Chamberlain was 100% wrong about the 2006 market being strong and we were 100% right about it being fundamentally weak. He’s wrong about it coming back after another mere 5% frop and we’re 100% right about it taking a long time before it reverses. Time will bear all this out, just as it has for the things we projected that have already transpired.

He’s not in the driver’s seat right now, and if he continues to ignore the realities in front of him he’s going to lose the remaining 17 readers who apparently still think he has credibility.

[Bugs]

All his arguments are based on what he thinks “should be”. All of our arguments have been based on what “is”.

We correctly identified how overstretched the markets are, we correctly identified each of the elements that contributed to those distortions, we correctly identified the risks each of those elements posed to the whole, and (so far) our projections about how it would unravel have been coming true. We literally wrote the list and as these events unfold its as if the market is going down our list and checking each box off in the sequence they were originally forecasted. The only thing we couldn’t know for sure was timing, which is why many of us characterized our projections on timing as guesswork.

Strage how he doesn’t apparently attribute any of the increase to media spin but he wants to lay the majority of the blame for the decline on the spin.

The facts remain:

– People haven’t been paying their mortgages in sufficient numbers to cause the foreclosure rate to skyrocket.

– Those foreclosures have caused massive losses in the secondary market because of the way the salesmen packaged them into derivatives.

– The losses in the secondary market have caused a number of lenders to go down and has forced investors to withdraw from those derivatives as best they can.

– All of these elements are contributing to tightening of underwriting of mortgages, reducing options, and increasing pricing on financings – all of these elements reduce purchasing power thus putting more pressure on an alreadyt weakening pricing structure.

– He’s whining about job growth but he neglects to consider the composition of the job market and how its degrading away from the high-paying jobs necessary to pay mortgages.

– The media’s reporting of these elements absolutely does have an effect on buyers – it makes them more informed. They are using this information to make decisions, including the decision to withdraw from the market or to lowball their bids.

Inasmuch as Mr. Chamberlain works in the media, I should think he’d go a little easier on his peers who, after all, are just reporting the news. Reporting that the hedge funds are going bust and mortgage lenders are going out of business is not spin – it’s fact.

Here’s another fact – Mr. Chamberlain was 100% wrong about the 2006 market being strong and we were 100% right about it being fundamentally weak. He’s wrong about it coming back after another mere 5% frop and we’re 100% right about it taking a long time before it reverses. Time will bear all this out, just as it has for the things we projected that have already transpired.

He’s not in the driver’s seat right now, and if he continues to ignore the realities in front of him he’s going to lose the remaining 17 readers who apparently still think he has credibility.

[Bugs]

All his arguments are based on what he thinks “should be”. All of our arguments have been based on what “is”.

We correctly identified how overstretched the markets are, we correctly identified each of the elements that contributed to those distortions, we correctly identified the risks each of those elements posed to the whole, and (so far) our projections about how it would unravel have been coming true. We literally wrote the list and as these events unfold its as if the market is going down our list and checking each box off in the sequence they were originally forecasted. The only thing we couldn’t know for sure was timing, which is why many of us characterized our projections on timing as guesswork.

Strage how he doesn’t apparently attribute any of the increase to media spin but he wants to lay the majority of the blame for the decline on the spin.

The facts remain:

– People haven’t been paying their mortgages in sufficient numbers to cause the foreclosure rate to skyrocket.

– Those foreclosures have caused massive losses in the secondary market because of the way the salesmen packaged them into derivatives.

– The losses in the secondary market have caused a number of lenders to go down and has forced investors to withdraw from those derivatives as best they can.

– All of these elements are contributing to tightening of underwriting of mortgages, reducing options, and increasing pricing on financings – all of these elements reduce purchasing power thus putting more pressure on an alreadyt weakening pricing structure.

– He’s whining about job growth but he neglects to consider the composition of the job market and how its degrading away from the high-paying jobs necessary to pay mortgages.

– The media’s reporting of these elements absolutely does have an effect on buyers – it makes them more informed. They are using this information to make decisions, including the decision to withdraw from the market or to lowball their bids.

Inasmuch as Mr. Chamberlain works in the media, I should think he’d go a little easier on his peers who, after all, are just reporting the news. Reporting that the hedge funds are going bust and mortgage lenders are going out of business is not spin – it’s fact.

Here’s another fact – Mr. Chamberlain was 100% wrong about the 2006 market being strong and we were 100% right about it being fundamentally weak. He’s wrong about it coming back after another mere 5% frop and we’re 100% right about it taking a long time before it reverses. Time will bear all this out, just as it has for the things we projected that have already transpired.

He’s not in the driver’s seat right now, and if he continues to ignore the realities in front of him he’s going to lose the remaining 17 readers who apparently still think he has credibility.

[Bugs]

Another David Streitfield article. He’s hitting the front page more often as time goes on.

[Bugs]

Another David Streitfield article. He’s hitting the front page more often as time goes on.

[Bugs]

Another David Streitfield article. He’s hitting the front page more often as time goes on.

[Bugs]

I was under the impression that the Creative Investment Club convened on another website.

There are two homes involved, and we’re apparently not talking about someone whose original motivations were limited to providing shelter for her family. There was apparently a profit motive involved, which moves this conversation in an entirely different direction away from portraying her as the victim.

There isn’t just one human face involved in this problem nor one set of poor decisions – there are several. There’s the loan originator who apparently “qualified” their borrower for far more payment than she could handle; there was the lender who allowed the LO and this borrower to get away with overstating income and other qualifications on a mortgage application; and finally there was the investor who bought the POS loans without performing their due diligence to ascertain their true risks.

That’s if the original purchases were straightforward and there was no other problems, like an overstated appraisal from a “cooperative” appraiser.

There are plenty of human faces who participated in this process and who fed at this trough. Had Dina’s gamble worked our like her mentor Carlton said it would I doubt there’d be talk of feeling sorry for her right now, despite any of the lying it would have taken to fraudulently enable those profits.

Here’s some compassion – we’re glad that the forces of the market will soon relieve Dina of the mental burden she’s carrying right now. By getting it over quickly she’ll be able to put her pain behind here rather than having to face the long slow bleed only to eventually succumb anyway 5 years from now. With her contaminated credit and her losses behind her she’ll be able to commit her full attention on her day job and thus contribute meaningfully to our society.

As for being “helpful”, I think it’s because of RE brokers and LOs who wanted to “help” Dina that she’s in this mess.

Wait!! I gotta go!! There’s another episode of “Flip this house” on TV right now!!!

[Bugs]

I was under the impression that the Creative Investment Club convened on another website.

There are two homes involved, and we’re apparently not talking about someone whose original motivations were limited to providing shelter for her family. There was apparently a profit motive involved, which moves this conversation in an entirely different direction away from portraying her as the victim.

There isn’t just one human face involved in this problem nor one set of poor decisions – there are several. There’s the loan originator who apparently “qualified” their borrower for far more payment than she could handle; there was the lender who allowed the LO and this borrower to get away with overstating income and other qualifications on a mortgage application; and finally there was the investor who bought the POS loans without performing their due diligence to ascertain their true risks.

That’s if the original purchases were straightforward and there was no other problems, like an overstated appraisal from a “cooperative” appraiser.

There are plenty of human faces who participated in this process and who fed at this trough. Had Dina’s gamble worked our like her mentor Carlton said it would I doubt there’d be talk of feeling sorry for her right now, despite any of the lying it would have taken to fraudulently enable those profits.

Here’s some compassion – we’re glad that the forces of the market will soon relieve Dina of the mental burden she’s carrying right now. By getting it over quickly she’ll be able to put her pain behind here rather than having to face the long slow bleed only to eventually succumb anyway 5 years from now. With her contaminated credit and her losses behind her she’ll be able to commit her full attention on her day job and thus contribute meaningfully to our society.

As for being “helpful”, I think it’s because of RE brokers and LOs who wanted to “help” Dina that she’s in this mess.

Wait!! I gotta go!! There’s another episode of “Flip this house” on TV right now!!!

[Bugs]

I was under the impression that the Creative Investment Club convened on another website.

There are two homes involved, and we’re apparently not talking about someone whose original motivations were limited to providing shelter for her family. There was apparently a profit motive involved, which moves this conversation in an entirely different direction away from portraying her as the victim.

There isn’t just one human face involved in this problem nor one set of poor decisions – there are several. There’s the loan originator who apparently “qualified” their borrower for far more payment than she could handle; there was the lender who allowed the LO and this borrower to get away with overstating income and other qualifications on a mortgage application; and finally there was the investor who bought the POS loans without performing their due diligence to ascertain their true risks.

That’s if the original purchases were straightforward and there was no other problems, like an overstated appraisal from a “cooperative” appraiser.

There are plenty of human faces who participated in this process and who fed at this trough. Had Dina’s gamble worked our like her mentor Carlton said it would I doubt there’d be talk of feeling sorry for her right now, despite any of the lying it would have taken to fraudulently enable those profits.

Here’s some compassion – we’re glad that the forces of the market will soon relieve Dina of the mental burden she’s carrying right now. By getting it over quickly she’ll be able to put her pain behind here rather than having to face the long slow bleed only to eventually succumb anyway 5 years from now. With her contaminated credit and her losses behind her she’ll be able to commit her full attention on her day job and thus contribute meaningfully to our society.

As for being “helpful”, I think it’s because of RE brokers and LOs who wanted to “help” Dina that she’s in this mess.

Wait!! I gotta go!! There’s another episode of “Flip this house” on TV right now!!!

[Bugs]

I read it as two separate houses.

Look at the minor difference in rental rates vs. the major differences in sizes.

[Bugs]

I read it as two separate houses.

Look at the minor difference in rental rates vs. the major differences in sizes.

[Author]

Posts