Time to fire 30% of public employees

[TheBreeze]

[quote=fat_lazy_union_worker]

Suit yourself. You’ll be in the 40ies one day, and one you’ll realize that most people around you are much younger and more productive that you are… I’m not close to that age, but getting there.[/quote]

FLUW, the key is to work smarter, not harder. If a young, go-getter comes into your group you just have to find a way to get credit for his or her work. Have the politically clueless, but hard-working whippersnapper do all the grunt work while you present the finished product or proposal to upper management. This is what all good managers do.

You just have to learn to play the political game. It’s not about how productive you are, it’s about how productive upper management thinks you are. 😉

[an]

[quote=TheBreeze]
FLUW, the key is to work smarter, not harder. If a young, go-getter comes into your group you just have to find a way to get credit for his or her work. Have the politically clueless, but hard-working whippersnapper do all the grunt work while you present the finished product or proposal to upper management. This is what all good managers do.

You just have to learn to play the political game. It’s not about how productive you are, it’s about how productive upper management thinks you are. 😉
[/quote]
The company that doesn’t see through this bureaucratic shenanigan won’t be able to hold onto their top productive employees for very long. The people in my generation have no qualm in leaving for greener pasture at the first sight of middle management BS. We might be idealistic but we can see right through the BS. If middle management want to play those kind of bureaucratic shenanigans, you’ll see us go right across the street to your competitors. If you take a look at Google, most projects are led by people under 30 and sometimes, under 25.

[an]

[quote=TheBreeze]
FLUW, the key is to work smarter, not harder. If a young, go-getter comes into your group you just have to find a way to get credit for his or her work. Have the politically clueless, but hard-working whippersnapper do all the grunt work while you present the finished product or proposal to upper management. This is what all good managers do.

You just have to learn to play the political game. It’s not about how productive you are, it’s about how productive upper management thinks you are. 😉
[/quote]
The company that doesn’t see through this bureaucratic shenanigan won’t be able to hold onto their top productive employees for very long. The people in my generation have no qualm in leaving for greener pasture at the first sight of middle management BS. We might be idealistic but we can see right through the BS. If middle management want to play those kind of bureaucratic shenanigans, you’ll see us go right across the street to your competitors. If you take a look at Google, most projects are led by people under 30 and sometimes, under 25.

[an]

[quote=TheBreeze]
FLUW, the key is to work smarter, not harder. If a young, go-getter comes into your group you just have to find a way to get credit for his or her work. Have the politically clueless, but hard-working whippersnapper do all the grunt work while you present the finished product or proposal to upper management. This is what all good managers do.

You just have to learn to play the political game. It’s not about how productive you are, it’s about how productive upper management thinks you are. 😉
[/quote]
The company that doesn’t see through this bureaucratic shenanigan won’t be able to hold onto their top productive employees for very long. The people in my generation have no qualm in leaving for greener pasture at the first sight of middle management BS. We might be idealistic but we can see right through the BS. If middle management want to play those kind of bureaucratic shenanigans, you’ll see us go right across the street to your competitors. If you take a look at Google, most projects are led by people under 30 and sometimes, under 25.

[an]

[quote=TheBreeze]
FLUW, the key is to work smarter, not harder. If a young, go-getter comes into your group you just have to find a way to get credit for his or her work. Have the politically clueless, but hard-working whippersnapper do all the grunt work while you present the finished product or proposal to upper management. This is what all good managers do.

You just have to learn to play the political game. It’s not about how productive you are, it’s about how productive upper management thinks you are. 😉
[/quote]
The company that doesn’t see through this bureaucratic shenanigan won’t be able to hold onto their top productive employees for very long. The people in my generation have no qualm in leaving for greener pasture at the first sight of middle management BS. We might be idealistic but we can see right through the BS. If middle management want to play those kind of bureaucratic shenanigans, you’ll see us go right across the street to your competitors. If you take a look at Google, most projects are led by people under 30 and sometimes, under 25.

[an]

[quote=TheBreeze]
FLUW, the key is to work smarter, not harder. If a young, go-getter comes into your group you just have to find a way to get credit for his or her work. Have the politically clueless, but hard-working whippersnapper do all the grunt work while you present the finished product or proposal to upper management. This is what all good managers do.

You just have to learn to play the political game. It’s not about how productive you are, it’s about how productive upper management thinks you are. 😉
[/quote]
The company that doesn’t see through this bureaucratic shenanigan won’t be able to hold onto their top productive employees for very long. The people in my generation have no qualm in leaving for greener pasture at the first sight of middle management BS. We might be idealistic but we can see right through the BS. If middle management want to play those kind of bureaucratic shenanigans, you’ll see us go right across the street to your competitors. If you take a look at Google, most projects are led by people under 30 and sometimes, under 25.

[CA renter]

Also, if FNMA and FRE backed off significantly in 2003 and 2004 and didn’t “participate” much in this subprime stuff, then why did we end up having to to nationalize them? Were they that poorly run that even w/out participating much in the “causes” (CDO and CDS) of the bubble, they still fail?
————-
AN,

Yes, they were that poorly run. See my comments about conservatorship (actually, receivership) in 2003/2004. They had major accounting problems and would have been de-listed if not for the “GSE” status they carried.

Here’s what I was referencing about their market share:

6. See OFHEO (2006) and Inside Mortgage Finance Publications (2006). I should also note that in 2003, Fannie and Freddie together accounted for almost 70 percent of all mortgage securitizations and about 75 percent of all mortgage-backed securities outstanding. The GSEs’ market shares of mortgage securitizations and outstanding MBS have fallen since 2003, reflecting the growth of private securitizations. Return to text

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke20070306a.htm

And warnings:

2001

April: The Administration’s FY02 budget declares that the size of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is “a potential problem,” because “financial trouble of a large GSE could cause strong repercussions in financial markets, affecting Federally insured entities and economic activity.” (2002 Budget Analytic Perspectives, pg. 142)
2002

May: The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) calls for the disclosure and corporate governance principles contained in the President’s 10-point plan for corporate responsibility to apply to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. (OMB Prompt Letter to OFHEO, 5/29/02)
2003

February: The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) releases a report explaining that unexpected problems at a GSE could immediately spread into financial sectors beyond the housing market.

September: Then-Treasury Secretary John Snow testifies before the House Financial Services Committee to recommend that Congress enact “legislation to create a new Federal agency to regulate and supervise the financial activities of our housing-related government sponsored enterprises” and set prudent and appropriate minimum capital adequacy requirements.

September: Then-House Financial Services Committee Ranking Member Barney Frank (D-MA) strongly disagrees with the Administration’s assessment, saying “these two entities – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – are not facing any kind of financial crisis … The more people exaggerate these problems, the more pressure there is on these companies, the less we will see in terms of affordable housing.” (Stephen Labaton, “New Agency Proposed To Oversee Freddie Mac And Fannie Mae,” The New York Times, 9/11/03)

October: Senator Thomas Carper (D-DE) refuses to acknowledge any necessity for GSE reforms, saying “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” (Sen. Carper, Hearing of Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 10/16/03)

November: Then-Council of the Economic Advisers (CEA) Chairman Greg Mankiw explains that any “legislation to reform GSE regulation should empower the new regulator with sufficient strength and credibility to reduce systemic risk.” To reduce the potential for systemic instability, the regulator would have “broad authority to set both risk-based and minimum capital standards” and “receivership powers necessary to wind down the affairs of a troubled GSE.” (N. Gregory Mankiw, Remarks At The Conference Of State Bank Supervisors State Banking Summit And Leadership, 11/6/03)

[check the links for more info…there’s lots of juicy bits]

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081009-10.html

[CA renter]

Also, if FNMA and FRE backed off significantly in 2003 and 2004 and didn’t “participate” much in this subprime stuff, then why did we end up having to to nationalize them? Were they that poorly run that even w/out participating much in the “causes” (CDO and CDS) of the bubble, they still fail?
————-
AN,

Yes, they were that poorly run. See my comments about conservatorship (actually, receivership) in 2003/2004. They had major accounting problems and would have been de-listed if not for the “GSE” status they carried.

Here’s what I was referencing about their market share:

6. See OFHEO (2006) and Inside Mortgage Finance Publications (2006). I should also note that in 2003, Fannie and Freddie together accounted for almost 70 percent of all mortgage securitizations and about 75 percent of all mortgage-backed securities outstanding. The GSEs’ market shares of mortgage securitizations and outstanding MBS have fallen since 2003, reflecting the growth of private securitizations. Return to text

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke20070306a.htm

And warnings:

2001

April: The Administration’s FY02 budget declares that the size of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is “a potential problem,” because “financial trouble of a large GSE could cause strong repercussions in financial markets, affecting Federally insured entities and economic activity.” (2002 Budget Analytic Perspectives, pg. 142)
2002

May: The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) calls for the disclosure and corporate governance principles contained in the President’s 10-point plan for corporate responsibility to apply to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. (OMB Prompt Letter to OFHEO, 5/29/02)
2003

February: The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) releases a report explaining that unexpected problems at a GSE could immediately spread into financial sectors beyond the housing market.

September: Then-Treasury Secretary John Snow testifies before the House Financial Services Committee to recommend that Congress enact “legislation to create a new Federal agency to regulate and supervise the financial activities of our housing-related government sponsored enterprises” and set prudent and appropriate minimum capital adequacy requirements.

September: Then-House Financial Services Committee Ranking Member Barney Frank (D-MA) strongly disagrees with the Administration’s assessment, saying “these two entities – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – are not facing any kind of financial crisis … The more people exaggerate these problems, the more pressure there is on these companies, the less we will see in terms of affordable housing.” (Stephen Labaton, “New Agency Proposed To Oversee Freddie Mac And Fannie Mae,” The New York Times, 9/11/03)

October: Senator Thomas Carper (D-DE) refuses to acknowledge any necessity for GSE reforms, saying “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” (Sen. Carper, Hearing of Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 10/16/03)

November: Then-Council of the Economic Advisers (CEA) Chairman Greg Mankiw explains that any “legislation to reform GSE regulation should empower the new regulator with sufficient strength and credibility to reduce systemic risk.” To reduce the potential for systemic instability, the regulator would have “broad authority to set both risk-based and minimum capital standards” and “receivership powers necessary to wind down the affairs of a troubled GSE.” (N. Gregory Mankiw, Remarks At The Conference Of State Bank Supervisors State Banking Summit And Leadership, 11/6/03)

[check the links for more info…there’s lots of juicy bits]

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081009-10.html

[CA renter]

Also, if FNMA and FRE backed off significantly in 2003 and 2004 and didn’t “participate” much in this subprime stuff, then why did we end up having to to nationalize them? Were they that poorly run that even w/out participating much in the “causes” (CDO and CDS) of the bubble, they still fail?
————-
AN,

Yes, they were that poorly run. See my comments about conservatorship (actually, receivership) in 2003/2004. They had major accounting problems and would have been de-listed if not for the “GSE” status they carried.

Here’s what I was referencing about their market share:

6. See OFHEO (2006) and Inside Mortgage Finance Publications (2006). I should also note that in 2003, Fannie and Freddie together accounted for almost 70 percent of all mortgage securitizations and about 75 percent of all mortgage-backed securities outstanding. The GSEs’ market shares of mortgage securitizations and outstanding MBS have fallen since 2003, reflecting the growth of private securitizations. Return to text

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke20070306a.htm

And warnings:

2001

April: The Administration’s FY02 budget declares that the size of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is “a potential problem,” because “financial trouble of a large GSE could cause strong repercussions in financial markets, affecting Federally insured entities and economic activity.” (2002 Budget Analytic Perspectives, pg. 142)
2002

May: The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) calls for the disclosure and corporate governance principles contained in the President’s 10-point plan for corporate responsibility to apply to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. (OMB Prompt Letter to OFHEO, 5/29/02)
2003

February: The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) releases a report explaining that unexpected problems at a GSE could immediately spread into financial sectors beyond the housing market.

September: Then-Treasury Secretary John Snow testifies before the House Financial Services Committee to recommend that Congress enact “legislation to create a new Federal agency to regulate and supervise the financial activities of our housing-related government sponsored enterprises” and set prudent and appropriate minimum capital adequacy requirements.

September: Then-House Financial Services Committee Ranking Member Barney Frank (D-MA) strongly disagrees with the Administration’s assessment, saying “these two entities – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – are not facing any kind of financial crisis … The more people exaggerate these problems, the more pressure there is on these companies, the less we will see in terms of affordable housing.” (Stephen Labaton, “New Agency Proposed To Oversee Freddie Mac And Fannie Mae,” The New York Times, 9/11/03)

October: Senator Thomas Carper (D-DE) refuses to acknowledge any necessity for GSE reforms, saying “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” (Sen. Carper, Hearing of Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 10/16/03)

November: Then-Council of the Economic Advisers (CEA) Chairman Greg Mankiw explains that any “legislation to reform GSE regulation should empower the new regulator with sufficient strength and credibility to reduce systemic risk.” To reduce the potential for systemic instability, the regulator would have “broad authority to set both risk-based and minimum capital standards” and “receivership powers necessary to wind down the affairs of a troubled GSE.” (N. Gregory Mankiw, Remarks At The Conference Of State Bank Supervisors State Banking Summit And Leadership, 11/6/03)

[check the links for more info…there’s lots of juicy bits]

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081009-10.html

[CA renter]

Also, if FNMA and FRE backed off significantly in 2003 and 2004 and didn’t “participate” much in this subprime stuff, then why did we end up having to to nationalize them? Were they that poorly run that even w/out participating much in the “causes” (CDO and CDS) of the bubble, they still fail?
————-
AN,

Yes, they were that poorly run. See my comments about conservatorship (actually, receivership) in 2003/2004. They had major accounting problems and would have been de-listed if not for the “GSE” status they carried.

Here’s what I was referencing about their market share:

6. See OFHEO (2006) and Inside Mortgage Finance Publications (2006). I should also note that in 2003, Fannie and Freddie together accounted for almost 70 percent of all mortgage securitizations and about 75 percent of all mortgage-backed securities outstanding. The GSEs’ market shares of mortgage securitizations and outstanding MBS have fallen since 2003, reflecting the growth of private securitizations. Return to text

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke20070306a.htm

And warnings:

2001

April: The Administration’s FY02 budget declares that the size of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is “a potential problem,” because “financial trouble of a large GSE could cause strong repercussions in financial markets, affecting Federally insured entities and economic activity.” (2002 Budget Analytic Perspectives, pg. 142)
2002

May: The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) calls for the disclosure and corporate governance principles contained in the President’s 10-point plan for corporate responsibility to apply to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. (OMB Prompt Letter to OFHEO, 5/29/02)
2003

February: The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) releases a report explaining that unexpected problems at a GSE could immediately spread into financial sectors beyond the housing market.

September: Then-Treasury Secretary John Snow testifies before the House Financial Services Committee to recommend that Congress enact “legislation to create a new Federal agency to regulate and supervise the financial activities of our housing-related government sponsored enterprises” and set prudent and appropriate minimum capital adequacy requirements.

September: Then-House Financial Services Committee Ranking Member Barney Frank (D-MA) strongly disagrees with the Administration’s assessment, saying “these two entities – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – are not facing any kind of financial crisis … The more people exaggerate these problems, the more pressure there is on these companies, the less we will see in terms of affordable housing.” (Stephen Labaton, “New Agency Proposed To Oversee Freddie Mac And Fannie Mae,” The New York Times, 9/11/03)

October: Senator Thomas Carper (D-DE) refuses to acknowledge any necessity for GSE reforms, saying “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” (Sen. Carper, Hearing of Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 10/16/03)

November: Then-Council of the Economic Advisers (CEA) Chairman Greg Mankiw explains that any “legislation to reform GSE regulation should empower the new regulator with sufficient strength and credibility to reduce systemic risk.” To reduce the potential for systemic instability, the regulator would have “broad authority to set both risk-based and minimum capital standards” and “receivership powers necessary to wind down the affairs of a troubled GSE.” (N. Gregory Mankiw, Remarks At The Conference Of State Bank Supervisors State Banking Summit And Leadership, 11/6/03)

[check the links for more info…there’s lots of juicy bits]

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081009-10.html

[CA renter]

Also, if FNMA and FRE backed off significantly in 2003 and 2004 and didn’t “participate” much in this subprime stuff, then why did we end up having to to nationalize them? Were they that poorly run that even w/out participating much in the “causes” (CDO and CDS) of the bubble, they still fail?
————-
AN,

Yes, they were that poorly run. See my comments about conservatorship (actually, receivership) in 2003/2004. They had major accounting problems and would have been de-listed if not for the “GSE” status they carried.

Here’s what I was referencing about their market share:

6. See OFHEO (2006) and Inside Mortgage Finance Publications (2006). I should also note that in 2003, Fannie and Freddie together accounted for almost 70 percent of all mortgage securitizations and about 75 percent of all mortgage-backed securities outstanding. The GSEs’ market shares of mortgage securitizations and outstanding MBS have fallen since 2003, reflecting the growth of private securitizations. Return to text

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke20070306a.htm

And warnings:

2001

April: The Administration’s FY02 budget declares that the size of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is “a potential problem,” because “financial trouble of a large GSE could cause strong repercussions in financial markets, affecting Federally insured entities and economic activity.” (2002 Budget Analytic Perspectives, pg. 142)
2002

May: The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) calls for the disclosure and corporate governance principles contained in the President’s 10-point plan for corporate responsibility to apply to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. (OMB Prompt Letter to OFHEO, 5/29/02)
2003

February: The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) releases a report explaining that unexpected problems at a GSE could immediately spread into financial sectors beyond the housing market.

September: Then-Treasury Secretary John Snow testifies before the House Financial Services Committee to recommend that Congress enact “legislation to create a new Federal agency to regulate and supervise the financial activities of our housing-related government sponsored enterprises” and set prudent and appropriate minimum capital adequacy requirements.

September: Then-House Financial Services Committee Ranking Member Barney Frank (D-MA) strongly disagrees with the Administration’s assessment, saying “these two entities – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – are not facing any kind of financial crisis … The more people exaggerate these problems, the more pressure there is on these companies, the less we will see in terms of affordable housing.” (Stephen Labaton, “New Agency Proposed To Oversee Freddie Mac And Fannie Mae,” The New York Times, 9/11/03)

October: Senator Thomas Carper (D-DE) refuses to acknowledge any necessity for GSE reforms, saying “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” (Sen. Carper, Hearing of Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 10/16/03)

November: Then-Council of the Economic Advisers (CEA) Chairman Greg Mankiw explains that any “legislation to reform GSE regulation should empower the new regulator with sufficient strength and credibility to reduce systemic risk.” To reduce the potential for systemic instability, the regulator would have “broad authority to set both risk-based and minimum capital standards” and “receivership powers necessary to wind down the affairs of a troubled GSE.” (N. Gregory Mankiw, Remarks At The Conference Of State Bank Supervisors State Banking Summit And Leadership, 11/6/03)

[check the links for more info…there’s lots of juicy bits]

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081009-10.html

[TheBreeze]

[quote=asianautica]
The company that doesn’t see through this bureaucratic shenanigan won’t be able to hold onto their top productive employees for very long. The people in my generation have no qualm in leaving for greener pasture at the first sight of middle management BS. We might be idealistic but we can see right through the BS. If middle management want to play those kind of bureaucratic shenanigans, you’ll see us go right across the street to your competitors. If you take a look at Google, most projects are led by people under 30 and sometimes, under 25.[/quote]

Don’t look now, but Google’s stock has been crashing. 🙂

It doesn’t matter though. Good middle managers don’t want Top Guns who could work for Google. We want socially-awkward grunts who are good at their jobs but not so good at politics. Good middle managers know how to play on the insecurities and inexperience of their grunts to get them to work harder.

And good luck getting another job in this environment. Do you really think you are that valuable? In this market, there are 10 college grads with high GPAs and no experience in playing the political game who are chomping at the bit to take your place. They’ll come in knowing the latest technology and they’ll work cheaper.

Just continue to do as your told and make sure you make your manager look good. Otherwise … you might be forced to take your (possibly self-overrated) talents to another company. 🙂

[TheBreeze]

[quote=asianautica]
The company that doesn’t see through this bureaucratic shenanigan won’t be able to hold onto their top productive employees for very long. The people in my generation have no qualm in leaving for greener pasture at the first sight of middle management BS. We might be idealistic but we can see right through the BS. If middle management want to play those kind of bureaucratic shenanigans, you’ll see us go right across the street to your competitors. If you take a look at Google, most projects are led by people under 30 and sometimes, under 25.[/quote]

Don’t look now, but Google’s stock has been crashing. 🙂

It doesn’t matter though. Good middle managers don’t want Top Guns who could work for Google. We want socially-awkward grunts who are good at their jobs but not so good at politics. Good middle managers know how to play on the insecurities and inexperience of their grunts to get them to work harder.

And good luck getting another job in this environment. Do you really think you are that valuable? In this market, there are 10 college grads with high GPAs and no experience in playing the political game who are chomping at the bit to take your place. They’ll come in knowing the latest technology and they’ll work cheaper.

Just continue to do as your told and make sure you make your manager look good. Otherwise … you might be forced to take your (possibly self-overrated) talents to another company. 🙂

[TheBreeze]

[quote=asianautica]
The company that doesn’t see through this bureaucratic shenanigan won’t be able to hold onto their top productive employees for very long. The people in my generation have no qualm in leaving for greener pasture at the first sight of middle management BS. We might be idealistic but we can see right through the BS. If middle management want to play those kind of bureaucratic shenanigans, you’ll see us go right across the street to your competitors. If you take a look at Google, most projects are led by people under 30 and sometimes, under 25.[/quote]

Don’t look now, but Google’s stock has been crashing. 🙂

It doesn’t matter though. Good middle managers don’t want Top Guns who could work for Google. We want socially-awkward grunts who are good at their jobs but not so good at politics. Good middle managers know how to play on the insecurities and inexperience of their grunts to get them to work harder.

And good luck getting another job in this environment. Do you really think you are that valuable? In this market, there are 10 college grads with high GPAs and no experience in playing the political game who are chomping at the bit to take your place. They’ll come in knowing the latest technology and they’ll work cheaper.

Just continue to do as your told and make sure you make your manager look good. Otherwise … you might be forced to take your (possibly self-overrated) talents to another company. 🙂

[TheBreeze]

[quote=asianautica]
The company that doesn’t see through this bureaucratic shenanigan won’t be able to hold onto their top productive employees for very long. The people in my generation have no qualm in leaving for greener pasture at the first sight of middle management BS. We might be idealistic but we can see right through the BS. If middle management want to play those kind of bureaucratic shenanigans, you’ll see us go right across the street to your competitors. If you take a look at Google, most projects are led by people under 30 and sometimes, under 25.[/quote]

Don’t look now, but Google’s stock has been crashing. 🙂

It doesn’t matter though. Good middle managers don’t want Top Guns who could work for Google. We want socially-awkward grunts who are good at their jobs but not so good at politics. Good middle managers know how to play on the insecurities and inexperience of their grunts to get them to work harder.

And good luck getting another job in this environment. Do you really think you are that valuable? In this market, there are 10 college grads with high GPAs and no experience in playing the political game who are chomping at the bit to take your place. They’ll come in knowing the latest technology and they’ll work cheaper.

Just continue to do as your told and make sure you make your manager look good. Otherwise … you might be forced to take your (possibly self-overrated) talents to another company. 🙂

[Author]

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