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davelj.
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April 5, 2009 at 9:01 PM #377209April 5, 2009 at 9:35 PM #376603
Allan from Fallbrook
ParticipantBreezhnev: Regarding systemic collapse: Not says me, so says the catastrophic near miss we had in 1998 with LTCM. Read Lowenstein’s book “When Genius Failed” and then let’s discuss what a disorderly unwinding would look like and in the midst of a global recession.
This is exactly what I posted before: You throw terms about very cavalierly and without thought as what, “Well, they’re just contracts, let’s tear ’em up!” or “Hell, let’s just let the banking system collapse” really mean. Have you thought either of those ideas through? I mean, seriously, what do you think would happen if the banking system did collapse?
And I’d be a little wary of what some Joe Stiglitz disciple at IMF is saying. Do a little research on Joe and his views and, more importantly, his resume and experiences and then we can talk about how truly objective he is. No, I’m not saying that Paulson or Geithner or Rubin are any better. To the contrary. No one and I mean no one in this has clean skirts. However, and as I opined earlier: Screaming and yelling sure as shit ain’t gonna solve this mess. As for what some financial planner at Sitka Pacific has to say (Shedlock): Yes, he’s knowledgeable and an interesting read, but hardly an authority. We can debate Keynesianism versus Monetarism or discuss von Mises and Rothbard, but what the fuck difference does that make RIGHT NOW?
You want to debate using facts? I’m all for that. I can categorically state and using historical precedent (LTCM, 1998) that a disorderly unwinding of some of the significant portfolios and positions held by “too big to fail” players would trigger a systemic collapse. We were on the verge in 1998 and LTCM was nothing compared to some of these behemoths and the staggering size of their portfolios.
Again, it’s a distinction without difference and there are much bigger issues right in front of us.
April 5, 2009 at 9:35 PM #376881ParticipantBreezhnev: Regarding systemic collapse: Not says me, so says the catastrophic near miss we had in 1998 with LTCM. Read Lowenstein’s book “When Genius Failed” and then let’s discuss what a disorderly unwinding would look like and in the midst of a global recession.
This is exactly what I posted before: You throw terms about very cavalierly and without thought as what, “Well, they’re just contracts, let’s tear ’em up!” or “Hell, let’s just let the banking system collapse” really mean. Have you thought either of those ideas through? I mean, seriously, what do you think would happen if the banking system did collapse?
And I’d be a little wary of what some Joe Stiglitz disciple at IMF is saying. Do a little research on Joe and his views and, more importantly, his resume and experiences and then we can talk about how truly objective he is. No, I’m not saying that Paulson or Geithner or Rubin are any better. To the contrary. No one and I mean no one in this has clean skirts. However, and as I opined earlier: Screaming and yelling sure as shit ain’t gonna solve this mess. As for what some financial planner at Sitka Pacific has to say (Shedlock): Yes, he’s knowledgeable and an interesting read, but hardly an authority. We can debate Keynesianism versus Monetarism or discuss von Mises and Rothbard, but what the fuck difference does that make RIGHT NOW?
You want to debate using facts? I’m all for that. I can categorically state and using historical precedent (LTCM, 1998) that a disorderly unwinding of some of the significant portfolios and positions held by “too big to fail” players would trigger a systemic collapse. We were on the verge in 1998 and LTCM was nothing compared to some of these behemoths and the staggering size of their portfolios.
Again, it’s a distinction without difference and there are much bigger issues right in front of us.
April 5, 2009 at 9:35 PM #377060ParticipantBreezhnev: Regarding systemic collapse: Not says me, so says the catastrophic near miss we had in 1998 with LTCM. Read Lowenstein’s book “When Genius Failed” and then let’s discuss what a disorderly unwinding would look like and in the midst of a global recession.
This is exactly what I posted before: You throw terms about very cavalierly and without thought as what, “Well, they’re just contracts, let’s tear ’em up!” or “Hell, let’s just let the banking system collapse” really mean. Have you thought either of those ideas through? I mean, seriously, what do you think would happen if the banking system did collapse?
And I’d be a little wary of what some Joe Stiglitz disciple at IMF is saying. Do a little research on Joe and his views and, more importantly, his resume and experiences and then we can talk about how truly objective he is. No, I’m not saying that Paulson or Geithner or Rubin are any better. To the contrary. No one and I mean no one in this has clean skirts. However, and as I opined earlier: Screaming and yelling sure as shit ain’t gonna solve this mess. As for what some financial planner at Sitka Pacific has to say (Shedlock): Yes, he’s knowledgeable and an interesting read, but hardly an authority. We can debate Keynesianism versus Monetarism or discuss von Mises and Rothbard, but what the fuck difference does that make RIGHT NOW?
You want to debate using facts? I’m all for that. I can categorically state and using historical precedent (LTCM, 1998) that a disorderly unwinding of some of the significant portfolios and positions held by “too big to fail” players would trigger a systemic collapse. We were on the verge in 1998 and LTCM was nothing compared to some of these behemoths and the staggering size of their portfolios.
Again, it’s a distinction without difference and there are much bigger issues right in front of us.
April 5, 2009 at 9:35 PM #377103ParticipantBreezhnev: Regarding systemic collapse: Not says me, so says the catastrophic near miss we had in 1998 with LTCM. Read Lowenstein’s book “When Genius Failed” and then let’s discuss what a disorderly unwinding would look like and in the midst of a global recession.
This is exactly what I posted before: You throw terms about very cavalierly and without thought as what, “Well, they’re just contracts, let’s tear ’em up!” or “Hell, let’s just let the banking system collapse” really mean. Have you thought either of those ideas through? I mean, seriously, what do you think would happen if the banking system did collapse?
And I’d be a little wary of what some Joe Stiglitz disciple at IMF is saying. Do a little research on Joe and his views and, more importantly, his resume and experiences and then we can talk about how truly objective he is. No, I’m not saying that Paulson or Geithner or Rubin are any better. To the contrary. No one and I mean no one in this has clean skirts. However, and as I opined earlier: Screaming and yelling sure as shit ain’t gonna solve this mess. As for what some financial planner at Sitka Pacific has to say (Shedlock): Yes, he’s knowledgeable and an interesting read, but hardly an authority. We can debate Keynesianism versus Monetarism or discuss von Mises and Rothbard, but what the fuck difference does that make RIGHT NOW?
You want to debate using facts? I’m all for that. I can categorically state and using historical precedent (LTCM, 1998) that a disorderly unwinding of some of the significant portfolios and positions held by “too big to fail” players would trigger a systemic collapse. We were on the verge in 1998 and LTCM was nothing compared to some of these behemoths and the staggering size of their portfolios.
Again, it’s a distinction without difference and there are much bigger issues right in front of us.
April 5, 2009 at 9:35 PM #377225ParticipantBreezhnev: Regarding systemic collapse: Not says me, so says the catastrophic near miss we had in 1998 with LTCM. Read Lowenstein’s book “When Genius Failed” and then let’s discuss what a disorderly unwinding would look like and in the midst of a global recession.
This is exactly what I posted before: You throw terms about very cavalierly and without thought as what, “Well, they’re just contracts, let’s tear ’em up!” or “Hell, let’s just let the banking system collapse” really mean. Have you thought either of those ideas through? I mean, seriously, what do you think would happen if the banking system did collapse?
And I’d be a little wary of what some Joe Stiglitz disciple at IMF is saying. Do a little research on Joe and his views and, more importantly, his resume and experiences and then we can talk about how truly objective he is. No, I’m not saying that Paulson or Geithner or Rubin are any better. To the contrary. No one and I mean no one in this has clean skirts. However, and as I opined earlier: Screaming and yelling sure as shit ain’t gonna solve this mess. As for what some financial planner at Sitka Pacific has to say (Shedlock): Yes, he’s knowledgeable and an interesting read, but hardly an authority. We can debate Keynesianism versus Monetarism or discuss von Mises and Rothbard, but what the fuck difference does that make RIGHT NOW?
You want to debate using facts? I’m all for that. I can categorically state and using historical precedent (LTCM, 1998) that a disorderly unwinding of some of the significant portfolios and positions held by “too big to fail” players would trigger a systemic collapse. We were on the verge in 1998 and LTCM was nothing compared to some of these behemoths and the staggering size of their portfolios.
Again, it’s a distinction without difference and there are much bigger issues right in front of us.
April 5, 2009 at 9:58 PM #376624TheBreeze
Participant[quote=Allan from Fallbrook]You want to debate using facts? I’m all for that. I can categorically state and using historical precedent (LTCM, 1998) that a disorderly unwinding of some of the significant portfolios and positions held by “too big to fail” players would trigger a systemic collapse. We were on the verge in 1998 and LTCM was nothing compared to some of these behemoths and the staggering size of their portfolios.
[/quote]There is only one mention of the term systemic collapse in that book (on page 204):
The banksters debated the likelihood of systemic collapse but got nowhere. It was a parlor topic, not something the banksters wanted to spend $250 million on.
So it doesn’t look like the banksters of that era would agree that we were on the verge of systemic collapse. Nice try, though. Maybe next time use a more obscure reference that isn’t searchable online to make it a little harder for me to debunk your arguments.
Anyway, maybe a collapse of the banking system is what is needed. As Jim Rogers has said, every bank in Russia collapsed in the late 90’s and they pulled through just fine.
April 5, 2009 at 9:58 PM #376904Participant[quote=Allan from Fallbrook]You want to debate using facts? I’m all for that. I can categorically state and using historical precedent (LTCM, 1998) that a disorderly unwinding of some of the significant portfolios and positions held by “too big to fail” players would trigger a systemic collapse. We were on the verge in 1998 and LTCM was nothing compared to some of these behemoths and the staggering size of their portfolios.
[/quote]There is only one mention of the term systemic collapse in that book (on page 204):
The banksters debated the likelihood of systemic collapse but got nowhere. It was a parlor topic, not something the banksters wanted to spend $250 million on.
So it doesn’t look like the banksters of that era would agree that we were on the verge of systemic collapse. Nice try, though. Maybe next time use a more obscure reference that isn’t searchable online to make it a little harder for me to debunk your arguments.
Anyway, maybe a collapse of the banking system is what is needed. As Jim Rogers has said, every bank in Russia collapsed in the late 90’s and they pulled through just fine.
April 5, 2009 at 9:58 PM #377083Participant[quote=Allan from Fallbrook]You want to debate using facts? I’m all for that. I can categorically state and using historical precedent (LTCM, 1998) that a disorderly unwinding of some of the significant portfolios and positions held by “too big to fail” players would trigger a systemic collapse. We were on the verge in 1998 and LTCM was nothing compared to some of these behemoths and the staggering size of their portfolios.
[/quote]There is only one mention of the term systemic collapse in that book (on page 204):
The banksters debated the likelihood of systemic collapse but got nowhere. It was a parlor topic, not something the banksters wanted to spend $250 million on.
So it doesn’t look like the banksters of that era would agree that we were on the verge of systemic collapse. Nice try, though. Maybe next time use a more obscure reference that isn’t searchable online to make it a little harder for me to debunk your arguments.
Anyway, maybe a collapse of the banking system is what is needed. As Jim Rogers has said, every bank in Russia collapsed in the late 90’s and they pulled through just fine.
April 5, 2009 at 9:58 PM #377123Participant[quote=Allan from Fallbrook]You want to debate using facts? I’m all for that. I can categorically state and using historical precedent (LTCM, 1998) that a disorderly unwinding of some of the significant portfolios and positions held by “too big to fail” players would trigger a systemic collapse. We were on the verge in 1998 and LTCM was nothing compared to some of these behemoths and the staggering size of their portfolios.
[/quote]There is only one mention of the term systemic collapse in that book (on page 204):
The banksters debated the likelihood of systemic collapse but got nowhere. It was a parlor topic, not something the banksters wanted to spend $250 million on.
So it doesn’t look like the banksters of that era would agree that we were on the verge of systemic collapse. Nice try, though. Maybe next time use a more obscure reference that isn’t searchable online to make it a little harder for me to debunk your arguments.
Anyway, maybe a collapse of the banking system is what is needed. As Jim Rogers has said, every bank in Russia collapsed in the late 90’s and they pulled through just fine.
April 5, 2009 at 9:58 PM #377246Participant[quote=Allan from Fallbrook]You want to debate using facts? I’m all for that. I can categorically state and using historical precedent (LTCM, 1998) that a disorderly unwinding of some of the significant portfolios and positions held by “too big to fail” players would trigger a systemic collapse. We were on the verge in 1998 and LTCM was nothing compared to some of these behemoths and the staggering size of their portfolios.
[/quote]There is only one mention of the term systemic collapse in that book (on page 204):
The banksters debated the likelihood of systemic collapse but got nowhere. It was a parlor topic, not something the banksters wanted to spend $250 million on.
So it doesn’t look like the banksters of that era would agree that we were on the verge of systemic collapse. Nice try, though. Maybe next time use a more obscure reference that isn’t searchable online to make it a little harder for me to debunk your arguments.
Anyway, maybe a collapse of the banking system is what is needed. As Jim Rogers has said, every bank in Russia collapsed in the late 90’s and they pulled through just fine.
April 6, 2009 at 7:30 AM #376669ParticipantBreezhnev: My God, you really don’t know how to properly argue a point, do you?
Read my paragraph that you have highlighted. Note where I say that we were “on the verge” in 1998 with LTCM and that, given the much, much larger exposure today in terms of size, that we would cause systemic collapse. Can you grasp the nettle and see the distinction?
1998 = close to collapse and with much smaller exposure and far smaller derivatives market.
2009 = collapse due to much larger exposure and far larger market. With me so far?
Using that very same example, Russia’s banking system is nowhere near the size of ours, nor does it have anywhere near the same level of complexity as ours does.
Both examples are apples and oranges and not apples and apples. Sheesh. It’s like not knowing the difference between an investment bank and a commercial bank =).
April 6, 2009 at 7:30 AM #376948ParticipantBreezhnev: My God, you really don’t know how to properly argue a point, do you?
Read my paragraph that you have highlighted. Note where I say that we were “on the verge” in 1998 with LTCM and that, given the much, much larger exposure today in terms of size, that we would cause systemic collapse. Can you grasp the nettle and see the distinction?
1998 = close to collapse and with much smaller exposure and far smaller derivatives market.
2009 = collapse due to much larger exposure and far larger market. With me so far?
Using that very same example, Russia’s banking system is nowhere near the size of ours, nor does it have anywhere near the same level of complexity as ours does.
Both examples are apples and oranges and not apples and apples. Sheesh. It’s like not knowing the difference between an investment bank and a commercial bank =).
April 6, 2009 at 7:30 AM #377127ParticipantBreezhnev: My God, you really don’t know how to properly argue a point, do you?
Read my paragraph that you have highlighted. Note where I say that we were “on the verge” in 1998 with LTCM and that, given the much, much larger exposure today in terms of size, that we would cause systemic collapse. Can you grasp the nettle and see the distinction?
1998 = close to collapse and with much smaller exposure and far smaller derivatives market.
2009 = collapse due to much larger exposure and far larger market. With me so far?
Using that very same example, Russia’s banking system is nowhere near the size of ours, nor does it have anywhere near the same level of complexity as ours does.
Both examples are apples and oranges and not apples and apples. Sheesh. It’s like not knowing the difference between an investment bank and a commercial bank =).
April 6, 2009 at 7:30 AM #377168ParticipantBreezhnev: My God, you really don’t know how to properly argue a point, do you?
Read my paragraph that you have highlighted. Note where I say that we were “on the verge” in 1998 with LTCM and that, given the much, much larger exposure today in terms of size, that we would cause systemic collapse. Can you grasp the nettle and see the distinction?
1998 = close to collapse and with much smaller exposure and far smaller derivatives market.
2009 = collapse due to much larger exposure and far larger market. With me so far?
Using that very same example, Russia’s banking system is nowhere near the size of ours, nor does it have anywhere near the same level of complexity as ours does.
Both examples are apples and oranges and not apples and apples. Sheesh. It’s like not knowing the difference between an investment bank and a commercial bank =).
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