NATO Summit 2008 and a New World Map

[SD Transplant]

One can not help but wonder what the World’s map will look like in the next 50-100 years. This is a tremendous event in our history, and the expension of the EU is making huge progress (post cold war). The old USSR’s small provinces/sattelites are becoming part of the EU and the defence shield is expending.

The question is if Putin will buy into it or not (based on the fist impressions – Russia won’t agree with the expansion). Anyone care to comment (the piggs with military backgrounds have a more detail prospective)

http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL0380614120080403

[Eugene]

Russia is extremely unhappy about this expansion. They don’t have much of an army any more (it’s undertrained and underequipped by Western standards), so there is little they can do military-wise. They do have a few thousand nukes aimed at the United States and the EU but I don’t see those being used unless things deteriorate much further.

Former Soviet republics / satellites need friendly Russia as a trade partner much more than they need NATO or EU membership. Ukraine and Georgia do a lot of business with Russia. They are essentially shooting themselves in the foot out of nationalist/anti-Russian sentiment. Ukraine, for example, depends a lot on Russian oil and natural gas. If they do join NATO, Russia can, and probably will, refuse to sell them gas at any price. For a country at the latitude of Alberta with no oil or gas of their own, that would be fatal.

The defense shield is mostly a symbolic issue. Missile interceptors and radar stations in Eastern Europe can’t possibly be used as a protection against Russian nukes.
First of all, there are way too many of them. The system in its current state is lucky to intercept one or two ballistic missiles. It would have a snowflakes chance in hell of stopping a nuclear war.
More importantly, Russian ICBM trajectories don’t even pass over Eastern Europe. Washington DC-bound ICBM from Siberia would fly over Svalbard, Greenland, and Quebec.

[Eugene]

Russia is extremely unhappy about this expansion. They don’t have much of an army any more (it’s undertrained and underequipped by Western standards), so there is little they can do military-wise. They do have a few thousand nukes aimed at the United States and the EU but I don’t see those being used unless things deteriorate much further.

Former Soviet republics / satellites need friendly Russia as a trade partner much more than they need NATO or EU membership. Ukraine and Georgia do a lot of business with Russia. They are essentially shooting themselves in the foot out of nationalist/anti-Russian sentiment. Ukraine, for example, depends a lot on Russian oil and natural gas. If they do join NATO, Russia can, and probably will, refuse to sell them gas at any price. For a country at the latitude of Alberta with no oil or gas of their own, that would be fatal.

The defense shield is mostly a symbolic issue. Missile interceptors and radar stations in Eastern Europe can’t possibly be used as a protection against Russian nukes.
First of all, there are way too many of them. The system in its current state is lucky to intercept one or two ballistic missiles. It would have a snowflakes chance in hell of stopping a nuclear war.
More importantly, Russian ICBM trajectories don’t even pass over Eastern Europe. Washington DC-bound ICBM from Siberia would fly over Svalbard, Greenland, and Quebec.

[Eugene]

Russia is extremely unhappy about this expansion. They don’t have much of an army any more (it’s undertrained and underequipped by Western standards), so there is little they can do military-wise. They do have a few thousand nukes aimed at the United States and the EU but I don’t see those being used unless things deteriorate much further.

Former Soviet republics / satellites need friendly Russia as a trade partner much more than they need NATO or EU membership. Ukraine and Georgia do a lot of business with Russia. They are essentially shooting themselves in the foot out of nationalist/anti-Russian sentiment. Ukraine, for example, depends a lot on Russian oil and natural gas. If they do join NATO, Russia can, and probably will, refuse to sell them gas at any price. For a country at the latitude of Alberta with no oil or gas of their own, that would be fatal.

The defense shield is mostly a symbolic issue. Missile interceptors and radar stations in Eastern Europe can’t possibly be used as a protection against Russian nukes.
First of all, there are way too many of them. The system in its current state is lucky to intercept one or two ballistic missiles. It would have a snowflakes chance in hell of stopping a nuclear war.
More importantly, Russian ICBM trajectories don’t even pass over Eastern Europe. Washington DC-bound ICBM from Siberia would fly over Svalbard, Greenland, and Quebec.

[Eugene]

Russia is extremely unhappy about this expansion. They don’t have much of an army any more (it’s undertrained and underequipped by Western standards), so there is little they can do military-wise. They do have a few thousand nukes aimed at the United States and the EU but I don’t see those being used unless things deteriorate much further.

Former Soviet republics / satellites need friendly Russia as a trade partner much more than they need NATO or EU membership. Ukraine and Georgia do a lot of business with Russia. They are essentially shooting themselves in the foot out of nationalist/anti-Russian sentiment. Ukraine, for example, depends a lot on Russian oil and natural gas. If they do join NATO, Russia can, and probably will, refuse to sell them gas at any price. For a country at the latitude of Alberta with no oil or gas of their own, that would be fatal.

The defense shield is mostly a symbolic issue. Missile interceptors and radar stations in Eastern Europe can’t possibly be used as a protection against Russian nukes.
First of all, there are way too many of them. The system in its current state is lucky to intercept one or two ballistic missiles. It would have a snowflakes chance in hell of stopping a nuclear war.
More importantly, Russian ICBM trajectories don’t even pass over Eastern Europe. Washington DC-bound ICBM from Siberia would fly over Svalbard, Greenland, and Quebec.

[Eugene]

Russia is extremely unhappy about this expansion. They don’t have much of an army any more (it’s undertrained and underequipped by Western standards), so there is little they can do military-wise. They do have a few thousand nukes aimed at the United States and the EU but I don’t see those being used unless things deteriorate much further.

Former Soviet republics / satellites need friendly Russia as a trade partner much more than they need NATO or EU membership. Ukraine and Georgia do a lot of business with Russia. They are essentially shooting themselves in the foot out of nationalist/anti-Russian sentiment. Ukraine, for example, depends a lot on Russian oil and natural gas. If they do join NATO, Russia can, and probably will, refuse to sell them gas at any price. For a country at the latitude of Alberta with no oil or gas of their own, that would be fatal.

The defense shield is mostly a symbolic issue. Missile interceptors and radar stations in Eastern Europe can’t possibly be used as a protection against Russian nukes.
First of all, there are way too many of them. The system in its current state is lucky to intercept one or two ballistic missiles. It would have a snowflakes chance in hell of stopping a nuclear war.
More importantly, Russian ICBM trajectories don’t even pass over Eastern Europe. Washington DC-bound ICBM from Siberia would fly over Svalbard, Greenland, and Quebec.

[svelte]

Slowly but surely, as countries form closer alliances (ie, EU) and technology/trade makes us more interdependent due to the ease of travel, we are taking the first baby steps towards becoming a globe with one governing body.

It may take 100 years or even more, but we are heading in that direction. As John Lennon would say, Imagine.

[svelte]

Slowly but surely, as countries form closer alliances (ie, EU) and technology/trade makes us more interdependent due to the ease of travel, we are taking the first baby steps towards becoming a globe with one governing body.

It may take 100 years or even more, but we are heading in that direction. As John Lennon would say, Imagine.

[svelte]

Slowly but surely, as countries form closer alliances (ie, EU) and technology/trade makes us more interdependent due to the ease of travel, we are taking the first baby steps towards becoming a globe with one governing body.

It may take 100 years or even more, but we are heading in that direction. As John Lennon would say, Imagine.

[svelte]

Slowly but surely, as countries form closer alliances (ie, EU) and technology/trade makes us more interdependent due to the ease of travel, we are taking the first baby steps towards becoming a globe with one governing body.

It may take 100 years or even more, but we are heading in that direction. As John Lennon would say, Imagine.

[svelte]

Slowly but surely, as countries form closer alliances (ie, EU) and technology/trade makes us more interdependent due to the ease of travel, we are taking the first baby steps towards becoming a globe with one governing body.

It may take 100 years or even more, but we are heading in that direction. As John Lennon would say, Imagine.

[Sandi Egan]

The defense shield is mostly a symbolic issue. Missile interceptors and radar stations in Eastern Europe can’t possibly be used as a protection against Russian nukes.

I’ve read a Russian general’s opinion on this, which explains why hey are so pissed with just 10 interceptors. I don’t know how much of it is factual, but at least it explains their position.

—-
As you noted, there is no way to stop thousands of nukes with this shield. The only scenario when the shield against Russia does make sense is when most of Russian ICBMs are already destroyed.
Since the invention of spy satellites the location of strategic missile silos of the all countries is largely not a secret. If US uses nuclear submarines to attack Russian ballistic missile silos, Russian retaliation options will be limited to a few mobile ICBMs. And then the proposed shield in Eastern Europe becomes highly effective: it can intercept up to 10 ICBMs on early stages, before they split into warheads (could be 200 warheads in 10 missiles).
Any US domestic anti-missile defense has to deal with individual warheads. Even 10 ICBMs if allowed to leave Europe are a very serious danger, since realistically it’s not possible to stop even half of the 200 warheads heading towards US cities and military installations.
Also, once the shield is in place, nothing will stop NATO from turning 10 interceptor missiles into 50 in a very short time.
So basically the only scenario when this shield is useful against Russia is during an offensive strike, greatly increasing chances for such a strike to go unpunished.

[Sandi Egan]

The defense shield is mostly a symbolic issue. Missile interceptors and radar stations in Eastern Europe can’t possibly be used as a protection against Russian nukes.

I’ve read a Russian general’s opinion on this, which explains why hey are so pissed with just 10 interceptors. I don’t know how much of it is factual, but at least it explains their position.

—-
As you noted, there is no way to stop thousands of nukes with this shield. The only scenario when the shield against Russia does make sense is when most of Russian ICBMs are already destroyed.
Since the invention of spy satellites the location of strategic missile silos of the all countries is largely not a secret. If US uses nuclear submarines to attack Russian ballistic missile silos, Russian retaliation options will be limited to a few mobile ICBMs. And then the proposed shield in Eastern Europe becomes highly effective: it can intercept up to 10 ICBMs on early stages, before they split into warheads (could be 200 warheads in 10 missiles).
Any US domestic anti-missile defense has to deal with individual warheads. Even 10 ICBMs if allowed to leave Europe are a very serious danger, since realistically it’s not possible to stop even half of the 200 warheads heading towards US cities and military installations.
Also, once the shield is in place, nothing will stop NATO from turning 10 interceptor missiles into 50 in a very short time.
So basically the only scenario when this shield is useful against Russia is during an offensive strike, greatly increasing chances for such a strike to go unpunished.

[Sandi Egan]

The defense shield is mostly a symbolic issue. Missile interceptors and radar stations in Eastern Europe can’t possibly be used as a protection against Russian nukes.

I’ve read a Russian general’s opinion on this, which explains why hey are so pissed with just 10 interceptors. I don’t know how much of it is factual, but at least it explains their position.

—-
As you noted, there is no way to stop thousands of nukes with this shield. The only scenario when the shield against Russia does make sense is when most of Russian ICBMs are already destroyed.
Since the invention of spy satellites the location of strategic missile silos of the all countries is largely not a secret. If US uses nuclear submarines to attack Russian ballistic missile silos, Russian retaliation options will be limited to a few mobile ICBMs. And then the proposed shield in Eastern Europe becomes highly effective: it can intercept up to 10 ICBMs on early stages, before they split into warheads (could be 200 warheads in 10 missiles).
Any US domestic anti-missile defense has to deal with individual warheads. Even 10 ICBMs if allowed to leave Europe are a very serious danger, since realistically it’s not possible to stop even half of the 200 warheads heading towards US cities and military installations.
Also, once the shield is in place, nothing will stop NATO from turning 10 interceptor missiles into 50 in a very short time.
So basically the only scenario when this shield is useful against Russia is during an offensive strike, greatly increasing chances for such a strike to go unpunished.

[Sandi Egan]

The defense shield is mostly a symbolic issue. Missile interceptors and radar stations in Eastern Europe can’t possibly be used as a protection against Russian nukes.

I’ve read a Russian general’s opinion on this, which explains why hey are so pissed with just 10 interceptors. I don’t know how much of it is factual, but at least it explains their position.

—-
As you noted, there is no way to stop thousands of nukes with this shield. The only scenario when the shield against Russia does make sense is when most of Russian ICBMs are already destroyed.
Since the invention of spy satellites the location of strategic missile silos of the all countries is largely not a secret. If US uses nuclear submarines to attack Russian ballistic missile silos, Russian retaliation options will be limited to a few mobile ICBMs. And then the proposed shield in Eastern Europe becomes highly effective: it can intercept up to 10 ICBMs on early stages, before they split into warheads (could be 200 warheads in 10 missiles).
Any US domestic anti-missile defense has to deal with individual warheads. Even 10 ICBMs if allowed to leave Europe are a very serious danger, since realistically it’s not possible to stop even half of the 200 warheads heading towards US cities and military installations.
Also, once the shield is in place, nothing will stop NATO from turning 10 interceptor missiles into 50 in a very short time.
So basically the only scenario when this shield is useful against Russia is during an offensive strike, greatly increasing chances for such a strike to go unpunished.

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