I don’t get it!

[scaredyclassic]

stop making sense.

[moneymaker]

Ok makes sense now,took so long getting here I forgot all about inflation as I’m sure others have as well.

[moneymaker]

Ok makes sense now,took so long getting here I forgot all about inflation as I’m sure others have as well.

[moneymaker]

Ok makes sense now,took so long getting here I forgot all about inflation as I’m sure others have as well.

[moneymaker]

Ok makes sense now,took so long getting here I forgot all about inflation as I’m sure others have as well.

[moneymaker]

Ok makes sense now,took so long getting here I forgot all about inflation as I’m sure others have as well.

[SD Transplant]

Today’s news were pretty much in relation to a solutions to the Greek problem, right?

So, what use to be PIGS(Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain), it is now PIS, if u kindly drop the “G” :).

the solution = PIS

[SD Transplant]

Today’s news were pretty much in relation to a solutions to the Greek problem, right?

So, what use to be PIGS(Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain), it is now PIS, if u kindly drop the “G” :).

the solution = PIS

[SD Transplant]

Today’s news were pretty much in relation to a solutions to the Greek problem, right?

So, what use to be PIGS(Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain), it is now PIS, if u kindly drop the “G” :).

the solution = PIS

[SD Transplant]

Today’s news were pretty much in relation to a solutions to the Greek problem, right?

So, what use to be PIGS(Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain), it is now PIS, if u kindly drop the “G” :).

the solution = PIS

[SD Transplant]

Today’s news were pretty much in relation to a solutions to the Greek problem, right?

So, what use to be PIGS(Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain), it is now PIS, if u kindly drop the “G” :).

the solution = PIS

[Nor-LA-SD-guy]

OK for you Guy’s with the fully stocked Bomb shelters I summit this:

Will the Argentine experience be repeated in Greece? == California ???

In 1999, the Argentine economy entered into a severe recession that coincided with various recessions and financial crises around the world, a state of affairs that exacerbated the problems in Argentina. A series of multi-billion-dollar financial “rescue packages” orchestrated by the IMF, World Bank, and the US Treasury — all of which involved financing to roll over the existing stock of debt and to finance new deficits, in exchange for various austerity measures including spending cuts and tax increases — culminated in full-blown financial panic, economic depression, social emergency, and political crisis in the 2001-2002 period.

Ingrained culture of fiscal indiscipline.
Prior to adoption of the hard currency regime, Argentina had been a nation characterized, from its very inception at independence, by its fiscal indiscipline. Historically, chronic deficit spending and debt accumulation was followed by monetary expansion to pay off the deficits and debt, resulting in massive episodes of inflation and devaluation of the currency. The Greek culture of fiscal indiscipline, prior to the inception of the euro, is virtually identical to that of Argentina.

. Large sectors of the population unwilling to sacrifice; ready and able to mobilize against regime.
In Argentina, populist and nationalist groups railed against the terms of the austerity plans. As the recession worsened, massive violent demonstrations erupted. The government fell. Then another government fell. Financial panic ensued, making the recession even worse. In Greece, there is every indication that much of the population is unwilling to undergo the hardships implied by an austerity program. As in Argentina, history indicates that labor unions and other groups in Greece are willing and able to mobilize violently in order to bring about social and political chaos and hold the nation hostage.

How Did the Situation in Argentina End?
Not too well. Economic depression, mass insolvencies, bank runs, forced seizure of deposits, unemployment and underemployment exceeding 40%, blood in the streets, a fall of the government, a complete reneging of the terms of the “rescue packages,” an abandonment of the hard currency monetary regime, a mega-devaluation, and a massive default of foreign debt obligations.
Can Greece escape this same fate?
There are no two situations that are exactly alike, but the similarities of the Greek and Argentine situations are striking.
Interestingly, one difference is that Greek levels of deficits and debt are between two and three times as great as they were in Argentina. In principle this would seem to make the situation in Greece even worse. However, this demonstrates that there is no particular amount of deficits or debt that triggers a debt crisis. What triggers a crisis is more a product of psychology on the part of those that finance the deficits and debt.
In this regard, perhaps the main difference that I can detect between the Argentine and Greek situations is that EU nations have a vital stake in avoiding a Greek meltdown and abandonment of the currency regime to an extent that the international community and the US did not in the Argentine case. This “community of interests” could result in more aggressive and intelligent forms of assistance on the part of EU members towards Greece.
Thus far, however, I’m not seeing any evidence of such urgency or intelligence. Up until now, it’s looking like a repeat of the same old story.

I think if we go Double hmm maybe

[Nor-LA-SD-guy]

OK for you Guy’s with the fully stocked Bomb shelters I summit this:

Will the Argentine experience be repeated in Greece? == California ???

In 1999, the Argentine economy entered into a severe recession that coincided with various recessions and financial crises around the world, a state of affairs that exacerbated the problems in Argentina. A series of multi-billion-dollar financial “rescue packages” orchestrated by the IMF, World Bank, and the US Treasury — all of which involved financing to roll over the existing stock of debt and to finance new deficits, in exchange for various austerity measures including spending cuts and tax increases — culminated in full-blown financial panic, economic depression, social emergency, and political crisis in the 2001-2002 period.

Ingrained culture of fiscal indiscipline.
Prior to adoption of the hard currency regime, Argentina had been a nation characterized, from its very inception at independence, by its fiscal indiscipline. Historically, chronic deficit spending and debt accumulation was followed by monetary expansion to pay off the deficits and debt, resulting in massive episodes of inflation and devaluation of the currency. The Greek culture of fiscal indiscipline, prior to the inception of the euro, is virtually identical to that of Argentina.

. Large sectors of the population unwilling to sacrifice; ready and able to mobilize against regime.
In Argentina, populist and nationalist groups railed against the terms of the austerity plans. As the recession worsened, massive violent demonstrations erupted. The government fell. Then another government fell. Financial panic ensued, making the recession even worse. In Greece, there is every indication that much of the population is unwilling to undergo the hardships implied by an austerity program. As in Argentina, history indicates that labor unions and other groups in Greece are willing and able to mobilize violently in order to bring about social and political chaos and hold the nation hostage.

How Did the Situation in Argentina End?
Not too well. Economic depression, mass insolvencies, bank runs, forced seizure of deposits, unemployment and underemployment exceeding 40%, blood in the streets, a fall of the government, a complete reneging of the terms of the “rescue packages,” an abandonment of the hard currency monetary regime, a mega-devaluation, and a massive default of foreign debt obligations.
Can Greece escape this same fate?
There are no two situations that are exactly alike, but the similarities of the Greek and Argentine situations are striking.
Interestingly, one difference is that Greek levels of deficits and debt are between two and three times as great as they were in Argentina. In principle this would seem to make the situation in Greece even worse. However, this demonstrates that there is no particular amount of deficits or debt that triggers a debt crisis. What triggers a crisis is more a product of psychology on the part of those that finance the deficits and debt.
In this regard, perhaps the main difference that I can detect between the Argentine and Greek situations is that EU nations have a vital stake in avoiding a Greek meltdown and abandonment of the currency regime to an extent that the international community and the US did not in the Argentine case. This “community of interests” could result in more aggressive and intelligent forms of assistance on the part of EU members towards Greece.
Thus far, however, I’m not seeing any evidence of such urgency or intelligence. Up until now, it’s looking like a repeat of the same old story.

I think if we go Double hmm maybe

[Nor-LA-SD-guy]

OK for you Guy’s with the fully stocked Bomb shelters I summit this:

Will the Argentine experience be repeated in Greece? == California ???

In 1999, the Argentine economy entered into a severe recession that coincided with various recessions and financial crises around the world, a state of affairs that exacerbated the problems in Argentina. A series of multi-billion-dollar financial “rescue packages” orchestrated by the IMF, World Bank, and the US Treasury — all of which involved financing to roll over the existing stock of debt and to finance new deficits, in exchange for various austerity measures including spending cuts and tax increases — culminated in full-blown financial panic, economic depression, social emergency, and political crisis in the 2001-2002 period.

Ingrained culture of fiscal indiscipline.
Prior to adoption of the hard currency regime, Argentina had been a nation characterized, from its very inception at independence, by its fiscal indiscipline. Historically, chronic deficit spending and debt accumulation was followed by monetary expansion to pay off the deficits and debt, resulting in massive episodes of inflation and devaluation of the currency. The Greek culture of fiscal indiscipline, prior to the inception of the euro, is virtually identical to that of Argentina.

. Large sectors of the population unwilling to sacrifice; ready and able to mobilize against regime.
In Argentina, populist and nationalist groups railed against the terms of the austerity plans. As the recession worsened, massive violent demonstrations erupted. The government fell. Then another government fell. Financial panic ensued, making the recession even worse. In Greece, there is every indication that much of the population is unwilling to undergo the hardships implied by an austerity program. As in Argentina, history indicates that labor unions and other groups in Greece are willing and able to mobilize violently in order to bring about social and political chaos and hold the nation hostage.

How Did the Situation in Argentina End?
Not too well. Economic depression, mass insolvencies, bank runs, forced seizure of deposits, unemployment and underemployment exceeding 40%, blood in the streets, a fall of the government, a complete reneging of the terms of the “rescue packages,” an abandonment of the hard currency monetary regime, a mega-devaluation, and a massive default of foreign debt obligations.
Can Greece escape this same fate?
There are no two situations that are exactly alike, but the similarities of the Greek and Argentine situations are striking.
Interestingly, one difference is that Greek levels of deficits and debt are between two and three times as great as they were in Argentina. In principle this would seem to make the situation in Greece even worse. However, this demonstrates that there is no particular amount of deficits or debt that triggers a debt crisis. What triggers a crisis is more a product of psychology on the part of those that finance the deficits and debt.
In this regard, perhaps the main difference that I can detect between the Argentine and Greek situations is that EU nations have a vital stake in avoiding a Greek meltdown and abandonment of the currency regime to an extent that the international community and the US did not in the Argentine case. This “community of interests” could result in more aggressive and intelligent forms of assistance on the part of EU members towards Greece.
Thus far, however, I’m not seeing any evidence of such urgency or intelligence. Up until now, it’s looking like a repeat of the same old story.

I think if we go Double hmm maybe

[Nor-LA-SD-guy]

OK for you Guy’s with the fully stocked Bomb shelters I summit this:

Will the Argentine experience be repeated in Greece? == California ???

In 1999, the Argentine economy entered into a severe recession that coincided with various recessions and financial crises around the world, a state of affairs that exacerbated the problems in Argentina. A series of multi-billion-dollar financial “rescue packages” orchestrated by the IMF, World Bank, and the US Treasury — all of which involved financing to roll over the existing stock of debt and to finance new deficits, in exchange for various austerity measures including spending cuts and tax increases — culminated in full-blown financial panic, economic depression, social emergency, and political crisis in the 2001-2002 period.

Ingrained culture of fiscal indiscipline.
Prior to adoption of the hard currency regime, Argentina had been a nation characterized, from its very inception at independence, by its fiscal indiscipline. Historically, chronic deficit spending and debt accumulation was followed by monetary expansion to pay off the deficits and debt, resulting in massive episodes of inflation and devaluation of the currency. The Greek culture of fiscal indiscipline, prior to the inception of the euro, is virtually identical to that of Argentina.

. Large sectors of the population unwilling to sacrifice; ready and able to mobilize against regime.
In Argentina, populist and nationalist groups railed against the terms of the austerity plans. As the recession worsened, massive violent demonstrations erupted. The government fell. Then another government fell. Financial panic ensued, making the recession even worse. In Greece, there is every indication that much of the population is unwilling to undergo the hardships implied by an austerity program. As in Argentina, history indicates that labor unions and other groups in Greece are willing and able to mobilize violently in order to bring about social and political chaos and hold the nation hostage.

How Did the Situation in Argentina End?
Not too well. Economic depression, mass insolvencies, bank runs, forced seizure of deposits, unemployment and underemployment exceeding 40%, blood in the streets, a fall of the government, a complete reneging of the terms of the “rescue packages,” an abandonment of the hard currency monetary regime, a mega-devaluation, and a massive default of foreign debt obligations.
Can Greece escape this same fate?
There are no two situations that are exactly alike, but the similarities of the Greek and Argentine situations are striking.
Interestingly, one difference is that Greek levels of deficits and debt are between two and three times as great as they were in Argentina. In principle this would seem to make the situation in Greece even worse. However, this demonstrates that there is no particular amount of deficits or debt that triggers a debt crisis. What triggers a crisis is more a product of psychology on the part of those that finance the deficits and debt.
In this regard, perhaps the main difference that I can detect between the Argentine and Greek situations is that EU nations have a vital stake in avoiding a Greek meltdown and abandonment of the currency regime to an extent that the international community and the US did not in the Argentine case. This “community of interests” could result in more aggressive and intelligent forms of assistance on the part of EU members towards Greece.
Thus far, however, I’m not seeing any evidence of such urgency or intelligence. Up until now, it’s looking like a repeat of the same old story.

I think if we go Double hmm maybe

[Author]

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