This is old news. The capability to validate security has been around since the beginning of SSL.
The security requirements in the EV-certificate 2008 CPS are (except for minor differences in the legalese used to express them) practically identical to the requirements for Class 3 certificates listed in Verisign’s version 1.0 CPS from 1996. EV certificates simply roll back the clock to the approach that had already failed the first time it was tried in 1996, resetting the shifting baseline and charging 1996 prices as a side-effect.
from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Validation_Certificate. It really does not add anything, and may subtract things. One of the problems in the past has been with man in the middle attacks (which is the what is described in your link). There have been two issues leading up to those attacks:
1) For years, Internet explorer did not check the full certificate keychain. It would just check that it had a cert and not that the cert belonged to the website being accessed.
2) Certain 3 letter snooping agencies have negotiated with top level signatories for the purpose of getting a cert. This is why checking the full keychain is important.
One thing to note: because the certain 3 letter snooping agencies are negotiating with the CA (Certificate Authorities), they will also be able to negotiate access to the extended certs as well.
By the way, it is possible to access the top level certs in your browser and add or delete CAs as you feel necessary.
