“I have found that even with recourse loans on some short sales, people are getting the deficiencies forgiven.”
“We’ve done this in Las Vegas with 3 short sales since November of 2007. The homeowner never went late, preserved their credit and successfully sold their homes on short sale.”
I read this, and thought about the whole debate over moral hazard and the economic sense behind allowing home purchases with less than, say, 30% of the borrower’s own money at risk.
I don’t think there are many, if any, Piggingtons who have savings who would volunteer to lend a significant portion of those savings to borrowers if those borrowers get to keep most of the winnings if home prices go up, and hand back most of the losses if home prices go down. Especially not if there is forgiveness of debt on recourse loans, and only minor or short-term credit damage for the borrowers when they walk away.
Almost all the money put at risk in buying homes in the last few motnhs has been from taxpayers. Adding FHLB lending, FHA guarantees, and implicit FNMA and Freddie Mac guarantees, virtually all the risk in new home loan lending is now borne by taxpayers. With moral hazard reaching the levels described by SDR and Deal Hunter, it is hard to see savvy private investors replacing the govt role for the next generation or two. It seems that taxpayers have been drafted to be the sole supporter of inflated home prices for the foreseeable future.
Has any mainstream economist with broad credibility done a good job of analyzing the real economic damage of such a massive move away from the free enterprise system? Right now, everyone in a position of authority seems to support the notion that it’s better to feed the long-term hazard to starve the short-term recession beast. Only a few peripheral “nut-jobs” say otherwise.
