1) The avionics warned “stall stall stall” something like 75 times. Yet the word never came up in the cockpit conversation. Language issue? Sensory overload? Was it an issue that they didn’t “believe” the warning? If you truly internalized “stall” the recovery actions would have been more obvious.
2) Perhaps the root issue really was that the other pilots didn’t know what was going on with the right hand sidestick. Make that more obvious? You could say “detect conflicts between left and right” but that won’t be enough. In a disciplined cockpit only one pilot will “have the controls” at a time, which was generally the case here. They handed off verbally. The problem was when the right hand guy was in control the inputs were improper. How to detect that – even *more* software and alarms? Difficult situation. Yes there was a time when left and right pilots were both controlling but that was only a small portion of the accident, near the end, as I understand it.
3) I’m not sure there’s an angle of attack indicator in that aircraft. Others on this board may know. But even if the cockpit said “angle of attack, angle of attack, angle of attack”, they were ignoring the other warning that said “Stall”.
4) Even though it was mentioned above that “they were descending at 10000ft/min, they knew what was going on”, the popular mechanics article said they “incredibly” were debating whether they were descending.
5) When envisioning this accident, keep in mind this was at night over the middle of the ocean, in a storm. Probably no visual references whatsover. No horizon.
6) We can blame it on the “stupid guy in the right hand seat”, but I guess you could have a guy with a brain fart in the left hand seat. What to do? Averaging the inputs won’t be enough. Difficult problem.
